Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

231. Letter From the Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

New Delhi, July 19, 1963.

Dear Mac: In addition to the more or less routine report of my impressions of East Asia which I have just sent through the regular channels,² I feel that I must write to you directly about the situation in Vietnam. Here in brief is the way it appears to me:

1. The highly contradictory nature of reports from South Vietnam is largely the result of a paradox: while the military situation is steadily improving, the political situation is rapidly deteriorating. Thus those who concentrate on military developments are optimistic while those who focus on the political aspects are gloomy. This state of affairs cannot continue indefinitely. If the political situation is not vastly improved, our ability to control the Viet Cong situation is almost certain to deteriorate.

2. Our mission in Saigon is on the edge of severe demoralization. The bitter conflict between the U.S. press and our mission is symptomatic. The morale of our military people, particularly the junior ones who are dealing with the military situation in the field, is high and they appear to be putting on an extraordinary performance. The same is true in the aid program. As you move further up the scale of authority, however, you encounter increasingly emotional differences and antagonisms.

3. We cannot achieve our objectives in Southeast Asia as long as Diem and his family run Vietnam. I met no one who was in a position to judge the attitudes of the Vietnamese people who did not stress this fact.

My own impression of Diem was that of a man quite remote from reality. For three hours and fifty-two minutes he gave me his version of what was happening in the country—a version which on key questions was inaccurate or distorted, and with respect to the U.S. not only misinformed but insulting.

In Diem and his family we have a set-up comparable to that presented by the Generalissimo in China in the 1940’s. We failed in China largely because we failed to find an effective means of dealing with an inept ruling power that had lost touch with the people. We will fail in Southeast Asia, and perhaps even more decisively, if we repeat this mistake in Vietnam.

Although the risks in any political switchover are formidable, the risks of staying on dead center are, in my opinion, substantially greater. Nor am I impressed by the familiar argument that “there is no available successor”. It is not too much to say that almost any articulate, courageous, anti-communist Vietnamese with a good reputation who puts himself at the head of a group to overthrow Diem, and who outlines a policy of continued vigorous anti-communism combined with anti-favoritism, better government administration and land reforms, would find himself a national hero in a matter of weeks.

Admittedly this would be merely the first stage; the ultimate test would be his capacity to carry out the promises which enabled him to take charge. However, it is defeatist in my opinion to assume that there is no anti-communist leadership other than Diem’s ready to blossom in Vietnam.

4. I think it would be a mistake to assume that Cabot Lodge by some magic can change the fundamental situation which I have described. Lodge has strong convictions and bluntly expresses his views. But Diem, according to every observer with whom I talked, is impervious to argument or threat.

It would therefore appear likely that Lodge will either find himself in a head-on conflict with Diem or be forced into a position of relative impotence. If the government is to change in Vietnam, there is much to be said for having the change occur before his arrival.

5. Although a new deal in Saigon appears to me an essential first step, we still may fail to achieve stability unless we can find some means of coming to grips with the deteriorating situation in southern Laos. For the last two years it has been my belief that the only feasible solution is likely to be partition by a line running across Laos from the 17th parallel then moving north and west along the Mekong. In my opinion we now have very little time to lose in securing this crucial area. Although I hesitate from this distance to attempt to outline a specific program, my previous knowledge of the area and what I heard and saw on my recent visits leads me to suggest a procedure along the following lines.

a. Once we are convinced that the neutrality experiment is unworkable under present conditions, an indigenous government (preferably-that of Souvanna Phouma) might issue a statement that the Geneva agreements have been subverted by the Pathet Lao and that he is now calling on all loyal government troops to defend the southern Laos area.

b. With a minimum of fanfare introduce some U.S. special service troops and advisors into Laos to beef up and train the best Laotian troops. It is estimated by the military men with whom I talked that 2000 could do the job. At the same time persuade the Vietnamese or Thai Governments to provide modest contingents of troops with the Thais assigned perhaps to the defense of a few strategic points along the left bank of the Mekong including the capital.

There is considerable doubt as to whether the Thais would agree to move unless we introduce at least a battle group of U.S. troops. However, in this first stage at least I suggest that every effort should be made to avoid this direct commitment since it would almost certainly involve us in difficulties with Congress. Several military experts were of the opinion that we could get by with the 2000 special service troops with perhaps [less than 1 1ine not declassified]Thailand [less than 1 line not declassified]occupy the area between the western border and the right bank of the Mekong in what is now northwestern Laos. [1 sentence (2 lines) not declassified]

c. Simultaneously a strong effort should be made to keep Cambodia as quiet as possible. Although Sihanouk cannot be expected publicly to applaud the proposed action, I believe that in his heart he might welcome it. Nguyen Ngoc Tho, Vice-President of Vietnam, offered the same judgment. Although the Malayans are currently occupied with the problems of Malaysia and the demagogy of Sukarno, I found them deeply concerned by the Laotian situation, [1-1/2 lines not declassified].

All of this would take a great deal of doing. However, I believe that the long struggle to create a basis for stability in Southeast Asia on which we have spent several billion dollars since 1951 is now calling for a major decision. I recognize the risks in the suggestions I have outlined, yet our continuing support of Diem and our relative inaction in Laos may result in the entire situation getting wholly out of control within a matter of months.

On the other hand, a bold political program with modest U.S. military commitments plus a bit of luck may enable us to turn the tide our way and to lay the basis for a far more favorable situation in Southeast Asia than seemed possible a few months ago.

I am sending this to you on a Personal Eyes Only basis with no copies to anyone as I do not want these observations to rattle too loosely around the Department.

The situation here is sensitive and complex; the staff is riddled with departures and home leave. I am bogged down with protocol and it is hot. Otherwise I have no complaint.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Personal.
2. See Document 216.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.