Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

260. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)¹

JCSM-629-963

Washington, August 20, 1963 .

SUBJECT

• Summary Report on Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference, Honolulu, 7 May 1963² (Withdrawal of 1,000 US Military From Vietnam)

1. During the Honolulu Conference on 6 May 1963, you directed that a plan be prepared for the withdrawal of 1,000 US military personnel from the Republic of Vietnam by the end of CY63.

2. A proposed plan for conducting the withdrawal, prepared by the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) and concurred in by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is attached hereto.

3. In reviewing the CINCPAC plan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that no US units should be withdrawn from the Republic of Vietnam for purely psychological purposes until the political and religious tensions now confronting the Government of Vietnam have eased. For that reason, the final decision to implement the withdrawal plan should be withheld until late October. This will allow ample time for all US personnel to arrive home by Christmas.

4. The CINCPAC plan to withdraw US personnel in three or four increments is favored over a one-time withdrawal of 1,000 personnel for the following reasons:

a. Minimum impact on US/GVN military activities.

b. Opportunity for news prominence and coverage over an extended period of time.

c. Creation of fewer personnel, administrative, and transportation problems, i.e., holding over personnel in order for them to depart with their unit, diverting transport aircraft for return to the United States, and overcrowding facilities in Saigon for staging and departure.

5. If you approve the proposed plan, a public affairs annex designed to produce the desired psychological impact, both domestic and foreign, will be prepared and forwarded for your approval.

6. It is recommended that you approve the withdrawal plan for planning purposes, and withhold final decision pending a reevaluation of the situation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that will be forwarded to you by 20 October 1963.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix

Honolulu, undated.

Plan Submitted by the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) ³

CINCPAC’S WITHDRAWAL PLAN

1. The main emphasis would be on withdrawal of units rather than individuals.

2. Training RVNAF units to replace US elements to be withdrawn has been in effect since the Comprehensive Plan for the Republic of Vietnam was first developed.

3. In order to achieve maximum press coverage, and at the same time cause the least impact on US/RVN military operations, the withdrawal should be programmed over approximately two months. For compassionate and psychological reasons, the last increment of personnel should be withdrawn in time to arrive home by Christmas.

4. Recommended list of units to be withdrawn:

Unit	Strength	Destination
Army:
One Platoon 560 Military Police Co.	33	CONUS
CV-92B (Caribou) Test Unit	3	CONUS
Engineer Construction/Advisory Teams	36	CONUS
Six Medical Civic Action Teams	57	CONUS
UTT Helicopter Co (Minus 1 platoon)	117	Okinawa
Army Support Unit	155	CONUS
Three Machine Gun Platoons	63	25th Division
Air Force:
Detachment 1964 Communications Group	56	CONUS
Detachment 5th Tactical Control Group	25	CONUS/Clark AFB
Air Force Support Unit	105	CONUS
C-123 Detachment Spray (Ranch Hand)	16	Clark AFB
F-102 Detachment (Water Glass)	48	Clark AFB
Precision Measuring Equipment Lab	15	Clark AFB
Detachment 6091st Recce Squadron	13	CONUS
Navy:
Headquarters Support (HSAS) Element	21	CONUS
Marine Corps:
Security Platoon	47	CONUS or Okinawa
Joint:
MAAG Element	167	CONUS
MACV Element	26	CONUS
Total Strength:	1,003

5. The withdrawal should be accomplished in three or four increments, each large enough and sufficiently spaced to obtain news prominence and coverage. The first increment, clearly the most important from a publicity viewpoint, should therefore contain more colorful units, a wide spectrum of skills, and representatives from all Services. The first increment is composed tentatively of the following units:

Unit	Strength
Army:
Medical Civic Action Teams	30
Engineer Construction/Advisory Teams	36
One Platoon UTT Helicopter Co.	66
MAAG Advisors	25
Air Force:
Detachment 1964 Communications Group	56
MAAG Advisors	12
Marine Corps:
Security Platoon	47
Navy:
MAAG Advisors	4
Total Strength:	276

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131, Vietnam 321 thru 370. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric saw this memorandum.
2. Regarding this conference, see Document 107. The summary report is not printed. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, Eight Sec Def Conf., May 6, 1963)
3. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but for a narrative summary of the preparation of this plan, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 3, pp. 12-16.