Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

202. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President¹

Washington, July 3, 1963.

FAR EAST ROUND UP

There follows a summary of the principal problems which currently face us in the Far East.

South Vietnam

The two-week truce between the GVN and the Buddhists signed on June 16th ended yesterday. We have received various reports from Buddhist circles that they are not satisfied with the manner in which the Government is implementing the agreement, particularly with respect to the release of prisoners, instructions to the province chiefs and rumors which have reached Buddhist ears that the Government does not intend to carry out the agreement in good faith. We have also received reports of coup plotting among the Buddhists and threats to resume demonstrations and incidents of self-destruction.

On the GVN side, we have fairly reliable information that Brother Nhu has been actively working to stir up phony popular demand that the truce agreement be disavowed by the Government, using his Republican Youth organization for this purpose. After a meeting of Diem’s family in Hue, the Times of Vietnam, a government-sponsored newspaper, came out on July 1 with a provocative article daring the Buddhist to resume demonstrations.²

These events, plus increasing recalcitrance on Diem’s part which has almost reached the point where communication with him has become difficult, has led us to believe that the situation is now more serious than ever. It is entirely possible that there will be a resumption of demonstrations, including self-immolations; and the incentive for organized plots against the regime is getting very high.

We have given Bill Trueheart, our Charge in Saigon, instructions to go to Diem and tell him that unless he makes a dramatic political gesture to the Buddhists reaffirming the July 16th agreement, we would expect further demonstrations in Saigon and would then be forced to make a strong statement disassociating the United States from the GVN’s policies towards the Buddhists.³ Ambassador Nolting does not agree with this approach and argues that it will succeed only in destroying the last vestiges of Diem’s confidence in us. Secretary Ball, Governor Harriman, Roger Hilsman and I feel that the political problem has come to such a point in the United States that we could not avoid public comment in the face of another bonze suicide, and that therefore we should leave no stone unturned to persuade Diem to change his attitude. Everyone recognizes that Diem’s position in South Vietnam has now become as critical as it has ever been, and that the United States may have to grope its way through governmental upheaval in Saigon.

Ambassador Nolting is being asked to return to Saigon on Monday.⁴ He has severe family problems which make it almost inhuman to require that he leave earlier. We are considering asking Secretary Rusk to persuade Ambassador Lodge to move up his scheduled departure for Saigon from September to August. We may need your help in this respect. In the meantime, Bill Trueheart has been doing an outstanding job. The main reason for asking Fritz Nolting to go back early is the inappropriateness of having our Ambassador away from his post during a crisis period.

State, the Agency and Defense are reviewing contingency plans in the event of a coup. At present our best hope in the event of an accident is to have the Vice President succeed Diem with the support of the principal army senior officers. Our policy is still to discourage a coup.

Despite the political turmoil in South Vietnam, the war against the Viet Cong seems to be progressing surprisingly well. Indeed the activity of the Vietnamese Army against the guerrillas has increased in the last two weeks.

[Here follows a summary of developments in Laos, Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand.]

1. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office File, Staff Memoranda, Forrestal. Secret. Also sent to McGeorge Bundy, under cover of a note from Forrestal which reads: “For your and the President’s week end reading.” (Ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Staff Memoranda: Michael Forrestal 11/62-11/63)
2. See footnote 2, Document 196.
3. Document 196.
4. July 8.