Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

109. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, May 6, 1963, 7 p.m.

987. CINCPAC for POLAD and Ambassador Nolting. Deptel 951, Emb A-651.²GVN replied May 4 to ICC concerning DRV charges on “noxious chemicals” (copies being pouched). Reply asserts charges completely without foundation, explains purpose defoliation operations in RVN; claims no chemical product other than 2,4-D 2,4,5-T has “ever” been used, particularly arsenites and others alleged by Hanoi. Letter says DRV charges constitute inadmissible interference in internal affairs of RVN; notes Communist propaganda effort aims at diverting international attention from VC aggressive acts (it mentions particularly VC arsonists in Saigon) in face realization that VN people: turning away from Communist propaganda (Strategic Hamlet and Chieu Hoi programs are cited). GVN letter also encloses text President Diem’s VOA interview (Emb A-552)³ and Professor Buu Hoi’s April 15 press conference this subject (Emb A-628).⁴ Finally, letter says in event “some” members ICC wish to form “personal opinion” GVN mission will arrange with local authorities for them to go to provinces where VC propaganda alleges defoliation caused damage or claimed victims.

We consider letter generally good (although claim that no other chemicals than 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T used is not true and no mention made of crop destruction) but final reference to visit more forthcoming than we would have preferred. Colonel An, Chief GVN Mission to ICC, explained to Embassy officer wording of this paragraph had been changed from “invitation” to offer to “arrange if requested” in light Embassy’s views; draft had then been discussed with Foreign Minister Mau and President Diem who “instructed” An leave offer in. An requested our assistance in obtaining British and Canadian support for position outlined in letter.

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

It continues our strong conviction (with which Colonel An [less than 1 line not declassified] agree) ICC investigation would be counterproductive and latest offer to arrange visit should not be permitted provide opening wedge such investigation. Would be helpful if New Delhi, Ottawa, London, and Department would continue use appropriate opportunities emphasize this position. We plan continue taking this position here with Canadians, British and GVN.

Concerning New Delhi’s 4123⁵ to Department, Embassy fully agrees first pare Deptel 1000.⁶ On question legal committee report,⁷ believe its release would have considerable exploitable value to us even though information old and we should seek avoid quid pro quo between non-publication of report and ICC decision not to investigate chemicals charges. In view immediate necessity preventing ICC investigation, however, and fact our views on legal report recently conveyed Indians, believe we should concentrate on “noxious chemicals” charges and not add to potential linkup those charges with legal report by pressing for latter at this time.

Manfull

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 S VIET Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC, London, New Delhi, and Ottawa.
2. In telegram 951 to Saigon, April 12, the Department concurred in the Embassy’s proposal to encourage the Government of Vietnam to limit the response to the North Vietnamese charges to a denial. (Ibid.,POL 27-10 S VIET) Airgram A-651 from Saigon, April 23, transmitted a copy of the April 8 letter from the ICC to the Government of Vietnam requesting a response to North Vietnamese charges that noxious chemicals had been used to carry out “collective reprisals” against the people of South Vietnam. (Ibid., POL 27 S VIET)
3. In the interview, which was conducted by the Voice of America on March 17, Diem characterized the North Vietnamese charges as “a pure fabrication”. (Airgram A-552 from Saigon, March 26; Ibid., POL 27-10 S VIET)
4. On April 15, Professor Buu Hoi, Director of the Vietnamese Atomic Energy Office, held a press conference in Saigon to explain that defoliants and herbicides were not harmful to humans or animals and could have beneficial effects. (Airgram A-628 from Saigon, April 18; Ibid.)
5. In telegram 4123 from New Delhi, April 23, the Embassy noted that Indian officials inclined to the view that it might be better if the ICC investigated the North Vietnamese charges and refuted them rather than dismiss them and leave the question open for further exploitation by the North Vietnamese. (Ibid.)
6. The first paragraph of telegram 1000 to Saigon, April 25, outlined the Department of State’s conviction that given Polish membership, the ICC was unlikely to clear the Government of Vietnam rapidly of the noxious chemical charges. Rather, the investigation would probably be prolonged with continued propaganda exploitation by the North Vietnamese. (Ibid.)
7. Not further identified.