Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

237. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, July 25, 1963, 8 p.m.

134. Hilsman from Nolting. Deptel 112.² delayed by servicing. I find myself more sanguine about prospects of GVN’s settling Buddhist problem and avoiding coup d’etat than general tenor reftel and SNIE.³ I would put question marks by all of first four numbered paragraphs reftel, which seem to me too gloomy—or at least too logical—for this situation. Without trying to spell out nuances of difference between our respective analyses, perhaps it is sufficient I feel that heat is slowly going out of this crisis and that this government is quite likely survive this crisis, as it has many others in past.

As you know, I also hold that, despite shortcomings of present GVN, it is government which stands best chance (as compared with realizable alternatives) of carrying to successful conclusion counterinsurgency effort here. Therefore, without putting all our eggs in one basket or alienating possible successor governments or leaders, we should, I think, help, by all means consistent with our own principles, to maximize this government’s chances of survival.

Since transmission your message, atmosphere has perceptibly calmed, at least on surface. GVN has at last gotten itself into sound posture on religious issue and may be said to be “one up” on Buddhists. In effect, GVN has pledged and repledged itself to implementation June 16 agreement and has offered Buddhists joint investigation any complaints on this score by examination of records or on-the-spot investigations.

If GVN pursues its initiative and avoids actions inconsistent with its announced policy of conciliation, Buddhist leadership may well find it best to settle on basis June 16 agreements and more radical elements will then, I think, cease agitation.

Just how solution of Buddhist issue will affect coup plotting it is impossible to say, but this is a threat which is always with us.

Thus for present I would advocate a course somewhere between para 5 (d) and (c). Specifically, I think we should publicly welcome conciliatory steps as they are taken by GVN, and any constructive steps taken by Buddhists, with view to encouraging more of same and disabusing those Buddhist leaders whose aims appear to be open-ended.⁴

Finally, I agree that situation has not reached point where we can sensibly think about throwing our support to any particular alternative to Diem regime⁵ (para 6 reftel).

Nolting

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET. Top Secret.
2. Document 234.
3. Document 217.
4. A marginal notation on the source text at this point, in an unknown hand, reads: “No.”
5. A marginal notation on the source text at this point, in the same hand, reads: “We didn’t mean this and I don’t think we said it.”