3. Memorandum for the Record by the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman)1
Nolting and Trueheart are both very optimistic about the way the war is going in South Vietnam. They took exception, in fact, to several of the cautious, general statements in INR’s contribution to the forthcoming NIE2 which had just arrived the day before I did.
One of the reasons for their optimism is apparently the vigor with which the South Vietnamese government and especially Brother Nhu have pushed the strategic hamlet program. (R.G.K. Thompson also mentioned that without Nhu’s enthusiastic and vigorous backing, the strategic hamlet program would probably not have gotten off the ground. He went on to say, in fact, that he is wrong in his worry earlier this year that the Vietnamese would endanger the program by doing too much of it in too many places. He now feels that Nhu was not wrong in doing this because it attracted a great deal of attention to the program all over Vietnam and hence got an essential momentum.)
Beyond the above it is hard to see exactly what specific basis there is for the Embassy’s optimism. Partly it is a question of mood. The sense of activity is much stronger. The morale of the Vietnamese at least in Saigon is higher principally because something is being done and because so much American aid which is so visible has appeared. On a factual basis, they cite as reasons for optimism the increased activity of the ARVN—they are going out more often, attacking more often, and even occasionally engaging in night attacks. (However, see the Memcon of the Conversation with General Ed Rowny.)3
I mentioned to Trueheart the figures that CINCPAC gave me—that 18,000 Viet Cong had been killed this past year, but that the total Viet Cong regular strength nevertheless rose from 18,000 to about 22,000 to 24,000 with the sympathizers and supporters remaining about the same. Trueheart scoffed at this and said that the explanation was only that the statistics were more accurate, meaning that last year [Page 6] there were considerably more than 18,000. I still find this hard to believe completely, however, since that would have given a total of around 42,000 regulars in the VC last year and I am sure that though the intelligence was not very good, it was considerably better than that differential would indicate.
Trueheart is running a so-called Junior Country Team which is apparently the guiding direction of the American effort on the strategic hamlet program. He is reportedly doing an excellent job at this. However, I do think his optimism stems in part from identification with the local scene and that it is not entirely objective.
I told [queried?] both Nolting and Bill Trueheart on the question of whether the officials, both civilian and military, were frustrated by Diem’s failures to delegate since this could be a very serious morale problem while parliamentary elections are not. They both said that the officials that they and their staff contacted did not evidence any such frustration nor had they heard of any from other American representatives reporting on their contact. (This, of course, could be attributed to the morale improvement as a result of American aid and might not, therefore, be a permanent phenomenon—i.e., the frustration might manifest itself again if there is no substantial progress in the war itself as opposed to progress in the arrival of American aid.)
Part of our discussion concerned the Cambodian problem. Nolting is very strong in the view that he could persuade the South Vietnamese to be exceptionally forthcoming in a settlement with Cambodia of their outstanding problems if the United States were willing to back bilateral guarantees for Cambodia rather than an international conference which the South Vietnamese fear. He thinks the quid pro quo of the U.S. opposing a conference would be sufficient to make the Vietnamese forthcoming. It was agreed that he would draft a cable inviting instructions to explore the problem with the Vietnamese government.
Nolting and Trueheart are also pleased with the Montagnard program. Paradoxically, one of the things that pleases them is the way that the CIA has managed to take arms away from the Montagnards without alienating them so far as we can tell. Here the device the CIA used was to take the people who are giving up weapons out to the new villages so that they could see that their weapons were being given to other Montagnards who are in less secure areas. The reason that Nolting and Trueheart are pleased, of course, is that the Sough Vietnamese Government is nervous about the Montagnards and about their having too many arms and extremely anxious that the arms be taken away as the areas become more secure. (I am myself a little nervous that the weapons are being taken away prematurely. The [Page 7] Montagnard strategic hamlet program is essential if the infiltration routes are to be cut and I am surprised to find the areas are regarded as secure so soon.)
I questioned Nolting and Trueheart on the progress made in providing police for the strategic hamlets. Apparently an experimental program for one or two villages has been started, but nothing much more. (This to my mind is an enormous gap in the implementation of the strategic hamlet concept.)
- Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Country Series—Vietnam. Confidential.↩
- An apparent reference to NIE 53-63, Document 94.↩
- Document 4.↩