Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

170. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, June 13, 1963, 7 p.m.

1178. Embtel 1168.² Following is situation as of 1500 on GVN-Buddhist negotiations.

1. Immediately after arrival of Buddhist delegation June 12, Vice President Tho sent them letter proposing that delegation meet with GVN commission at 1800 same day. (This and other letters mentioned this message cast in polite and respectful language.) Buddhists replied that head bonze Khiet was very weak and tired as a result of 5-day fast and flight to Saigon and would be “incapable of thinking or acting for 3 or 5 days, the more so since Buddhism is at present observing mourning (grand deuil) throughout the country.” Letter proposed meeting take place “on another day which would be more convenient.” Tho replied last night that his commission had proposed early meeting because of desire expressed by Buddhists in a June 8 letter “to proceed rapidly to a satisfactory arrangement.” Tho went on to propose that meeting take place today, June 13, at an hour to be selected by Khiet. Tho said commission considered that there would be many disadvantages in deferring meeting; as for “grand deuil”, Tho said this was a problem which should not be linked with the planned meeting “especially in the present situation.”

2. Thuan informed me at lunch time that Buddhists have now replied to Tho letter agreeing to meet tomorrow, June 14, provided GVN accepts in advance their ex parse version of agreement reached at meeting of June 5, terms of which are set out in Buddhists’ letter.

3. According to Thuan, Buddhist version differs from what GVN commission understood had been agreed. GVN version exactly as he had given it to me at the time (Embtel 1114).³ Moreover, Buddhist version amounts to acceptance of “5 points” in full plus broadening of certain of them. Finally, Buddhists have implied that commission’s acceptance June 5 agreement committed GVN, whereas it was ad referendum, as demonstrated by fact Minh had insisted on returning to Hue to put agreement before his principals. When I questioned Thuan as to nature of additional Buddhist demands, he said that there were several and some were complicated but he cited as examples that (a) on flag issue, GVN would agree authorization of local authorities would not be required, (b) pagodas, which for centuries have been community property in hamlets, should be “turned over to administration of Buddhists” (Thuan said he himself was not sure what this meant) and (c) on Law No.10 Buddhists proposed not only that Assembly amend it, as had been agreed, but that in meantime President should amend it by decree.

4. Thuan said GVN commission, which met this morning, was disturbed over Buddhist insistence on getting full satisfaction before coming to meeting. Commission also felt obliged to set record straight about June 5 agreement, particularly as they had described it to President in very different terms. Commission was therefore meeting at 1500 to draft reply, which he thought would first set out GVN version of June 5 agreement and propose that parties meet tomorrow to seek to iron out differences.

5. I told Thuan that I did not think this was nearly good enough. What we were talking about was dramatic, conciliatory move. Reply he described would have appearance of careful preparation for bazaar-type negotiation. Buddhists could use it as an excuse for breaking off talks, if that was what they wanted to do. Moreover, differences between two versions, as he described them, did not seem to me to be of great importance.

6. After some discussion-in the course of which I sought to revive yesterday’s mood of urgency and in which Thuan did not develop any other idea himself on how to deal with letter-I suggested that commission’s reply might state that, while Buddhists’ letter does not accord in all respects with commission’s understanding of June 5 agreement, commission in spirit of amity and in interests of moving forward accepts Buddhists’ statement of agreement in principle and as basis for discussion. Letter could also refer to need for clarification of certain points, if that was the case. Such a reply, it seemed to me, would be difficult for Buddhists to reject and was in keeping with spirit of conciliation and with object of restoring Buddhists’ confidence in GVN. I reminded Thuan also that while GVN and Buddhists were busy writing letters to each other, possibility of incidents was ever present, whereas I felt there was less chance of this while parties were actually at conference table. Thuan seemed immediately attracted by my suggestion and said without further discussion that he would proceed to try to sell it and let me hear from him later this afternoon.⁴

7. In reply to my question as to whether there had been any reaction to memorandum I left with President yesterday, Thuan said it was still being “studied”.

Trueheart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution.
2. Document 169.
3. Document 155.

4. Trueheart cabled the Department 2 hours later to report:

   “Thuan telephoned me at 8:30 p.m.-believe he had been with Diem until that time-to say that reply being sent to Buddhists would quote from a previous Buddhist letter passage stating that agreement not reached at June 5 meeting and would go on to propose meeting at 9 a.m. tomorrow mornng. My suggestion paragraph 6 reference telegram not accepted, Thuan said. On other hand, GVN had apparently not found it necessary to include in reply its own version of June 5 agreement.” (Telegram 1180 from Saigon, June 13; Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET)