Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

194. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, June 29, 1963, 7 p.m.

1259. Deptel 1283.² Following is our assessment two points reftel:

1. We do not believe Buddhists “clearly divided” between older, moderate element and younger activists, as stated reftel. Nevertheless, available evidence suggests that there is group of Buddhist activists who are dissatisfied with agreement Buddhist leaders reached with GVN. Members this group probably not wholly agreed on their demands. Some apparently not so opposed to terms of agreement with GVN as they are suspicious of GVN’s intentions; therefore, they seek get GVN so publicly committed in detail on implementation of agreement that it would be very difficult for GVN to renege in future or to take retaliatory action against them. Until GVN so committed, this group likely agitate for continued public Buddhist expressions of dissatisfaction. This group’s ends do not seem to exceed legitimacy but its suspicions of GVN’s intentions could be difficult for GVN to allay.

Others in activist group without doubt have “tasted blood” of. politics and either see religious issue as way for political changes or have discarded religious issue for outright political objective—change in regime. This latter group appears seek to discredit GVN to extent possible and is willing to receive overtures from political opposition groups. Thus, this group (which may include bonze Tri Quang) has aims going beyond legitimate ends originally sought by Buddhists.

2. As Deptel indicates, we have received reports that GVN not intending to live up to its end of bargain. Many of these reports, [document number not declassified], come from Buddhists, often Tri Quang, but there is very solid evidence, as Department aware, that Nhus were bitterly opposed to agreement. I have on several occasions since GVN-Buddhist agreement signed June 16 made points contained paragraph 2 reftel and others (e.g. Embtels 1224 and 1231)³ and since then we have had no further evidence that Nhus actively seeking upset agreement. Much, we believe, now depends on outcome of Ngo family conference which almost certainly took place in Hue yesterday and today. If various steps previously envisaged are in fact carried out, there will be chance of isolating extremists from moderate Buddhist leadership. Even if all these steps are accomplished in timely fashion, however, suspicion of GVN in minds some Buddhists, particularly young activists of both types, very likely will remain. We will nevertheless continue pressure on GVN for constructive steps as tactical situation demands.⁴

3. Thoroughly agree with last sentence reftel.⁵

Trueheart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.
2. See footnote 4, Document 189.
3. Documents 184 and 185.
4. On June 29, Trueheart received a telegram sent personally from Forrestal in the White House which reads: “Everyone here thinks you are doing a grand job. Keep up the good work.” (Telegram CAP 63357 to Saigon, June 29; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, 6/63)
5. The last sentence of telegram 1283 to Saigon reads: “General thought here with which we are sure you will agree is that U.S. must at all costs not be put in position of assuming the responsibility for this internal religious matter.”