Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, June 8, 1963, 5:37 p.m.

1196. As result preliminary study Buddhist problem here, following suggestions submitted for your consideration:

A. Immediate Actions

(1) Since Decree Law 10 apparently one of chief Buddhist grievances, suggest GVN be urged repeal it immediately by decree without waiting for action by National Assembly, which we understand will not meet until September. Believe under his emergency powers Diem could thus demonstrate GVN good faith, move toward prompt solution this issue.

(2) You or Nuncio suggest GVN avoid giving mourning for Pope John² any official cast.

(3) Believe might be well urge GVN at least temporarily play down Personalism in public pronouncements and GVN propaganda because of popular identification Personalism with Catholicism.

(4) Believe it would be helpful if RVNAF now appointed Buddhist chaplains. Understand Buddhists may later demand this move and see no reason why GVN should not forestall them. In urging such action you might point out even US army has few Buddhist chaplains. Perhaps this matter could be raised on strictly military level, between MACV and ARVN, without going to GVN.

B. Institutional Channels for Buddhist-GVN Communication

(1) At local level as we have previously suggested (Deptel 1170)³ believe recognition by GVN of village cult committees (Hoi Hung) would be most useful step. Probably GVN should not attempt create such committees where they don’t exist as they would then be patently creatures of GVN. Rather local GVN officials should be ordered to meet with them regularly, even if meetings non-productive, and meetings should be publicized.

(2) At national level we earlier suggested creation of Dept Religious Affairs under direction respected lay Buddhist. After further consideration realize it would be difficult find person who could represent and be respected by all citizens of Viet-Nam with their wide variety of religious beliefs. Further, position of such a person in GVN would soon be made impossible by members President Diem’s family.

Alternatively suggest for Embassy’s consideration that GVN might be encouraged to create a National Religious Council (under whatever name seemed best) to which leaders all Buddhist and Christian denominations and sects would be invited to send representatives. Such an organization could be somewhat on model National Economic Council which has been favorably regarded by the GVN and would deal with Vice President Tho’s Commission.

(3) DRV has two monks in National Assembly (point which was emphasized last meeting World Federation Buddhists). Might be very effective gesture for GVN to permit several monks or lay Buddhist leaders run for and win seats in August National Assembly elections.

C. In addition your consideration and comments on above suggestions, also request your estimate of whether or not specific political groups are behind Buddhist unrest, degree of political motivation Buddhist leaders and demonstrators, any evidence political groups gaining control of Buddhist organizations. Is there evidence Buddhist leaders are trying to organize rural population to support their demands? Also believe it important that we know whether Diem regards Buddhist “revolt” as primarily political or religious in motivation and would like your view.⁴

Department is preparing on crash basis draft study on Buddhism in Viet-Nam based on consultation with Gard and other knowledgeable persons here and on quick review available documentation. Recommendations this telegram based on this study.⁵

Dept will pouch study next week and suggests Embassy use it as starting point for more thorough study in Viet-Nam. This might be responsibility qualified Embassy officer who would be given authority work with and call on all parts Saigon Task Force. If Embassy desires, Dept will try arrange send Heavner who was in charge study here, to Saigon for about 10 days to help out with understanding final study would be Embassy responsibility.⁶ It would be difficult spare Heavner now and funds always a problem, but Dept prepared make every effort if requested by Embassy.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Heavner and Wood and cleared by Hilsman. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Pope John XXIII died on June 3.
3. In telegram 1170 to Saigon, June 3, the Department asked whether the Hoi Hung could be “officially reconstituted to include reps all local religions as well as village cult, officially recognized, and given advisory role to village and hamlet councils? Such step could be billed as GVN effort provide full religious freedom and representation within context strategic hamlet program.” (Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET)
4. On June 9, the Embassy replied, in telegram 1138 from Saigon: “Appreciate Department’s suggestions reference telegram. First two suggestions under immediate actions have already been discussed informally with Thuan (National Assembly in session until end June; would not propose insist on presidential action if GVN can produce prompt Assembly action on decree 10).” (Ibid.)
5. The results of the draft study on the Buddhist problem were summarized in a June 8 memorandum from Wood to Hilsman. (Ibid., Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, POL 25 Demos Protests Riots) A more comprehensive study of the Buddhist problem was submitted to Hilsman on July 2 in a memorandum by Richard A. Gard entitled “U.S. Policy and Program Considerations Regarding Buddhism in Asia.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA/IAF/VN Files: FRC 68 A 4933, POL 13-6 Political Affairs and Relations, Buddhists 1964/1965)
6. A June 20 letter from Trueheart to Wood indicates that Wood had enclosed the draft study on Buddhism in a letter to Trueheart on June 10. Trueheart wrote that the background provided by the study was “most helpful”, but that “events have gone beyond the stage where a study of Buddhism in Vietnam in greater depth by the Task Force here would be worth the considerable effort it would entail.” Consequently, Trueheart did not feel that it would be necessary for Heavner to come to Saigon. (Ibid., RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files,FRC 67 A 677, 570.3 Religion, Church, Buddhist Affairs (May-June 1963)