Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

93. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)¹

JCSM-302-63

Washington, April 17, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Defoliation and Crop Destruction in South Vietnam

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by Mr. Michael Forrestal of the White House Staff for the Honorable W. Averell Harriman, dated 13 March 1963,² which stated that the President would like an up-to-date report on the results of defoliation and crop destruction carried out by the Armed Forces, Republic of Vietnam. He suggested that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject be coordinated into a single State/Defense/US Information Agency paper for the President. Certain guidelines were furnished which have been followed in this memorandum.

2. Two separate herbicide programs have been in progress during the past year and a half in the Republic of Vietnam. In order to increase visibility and deter Viet Cong ambush, a total of 87 miles of roads, canals and areas bordering military installations were sprayed with defoliants. Trial crop destruction operations were conducted against Viet Cong crops in two areas, 750 acres of Phuoc Long Province and 29 acres in Thua Thien Province.

3. As in other weapons systems, a precise statistical determination of the military effectiveness of defoliant operations in terms of enemy losses or as a deterrent to his operations is difficult. Technical reports received from the field thus far, however, provide ample evidence that they do give us a degree of military advantage. Specifically, defoliation facilitates clearing of rights of way along rail lines, retards jungle growth, and thereby makes enemy concealment more difficult while improving our reconnaissance and ability to see the enemy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that defoliation contributes to the improvement of the security situation and that it is one tool of many in the counter-insurgency kit.

4. Crop destruction operation in Phuoc Long Province adjacent to Viet Cong War Zone D is estimated to have resulted in the destruction of over 700,000 pounds of rice or roughly enough to feed 1,000 Viet Cong for one year. Militarily and technically, the results were excellent. The actual operation was conducted entirely by Vietnamese. This operation was a military success in that it increased the Viet Cong food problems in the area and concurrently added to over-all logistic difficulties in the Viet Cong Zone D area.

5. In Thua Thien Province, only 29 out of 296 target acres have been attacked with herbicides. This was a hand-sprayed operation carried out on an experimental basis which in part accounts for the low percentage of total area sprayed. Consequently, a full evaluation of this operation is not yet available. However, initial reports citing the destruction of 56,000 pounds of food give every evidence that the success achieved in Phuoc Long will be repeated.

6. In connection with proposed plans for future operations, the Country Team has recently approved a Government of Vietnam (GVN) request to apply herbicides to railroad rights of way primarily for proper railway maintenance and only secondarily for security. The project would be carried out on the ground by railroad maintenance employees with herbicides being provided by the US Overseas Mission from US commercial sources. In addition, COMUSMACV is now studying 12,000 acres as possible defoliant targets and the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces are actively selecting and evaluating additional targets for operations during the forthcoming growing season. Plans include communication and area targets with the major portion being in Central Vietnam. The total acreage is unknown now. A list of crop destruction targets in Binh Dinh, Thua Thien, Phuoc Thanh, and Quang Tin Provinces totaling approximately 4,000 acres has been submitted to COMUSMACV.³ Evaluation of first priority targets based on current selection criteria is now in process by COMUSMACV. To gain optimum effect, these crop destruction targets should be sprayed in April and May.

7. There is no indication from the field that herbicide operations have had an adverse propaganda effect upon the local population. Neither is there any indication of condemnation of GVN and US efforts from other than Bloc propaganda sources. Any propaganda effort on the part of the Bloc can be countered by timely and frequent press briefings and by permitting press members to observe defoliation and crop destruction missions. Efforts have been initiated in Saigon in this matter. In any event, stepped-up Bloc propaganda efforts should be regarded primarily as a barometric reading of the degree of success being achieved rather than as a reason for terminating or decreasing the defoliation and crop destruction effort.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the Country Team, Vietnam, that defoliation and crop destruction operations should be continued. Herbicides should be considered as an effective tool to be employed in specific situations and areas where its employment will hurt Viet Cong military or supply operations. This policy would reflect greater dependence on the views and recommendations of the local commanders and advisers. As Ambassador Nolting noted in his message to State on 10 March 1963,⁴ this should permit operations to be more directly related to the local military situation, thus ensuring a greater military value.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. Herbicide operations be prosecuted in Vietnam on a continuing basis.

b. The Country Team, Vietnam, be authorized to approve crop destruction as well as other defoliation targets based on existing target selection criteria. Resultant reports and evaluations would continue to be made.

c. A memorandum be forwarded to the Secretary of State substantially as indicated in the Appendix hereto.⁵

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Vietnam 1962 370.64 2 Feb. Secret.
2. Document 58.
3. Not found.
4. Not found.
5. Not printed. The draft memorandum prepared for Secretary McNamara’s signature was sent from William Bundy to Harriman on April 19. The memorandum reflected the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as outlined in the JCS memorandum printed here. (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, Pol-Polit Affairs & Rel, Pol 27-10 Chemical Warfare 1963)