Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, June 1, 1963, 1:59 p.m.

1168. Embtel 1085 [1084].² Approve your careful and thoughtful handling this difficult and important matter in talks with Thuan. While recognizing Diem’s sensitivity it is also true that it is difficult for US with its large stake in Viet-Nam to support GVN in face almost worldwide liberal criticism plus growing Buddhist criticism.

Following thoughts may be helpful:

1. Diem or other GVN members should keep talking with Buddhists even if there is no one group of accredited leaders. Such talks should be reported in press (as done by VN press Embtel 1038).³ Would be useful if commission could be appointed, but meanwhile conversations should be kept open. Eventual appointment of a moderate lay Buddhist leader as Secretary of State Religious Affairs might be useful permanent channel. Buddhist demands and Diem’s replies reported Embtel 1038 both seem reasonable. Given peaceful nature and divided leadership of Buddhists continued talks may serve calm immediate crisis and give time for longer range constructive action.

2. Agree that unrest has political as well as religious motivation, but believe it would be unwise for GVN to make any further moves to place blame on Communists. Naming them would make them an officially recognized party to the dispute and downgrade genuine grievances Buddhists themselves have. Would seem best ignore Communists and deal as reasonably as possible with Buddhists.

3. Dept prepared appoint interagency committee under Heavner to prepare report for Embassy background on whatever information on Buddhism in Viet-Nam available here. Fear there is little but prepared move rapidly if requested by Embassy.

4. Believe it would be wise seek persuade GVN use only force necessary maintain order. Bringing in US supplied M-113’s and other heavy equipment likely increase resentment Buddhists. Can this type equipment be kept in background? Local US advisers might follow up. Is it true that M-113’s ran over bodies after May 8 incident Hue?⁴

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Wood and cleared by Rice and Hilsman. Repeated to Bangkok and to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Reference is apparently to telegram 1084 from Saigon, which reported Trueheart’s conversation with Thuan on June 1 (see Document 141), rather than telegram 1085, Document 142.
3. Document 129.
4. In telegram 1112 from Saigon, June 5, the Embassy responded that “there were no M-113’s employed, only armed British and U.S. scout cars.” It was impossible to tell, from an examination of the bodies, how they were killed. (Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET)