Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

122. Current Intelligence Weekly Review⁰

Washington, October 5, 1961.

East-West Relations

Moscowʼs treatment of the conversations between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko and its general commentary on Berlin suggest that the Soviet leaders are confident formal negotiations will be arranged. Following the third meeting between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko on 30 September, Pravda on 2 October quoted from a US statement that the sessions were cordial, that they were related to the possibility of East-West negotiations, and that Gromyko was likely to meet with President Kennedy. Soviet press coverage of the first two discussions merely reported that the meetings had been held but gave no indication of the general atmosphere or possible results. The coverage of 2 October, therefore, conveys an impression that the talks are proceeding favorably.

Izvestia also injected a hopeful note in an article which claimed that the Soviet people did not believe that the international situation was entirely covered with the “leaden clouds of war.” A speaker at a public lecture in Moscow on 26 September predicted that the Rusk-Gromyko talks would be followed by negotiations and cited the US-Soviet agreement on disarmament principles as a favorable sign. The East German party organ Neues Deutschland echoed this line in an editorial of 28 September, stating, “Everyone realizes now that there will be negotiations.” Polish party First Secretary Gomulka on 30 September also asserted that “on our side nothing stands in the way of a peaceful solution of the German problem by means of fruitful negotiations and mutual agreements.” The Polish news service reported that “UN circles” expect an East-West foreign ministers conference to be followed by a summit meeting.

This general line suggests that Moscow views the Rusk-Gromyko talks as the opening of a decisive phase in the Berlin crisis. A number of Soviet journalists, in their contacts with American officials, have stressed that the next several weeks will determine the future course for the bloc and have hinted that the Soviet year-end deadline for a solution could be revised if negotiations were in process or scheduled. The third secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City stated that the USSR was not disposed to sign a separate East German treaty if there were real possibilities for East-West agreement.

A Pravda correspondent claimed that the next six weeks would be most important for setting a date for a meeting at the highest level. He added that the date could be “sometime in 1962” provided the US agreed to the principle of negotiations. A TASS correspondent also emphasized negotiations and warned that if they failed to materialize, Khrushchev would have some “very interesting warnings” at the Soviet party congress.

Communist sources in London were apparently responsible for press reports that the bloc foreign ministers would convene in November to consider the next move on Germany. According to these reports, the bloc would review the results of current East-West contacts, such as the Rusk-Gromyko conversations, and decide whether to proceed with a peace treaty before the end of the year. If no East-West negotiations were arranged by November, the bloc would go ahead as announced and convoke a peace conference, but that if it was clear the West was prepared to negotiate, the Warsaw Pact ministers would recommend postponement of a peace conference until “two or three months” into 1962. Other press reports quoted “Communist diplomats” as saying that the bloc might postpone a separate treaty if the West agreed to negotiate a Berlin settlement.

These semiofficial statements have been accompanied by an official effort to appear responsive to Western views that the agenda of any formal negotiations should be broader than the Soviet proposal of a peace treaty and free-city status for West Berlin. The Soviets have begun to emphasize European security and certain limited partial disarmament measures to show willingness to enlarge the scope of East-West discussions. The Soviets have made it clear, however, that European security discussions are no substitute for a German treaty.

Disarmament

A Soviet Government memorandum submitted to the 16th UN General Assembly¹ suggested reaching agreement on freezing military budgets, denouncing the use of nuclear weapons, banning war propaganda, concluding a nonaggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact nations, withdrawing foreign troops from the territories of other countries, taking measures against the further spread of nuclear weapons, creating atom-free zones, and taking steps to lessen the danger of surprise attack.

All of these measures have appeared as provisions of earlier Soviet disarmament proposals, although not necessarily as “partial” disarmament measures. The increase in the number of partial disarmament measures listed may be aimed at countering neutralist dismay over the Soviet position that a test ban solution can be reached “only” through agreement on general and complete disarmament. Several of the measures—a NATO-Warsaw Treaty nonaggression pact, establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, withdrawal or at least reduction of foreign troops in Europe, and a ban on supplying nuclear weapons to other countries—are probably calculated to appeal to groups in Western Europe who favor tying European security arrangements to a German settlement.

The memorandumʼs call for reciprocal commitments not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is at variance with a recent statement by Khrushchev. The Soviet leader—who in past years had advocated such an agreement—told New York Times correspondent Sulzberger early in September, “It would be untimely at present to say that in the event of war, atomic weapons would not be employed.” He added that if both sides were to promise not to employ nuclear weapons but retained their stockpiles and the imperialists unleashed a war, “any side” that felt it was losing would “undoubtedly use its nuclear bombs.”

Berlin

Information on Khrushchevʼs discussions with Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio on 16 September supplements the line taken by Khrushchev in his talks with Nehru and Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak. Khrushchev stated he was willing to “accommodate” President Kennedy but that he could not infringe on East German sovereignty. He suggested that the access to West Berlin could be guaranteed in separate documents which would be attached to a peace treaty; the documents would be signed by both the German Democratic Republic and the USSR and in this way assuage East German sensibilities.

Bloc leaders continue to stress possible guarantees for future access to West Berlin. Gomulka said on 30 September that the peace treaty will allow a “solution of the West Berlin problem in a way … which will provide it with free communications with the world and international guarantees of the interested powers or guarantees of theUN.” On the same day, Czech President Novotny asserted that if Berlin had become a question of Western prestige, “Let us agree on guarantees for West Berlin, as clearly indicated by Khrushchev.”

[1 paragraph (13 lines of 2-column source text) not declassified]

The blocʼs intention to sign a separate peace treaty by the end of the year continues to be muted in statements and propaganda, although it appears occasionally. Gomulka referred to the deadline in speeches during a visit to Prague; an Izvestia editorial on 29 September mentioned a treaty by the end of the year; and East Germany has continued to stress the deadline. Further information on economic planning to achieve a position to deal with any Western reprisals after conclusion of a separate treaty was contained in an intercepted East German message, which referred to the goal of being “completely free from economic disruption by 1 December 1961.”

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]; Noforn. Prepared by CIAʼs Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 1-3 of the Weekly Review section of the issue.
1. Dated September 26. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 496-504.