202. Editorial Note
On March 7, 1962, President Kennedy sent a message to Chairman Khrushchev proposing a series of common projects in the exploration of space (Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VI, pages 116–118). On March 20 Khrushchev responded favorably to the idea and suggested that U.S. and Soviet representatives consult during the United Nations Space Committee meeting in New York “to discuss concrete questions of cooperation in research and peaceful use of outer space that are of interest to our countries.” (Ibid., pages 127–131)
In talks at New York, March 27, 28, and 30, Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, [Page 444] and A.A. Blagonravov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences reached a tentative basis for further discussion on cooperation on meteorological satellites, telemetry, and the mapping of the earthʼs magnetic field. A copy of Drydenʼs report on the talks and the papers he gave Blagonravov on the three subjects is in Department of State, Central Files, 911.80261/4-562. Following an abortive attempt to reach further agreement in Washington at the beginning of May, Dryden and Blagonravov resumed their discussions on May 29 at Geneva during the course of the United Nations Outer Space Subcommittee meetings. On June 8 they reached agreement covering cooperation on meteorology, arrangements for measuring the earthʼs magnetic field, and the use of the U.S. Echo satellite for experiments in telecommunications. For text of the agreement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pages 1328-1332.
Following Drydenʼs return from Geneva, Under Secretary of State McGhee convened a meeting with representatives of the White House, NASA, the Defense Department, CIA, and the Air Force. This meeting reviewed the discussion in Geneva and agreed to propose to the President the following:
- “1. After a reasonable interval and if no serious objections have been raised by any of the interested agencies, Dr. Dryden will inform Professor Blagonravov that we have no changes to suggest in their joint memorandum. (The memorandum provided for a two-month waiting period during which either party could propose changes.)
- “2. Upon notification from Professor Blagonravov that the Soviets do not desire changes which would be unacceptable to us (or at the conclusion of the two-month waiting period), we will, assuming the Soviets still wish to proceed, exchange notes with the Soviet Government to confirm government-level agreement to these proposals.
- “3. It was suggested that when that agreement has been obtained, you may wish to write to Chairman Khrushchev noting both the agreement to proceed with the specific arrangements at hand and the prospects of further technical discussions on additional topics. A draft of such a letter will be submitted for your approval.
- “4. Meanwhile, Under Secretary McGhee and Dr. Dryden will report these developments to members of Congress who have a specific interest and responsibility in this field, and the Department will prepare a report to be sent to the Secretary General of the United Nations when formal agreement has been reached with the Soviets.
- “5. Dr. Dryden will, in cooperation with the interested agencies, proceed now to arrange nominations for US membership in the joint US-Soviet working groups which are to develop the detailed implementation of the meteorological and geomagnetic proposals. These working groups will not, however, be activated until formal agreement has been reached with the Soviet Government.
- “6. The joint Dryden-Blagonravov memorandum will be treated as confidential, pending government-level agreement by the Soviets or earlier Soviet public release.
- “7. After formal agreement has been obtained, Dr. Dryden will arrange directly with Professor Blagonravov for further technical discussions, possibly in Moscow this fall, concerning broader cooperation in communication via satellites and the possibility of cooperation in such of the remaining topics dealt with in your exchange of letters with Chairman Khrushchev as may seem worthwhile to pursue further.” (Memorandum from Ball to the President, July 5; Department of State, Central Files, 911.80261/7-562)
On July 18, in NSAM No. 172, Bundy informed the Secretary of State that the President had concurred in this general approach and requested the responsible agencies to carry out the steps in paragraphs 1-7. (Ibid., NSAMs: Lot 72 D 316)