217. Telegram From the Embassy in Denmark to the Department of State0
76. For the Secretary from Ambassador Thompson.1 Reflecting upon my talk with Khrushchev have following conclusions:
- (1)
-
Am more convinced than ever that he at least does not intend push Berlin question to point of real risk of war. Much will depend, however, upon attitude his colleagues and allies as well as upon how we handle the matter. Believe line taken by President and your representation of our case at Geneva was just right but suggest we must be extremely careful on the one hand to show we are serious in our determination to defend Berlin and on other to avoid engaging their prestige particularly in the military field as they are unbelievably sensitive about this. I think, for example, we should for the present play down any boasts about our military superiority and in Berlin itself avoid any action that could be considered by them as annoyance on our part. At same time we should proceed vigorously with contingency planning which they will know about but without publicity.
I believe Khrushchev is likely to bring Berlin problem before U.N and probably will personally present Soviet case. Suggest we should be thinking about how to prevent neutrals from proposing compromise solutions unacceptable to us and from giving him impression he can proceed with his plans with strong support from world opinion. I have some thoughts on this to put before you upon my return.
- (2)
- Even if we are willing to give up insistence upon having control posts inside Soviet Union I do not think Khrushchev will agree to more than one or two verifications of test ban a year and probably none. He is obsessed with idea we want to locate his missiles but probably more important he wants to conceal his relative weakness.
- (3)
- The mere fact that Khrushchev asserted he could achieve his seven year plan without disarmament convinces me that the opposite is the case but I doubt that we will get anywhere on real disarmament at this time. I got impression, however, that Khrushchev will be prepared seriously to consider steps to prevent war by accident or miscalculation. If we can get over the Berlin hump and then let him know our intelligence capabilities we might make progress on GCD.