220. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs (Rice) to the Secretary of
State1
Washington, July 15,
1963.
SUBJECT
- Reports that Brother Nhu is
Planning a Coup
We have four reports2 from Vietnamese
Generals of a July 11 meeting of Nhu with officers of that rank. Two (or possibly three)
of these reports indicate that Nhu may be planning a coup. We think it not unlikely,
however, that Nhu is responding
to reports of coup plotting among the Generals themselves, seeking to
confuse and divide them, smoke out their intentions, and rally those
which he can reach by such blandishments as “active” assignments. He may
have
[Page 489]
had the additional
intention of improving his personal position with the Generals against
the possibility that they will successfully mount a coup.
The four reports are not wholly consistent with one another, but the
following emerges from all four: (1) Nhu asked the Generals for their support; (2) Nhu criticized the government and/or
his brothers during the meeting; (3) Nhu extended an olive branch to the Generals by being
very cordial and by promising “active” assignments to all.
General Khanh reported Nhu asked for “personal support”;
General Kim stated Nhu said he would not blame the
Generals if they were thinking of a coup and that he would be with them;
General Cao merely said that Nhu
had asked for their cooperation in meeting the present crisis. One
unnamed “general officer” who may or may not have attended the meeting
reported that Nhu had spoken of a
“lightning” coup with himself leading it. But a large meeting of this
sort would not provide a suitably secure forum in which to make a
serious proposal of this sort, and Nhu’s position on the Buddhist crisis is not one which
would be most likely to appeal to dissatisfied officers.
Unless the Buddhist crisis deepens, the longer the various coup plots
incubate, the less likelihood of anything hatching. We have not yet
heard that any coup group has developed a well articulated plan with
much chance of success, nor do the Generals appear to be united-and
Nhu’s move is probably
shrewdly intended, among other things, to prevent their uniting.
However, this does not eliminate the possibility of a plan being
suddenly attempted. We have heard of several, but the better a plan was
the less likely we would be to learn of it in advance.
The joint Embassy/CAS evaluation of the
four reports (Tab A), together with the reports themselves (Tabs B to E)
are attached.
[Tab A]
Central Intelligence Agency Information Report3
TDCSDB-3/655,524
Washington, July 13,
1963.
SUBJECT
- Comments on reports of Ngo Dinh
Nhu’s coup plotting
Following are the joint Embassy/CAS
comments on the four reports concerning the 11 July 1963 meeting at
Joint General Staff Headquarters. The first of these came from
Brigadier General Van Thanh
[Page 490]
Cao, delegate to the eastern provinces, Saigon AmEmbtel 80,4 two other
reports on 12 July, one from Brigadier General Nguyen Khanh Commanding General II
Corps, TDCSDB-3/655,512 [document number not
declassified], and the other from a general officer,
TDCSDB-3/655,512 [document number not
declassified]. The fourth report is from Brigadier General
Le Van Kim, Ministry of
National Defense, TDCSDB-3/655,523 [document
number not declassified].5
- 1.
- All of these reports have some elements in common. They differ
widely in detail and emphasis. Common elements are:
- a.
- The meeting was called by Nhu;
- b.
- Nhu criticized
the Government of Vietnam (GVN) handling of the Buddhist
crisis;
- c.
- Nhu promised
the Generals a more active role in the war and promised
to give those Generals whose positions are sinecures
legitimate responsibilities; and,
- d.
- Nhu made an
appeal for the loyalty of the Generals (to whom is the
question).
- 2.
- Actually there may have been two meetings between Nhu and the Generals on 11
July. The first was a formal meeting at Joint General Staff
offices. The second followed immediately after the first at the
Officers Club at the Joint General Staff. The general officer
states clearly that his report derives from the Officers Club
talk, although he attended both meetings. We are not clear as to
those present at either meeting. General Khanh states that there were
“about fourteen” Generals in attendance when Nhu made the remarks he
reported. Including newly appointed Brigadier General Do Cao
Tri, there are now nineteen generals in the Army of the Republic
of Vietnam (ARVN).
- 3.
- The general officer’s report is the only one of the three
which is explicit with regard to a coup led by Nhu. With respect to
specificity, it is worth noting that Khanh, Cao, and Kim have had long time
relationships with the individuals to whom they spoke.
- 4.
- It is worthwhile to compare the remarks attributed to
Nhu by the general
officer with the report of the conversation between Nhu and an American observer on
25 June, CSDB-3/655,373.6 At that time Nhu indicated, as he had previously, that if he
believed the government, meaning Diem, was becoming servile to the United States,
he himself would lead a coup d’etat.
- 5.
- Both Cao’s report and Khanh’s reports indicate that Nhu’s remarks had some
considerable impact upon the Generals. Cao believed that
Nhu’s statements had
relieved the critical situation, at least temporarily. Khanh stated that Nhu had been convincing in his
request
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for loyalty
and support, and that he believed that the majority of the
general officers would support Nhu. It was not clear from Khanh’s remarks that this
support would be provided within the context of a coup d’etat.
On the other hand, Kim
thought that the majority of the. Generals reacted negatively.
According to the general officer, Major General Nguyen Ngoc Le,
Chief of Veterans Affairs, commented on 12 July that he believed
that the Generals should proceed without Nhu since Nhu only sought to save
himself. We are inclined to believe that if the Generals should
consent to support Nhu,
it would be from their point of view a temporary marriage of
convenience.
- 6.
- It is still too early to evaluate exactly what Nhu may have in mind. It is
possible that the general officer has misread Nhu’s remarks which were
possibly made in the same vein as Nhu”. comments to an American observer on 25
June. This interpretation, however, must take into consideration
Nhu’s statement that
the coup must be staged overnight and must be lightning fast
followed by a turnover of power from the general officers to
civilian control. It is difficult to believe that this
construction could be based on the sometimes vague and
theoretical utterances of Nhu.
- 7.
- We believe that some Generals are planning, or at the very
least, far more intensively thinking about, coup action. How the
Generals plans or intentions may be advanced or retarded by
Nhu’s remarks is too
early to tell.
- 8.
- Even if one accepts the general officer’s account, it does not
necessarily follow that Nhu is in fact contemplating a coup. It is
possible that Nhu is
seeking to entrap the Generals in some fashion and might even be
doing so with the knowledge of Diem.
- 9.
- As a subsidiary comment, we conclude from these four reports
that Major General Tran Van
Don, Commander of the ARVN, claim to be a member of a coup group,
TDCS-3/552,8227
[document number not declassified]
comprising most of the general officers is exaggerated. From
these reports, it does not emerge that the Generals have reached
a consensus or are plotting as a single group, rather that there
may be two or more groups among them.8
- 10.
- Field Dissem. None.
