Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

166. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, June 11, 1963, 7 p.m.

1155. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 1196; Embtel 1138.²

A. following are factors in current Buddhist situation as we currently see it:

Buddhists

1. Buddhist demonstrations and opposition to GVN began as reaction to specific GVN limitations on religious expression (i.e., flying of Buddhist flags outside pagoda premises). Whether Buddhist reaction was spontaneous or premeditated is not clear; however, those actions in fact articulated long-standing Buddhist sense of grievance at religious discrimination. By now Buddhist actions have taken on political significance, partly because of GVN’s slowness to react politically to Buddhist demands, speed with which it has exercised repressive measures, transparent attempts of GVN to draw up “spontaneous” expression of Buddhist support, and opportunity issue provided to other dissatisfied elements to express opposition to GVN. While Buddhists still seeking largely religious ends, fact is that Buddhist leaders question GVN’s intentions and sincerity to such degree that some of them beginning question whether GVN as presently constituted will ever bring them satisfaction.

2. Buddhist actions have not all been above reproach. Although to Embassy’s knowledge, they are still seeking satisfaction only on their five demands, sufficient momentum may have developed behind their protest movement so that five demands will themselves be given liberal interpretation or be overtaken by larger and more extensive demands. Some Buddhists are reportedly talking about bringing about overthrow of GVN. In addition Buddhists have not respected propaganda truce but have been distributing tracts, encouraging further demonstrations, and sought to enlist foreign press in their cause.

3. There is no evidence that any specific political group is behind Buddhist unrest. On contrary, there is evidence that Buddhists have resisted temptation enlist aid political opposition groups and that in fact have repelled effort by such groups to jump on bandwagon overtly. Similarly, there is no evidence that VC are exerting any direct influence on Buddhists at this juncture; there is, however, some evidence that VC are waiting expectantly in wings for propitious moment to exploit situation politically and/or militarily.

4. Opposition to GVN’s position has tended to unify Buddhist groups; moreover, there is evidence that Buddhists are trying at least inform, if not organize, rural population in bid for their support. Their reasonably successful resistance to GVN without serious punishment so far has given them confidence. Thus, it is quite possible that Buddhists will press GVN beyond five demands. What is not so certain, however, is whether Buddhist groups sufficiently organized and cohesive to back any agreement reached by Buddhist leaders negotiating with GVN.

GVN

1. In early stages “Buddhist revolt” GVN undoubtedly misjudged strength Buddhist emotions and determination and thought Buddhists would bow quickly to forceful measures.

2. Constructive steps taken by GVN have come too slowly to have maximum impact on Buddhists, and such steps have been taken only under pressure of events or at strong US urging. GVN has at times given impression of being divided within itself on how to cope with Buddhists.

3. GVN from beginning has regarded Buddhist “revolt” as political problem and politically motivated since potential threat it poses to regime is political. In this regard, GVN finds itself in quandary, which to some extent explains its slow and uncertain actions to placate Buddhists, its tendency to use forceful measures to restore status quo, and even Mme. Nhu’s unhelpful statement. GVN realizes that giving satisfaction to Buddhists could (a) lead to further Buddhist demands and (b) temptations on part of other groups to follow Buddhist example.

B. At this moment, we believe there is still some chance that GVN will come to satisfactory terms with Buddhists. This will depend on whether dialogue between two parties can be maintained and whether it succeeds in dispelling suspicion and distrust on both sides. Even assuming that agreement can now be reached—and that Buddhist leaders can rally rank and file support for it—Buddhist revolt and GVN’s record of response to it will leave mark in terms further gap in communication between GVN and people, as well as in terms GVN fear that similar trouble will pop up elsewhere.

It is in context possibility that two parties can come to terms that GVN will be most receptive to suggestions under parts A and B of Deptel 1196. Regarding part A, suggestions (1) and (2) have already been raised informally with Thuan, who indicated that GVN exploring what action feasible on Decree 10 and that no official GVN commemoration planned for Pope John. We would be reluctant pass on suggestion (3) which certain to irritate GVN but unlikely have any important benefits, if accepted, since we doubt seriously that public understands Personalism or its background sufficiently for soft-pedalling it to have any impact. Re (4), I will suggest to General Harkins that he explore ways and means to raise this with GVN.

Suggestions under part B are of course for longer term. Their implementation now unlikely aid current situation materially, since any impact would take time. We concerned at suggestion (3) under part B, since it implies “packing the Assembly” with US blessing; also, given nature Assembly, Buddhists likely consider Assembly monks as kept men. Further, we question whether good idea deliberately mix religion and politics. We will explore how handle this one, but inclined believe we should go no further than suggesting that GVN consider feasibility of monks presenting candidacies for Assembly.

Above estimate was prepared prior self-cremation incident and today’s talk with Thuan. If dialogue between GVN and Buddhists breaks down or becomes harsher GVN likely be unwilling take actions Buddhist could interpret as weakness. For example, in connection with suggestion regarding monks in National Assembly, believe we cannot rule out possibility that if Buddhist unrest continues, Diem will postpone Assembly elections altogether or carry them out in “safe” areas of country.

Appreciate Department’s effort in preparing background study on Buddhism in Vietnam. Would like examine it before deciding to ask for Heavner WG’s services.³

Trueheart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC.
2. Telegram 1196 is printed as Document 159; regarding telegram 1138, see footnote 4 thereto.
3. See footnote 6, Document 159.