221. Editorial Note
The Special Group charged with responsibility for Operation Mongoose (see Document 200) met on August 10, 1962. According to a chronology of Director of Central Intelligence McConeʼs positions concerning Cuba, prepared for him 2# months later, McCone maintained at the meeting that “the Soviets will not let Cuba fail” and that, to prevent such a failure, they would supplement conventional military aid with medium-range ballistic missiles. McCone confirmed that aspect of the discussion in a memorandum for the record he prepared on October 31. For more information, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume X, pages 923–924.
The National Board of Estimates reviewed “The Soviet Stake in Cuba” in a memorandum of August 15, stating: “Cuba could be used by the USSR as a military base from which to threaten the US. With the growth of Soviet strategic capabilities, however, installations on Cuba would add little to the weight of attack which the Soviets could direct against the US. The USSRʼs chief motive for the establishment of, for example, a medium-range missile base on Cuba would therefore be to deter an anticipated US military intervention against Castro. The USSR almost certainly recognizes, however, that such an undertaking would be as likely to provoke as to deter American intervention.” The memorandum continued: “Most important of all, by such an act the Soviets would firmly commit themselves to the military protection of Cuba, a step which they have thus far refrained from taking and which, we believe, they will continue to avoid.” For text, see ibid., pages 941–943.