212. Editorial Note
At 4 p.m. on July 12, 1962, Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary of State Rusk discussed Germany, Berlin, and other topics at the Secretaryʼs Office. For text of the memorandum of their conversation on Berlin and Germany, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XV, pages 215–222. During the discussion on Berlin the “Secretary noted the problem of signaling our intentions in such a way as not to create the danger of interpreting these as a willingness to yield on vital points. Referring to the Captive Nations Resolution, the Secretary suggested that, from the point of view of managing these things here with a minimum of controversy in our own country, it was better for the President to handle the subject in a low key. But if this were interpreted in the wrong way in Moscow, it would get into the wrong context. Dobrynin commented that a decision by Congress did not mean that the President must act. The Secretary agreed that there was no way under the Constitution by which the Congress could make action by the President compulsory. But the President had to think of his relations with the Congress and the effect on his entire legislative program. Dobrynin said a strong Soviet reaction was certain. This was a matter which could not help relations between the two countries and was a permanent source of difference.” (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-1262. For text of the Captive Nations Resolution, July 17, 1959, see 73 Stat. 212)
Secretary of State Rusk also: “noted that a source of misunderstanding between the two countries had been the discussion following the Presidentʼs interview with Stewart Alsop in an issue of the Saturday Evening Post some months ago. Soviet propaganda had stressed, on the basis of this interview, the intention of the US to make a preventive attack on the Soviet Union. Press Secretary Salinger had clarified the related statement in the article immediately. This, the Secretary noted, had not been a direct quotation of the President. What Salinger said is what the US has been saying for 15 years. If there is a massive attack on Western Europe, we will defend ourselves. There is nothing strange in that. If the Soviet misinterpretation is merely a matter of propaganda, we can understand that. If, however, the Soviet Union really believes that we are preparing a preventive attack, that is more serious.
“Dobrynin said the Soviet Union did believe this. It was not just a matter of one article. For many years there had been many articles and many statements by persons in authority. Many Generals had said that the US had bombs that would destroy and would be dropped on the Soviet Union. Then there is the question of the SAC alert. What could the Soviet leaders be expected to believe when statements of this kind were made not just by journalists but by Generals—people with real authority in their hands to begin war. If the US Government wants to stop such [Page 461] statements it can certainly do so. Then the President himself appears in a magazine discussing the possibility of an attack on the Soviet Union. The Soviet concern was therefore not just propaganda. ‘We are really worried about this.’ Perhaps the US thinks that the Soviet Union is too suspicious, but maps appear in magazines showing the planes and missiles allocated for the destruction of each city in the Soviet Union. This information obviously could only come from authoritative sources. There is nothing comparable in the Soviet Union.
“The Secretary asked how many bombs Khrushchev had said would be required to destroy the UK. Dobrynin indicated six or seven. He noted that this story had begun with a conversation with Churchill who had said he did not want war because six or seven bombs would be enough to destroy the UK. Dobrynin had been present at this conversation. The Secretary had observed that the present Administration has taken steps to bring speeches under control. He referred to the recent hearings on the subject conducted by Senator Stennis. It had to be conceded that there was plenty said on both sides. Dobrynin referred again to the American Generals. The Secretary commented that he did not get much comfort from speeches by Marshal Malinovsky. Dobrynin said that he only made one or two a year. In any event this was a reason why the Soviet Union was forced to increase its arms expenditures. Its reaction to American statements was not just propaganda. The Soviet Union had to be prepared.” (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/7-1262)
Also during the discussion, Dobrynin said that, “as to nuclear tests, the Soviet Union had felt that the United States had been ahead. It had then caught up, and now the United States was testing again. This was a vicious circle.” Rusk observed “that he had been sorry to see that Khrushchev, in his recent speech, had come back to the point that any kind of inspection was tantamount to espionage.” (Memorandum of conversation; Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VII, pages 485–487; for text of Khrushchevʼs speech in Moscow on July 10, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, volume II, pages 635-656)
Secretary of State Rusk also: “referred to a comment which he had made before his recent European trip to the effect that, in all the discussions on the Common Market, there was no indication that these arrangements were being directed toward the Eastern Bloc or Socialist camp. This was certainly his impression after his recent trip. Western Europe was not concerned with economic warfare. It was quite prepared, and we hope we can be prepared, to increase trade.
“Dobrynin asked about the future of US trade with the Soviet Union in view of Congressional attitudes. The Secretary observed that the prejudice of our policy favors trade. We are a trading nation, and we trade unless there is a reason not to. In his recent speech Khrushchev had [Page 462] referred to post-1946 military expenditures. He wished that there were some people in the Soviet Union assigned, perhaps as war-games, to the task of telling the Soviet leaders how Americans thought about things. In 1946 we had greatly reduced the US armed forces. Not a division or air unit was ready for combat. Our Defense budget was about 10 billion dollars. Now it is over four times that much. Why did this come about? It started with Soviet policies during the Stalinist period, the Greek experience etc. The major jump had come at the time of the Korean war. If Khrushchev had not insisted on greatly reducing or eliminating our position in Berlin last summer, the subsequent increase in our forces would not have occurred. If Stalin had not pushed in his time, the US would be disarmed today for all practical purposes. Because of pressures on Berlin, we have strengthened our forces. The Soviets became alarmed and strengthened their forces, and all this in relation to Berlin.
“The President would like to move on trade but people who are opposed to trade with the Soviets are nourished by pressures on Berlin.
“Dobrynin said for the Soviets the Common Market was aimed at creating a deeper split between East and West Europe. The US was a leading member of the Western society. That is why the Soviet Union believed nothing good for the Eastern countries will come from the Common Market. The Secretary commented that we are not members of the Common Market. Dobrynin observed that the US could influence it. This was why he had asked his original question about US trade with the Eastern countries. In view of the sad background of that trade, his country felt that the Common Market would have a very bad impact.” (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Secretaryʼs Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)