Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

165. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, June 11, 1963, 5 p.m.

1151. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 1148.² Saw Thuan at his house at lunch time. He had talked with President and Nhu this morning. Contrary reftel, he said there had been no Cabinet meeting. President had talked with individual ministers, however, and might assemble Cabinet this afternoon. He was urging conciliatory action on President and thought he was making some headway. His mood was quite different from last night, and I would guess that events of this morning have considerably strengthened his personal position.

I told Thuan that, in my judgment, GVN position abroad and probably in the country was very precarious. I doubted that position could be restored without an immediate, dramatic and conciliatory move by President Diem personally. Concessions which should be made would, I thought, have to go beyond things Thuan had privately told me last week Diem was prepared to do, and he would have to make his move in a manner which I knew went against his grain. I told Thuan, again as a personal opinion, that I thought if President did not do something of this sort this afternoon he might well be faced with a public US Government disassociation of itself from whole affair, with quite possibly a strong overtone of disapproval of GVN handling Buddhist problem since May 8. (This is, in fact, what I now recommend to Department unless we have action or the promise of it before the day is out.) Thuan took more or less verbatim notes of this and said he would bring it to the attention of the President at once.³

I also told Thuan that since Buddhist action this morning so obviously planned in advance, it seemed reasonable to suppose that there would be other incidents today. I said I was aware of movement of certain troop units to Saigon today and alerting of others. Possibility of clashes was therefore very real.

I also called to Thuan’s attention that Women’s Solidarity Movement had today published long letter of protest to UPI management on reporting of Neil Sheehan.⁴ On past form, I expected move to expel Sheehan. I said this was a “stupid” action. (Thuan asked if he could quote me and I said yes.) I said that I was also incensed, and knew Washington would be, that two days after the strongest warnings against Madame Nhu’s sounding off, she had done it again. I also pointed out that notwithstanding earlier statement that previous outburst would not appear in Vietnamese press, we had found that it was printed in two papers yesterday afternoon.

Thuan said he would let me know later this afternoon what progress he is making.⁵

Late item: As of noon, usually reliable CAS source indicated all VNAF personnel restricted to base effective 1230 hours. Air Force personnel additionally informed that they would receive instructions from JGS in early afternoon. VNAF Chief of Staff (Lt. Col. Do Khac Mai is a Buddhist) reportedly remarked to source that he and other senior officers were fed up with situation and that he could not understand why Americans stood by and lost golden opportunity to rectify situation in Vietnam, by which he clearly meant overthrow of government.

American employees and dependents have been notified to avoid crowds and demonstrations. USOM employees dismissed for afternoon, as USOM building very close to Xa Loi Pagoda. I have also asked principal to close American community school this afternoon. All above without public announcement.

At present situation quiet at Xa Loi Pagoda and at National Assembly.

Trueheart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC. Received at 7:37 a.m.
2. In telegram 1148 from Saigon, June 11, Trueheart reported that his conversations the previous evening with Thuan and Ngo Trong Hieu indicated that “as of that time Diem had decided situation fully under control and was preparing in a day or so to issue communique stating final government position.” Trueheart noted, however, that the situation had been “drastically changed by self-cremation of bonze in Central Saigon.” He stated that an emergency Cabinet session began sitting at 11:30 a.m. to consider the situation. Trueheart planned to see President Diem and “ask for dramatic conciliatory gesture.” (Ibid.)
3. In a radio address to the nation at 7 p.m., President Diem appealed for calm and noted that discussions with Buddhist leaders were continuing. He stated that extremists had distorted the facts of the situation, but he assured Buddhists that they “can count on the Constitution, in other words, on me.” (Telegram 1156 from Saigon, June 11, received at 8:59 a.m., Ibid.)
4. This letter, which was published in the Times of Viet-Nam on June 11, was summarized in telegram 1153 from Saigon, June 11. (Ibid.)
5. Trueheart saw Thuan at 6 p.m. and found him in a “relatively optimistic mood.” Thuan hoped that President Diem’s radio address would serve to maintain calm until the meeting scheduled for the following day with Buddhist leaders. Thuan would not say what concessions government negotiators would be prepared to make, but Trueheart noted that the Vice President’s Commission was “very much back in business today.” (Telegram 1157 from Saigon, June 11; received at 9:06 a.m; Ibid.)