Office of the Historian

104. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy)1

Washington, May 1, 1963.

Dear Bill: I was glad to discuss with you the problem of jets for Viet-Nam. Having thought it over, I believe on balance that it is best not to provide the Vietnamese Air Force with jets at this time. Certainly we should consider whether they should have jets before our extraordinary assistance is withdrawn, but this is some years off. Unless some new and important factors arise, I suggest we let the matter rest for the time being.

Certainly American pilots in F-101’s can do a better job of photo reconnaissance than Vietnamese pilots in T-33’s. It would not lead to a significant reduction in U.S. personnel. There thus doesn’t seem to be a compelling reason for changing now. As you say, we have violated the Geneva Accords in the past. We have been cited for these violations. However, in each case our actions resulted in an important increase in Viet-Nam’s ability to defend itself (e.g. helicopters and M-113’s). The reason our violations have not caused greater repercussions is because we made it clear to the ICC that we were helping Viet-Nam defend itself. Tacit Indian recognition of this point was shown by the helpful ICC report of June 2, 1962,2 which came close to charging North Viet-Nam with aggression. We are still trying to get a legal report out of the ICC which could give us more useful ammunition. Thus, we don’t want to rock the tippy ICC boat more than we have to. Jets are an emotional subject with them which we should not take on without compelling reasons. Herbicides in Viet-Nam and the whole situation in Laos are already giving us enough to do with the ICC.

Finally, so long as the jets are ours we can pull them out any time it is in our interest to do so. To give them to the Vietnamese could be considered an escalation. The war seems to be going our way under the terms in which it is now being fought. We shouldn’t give the other side a pretext to change the terms unless we thereby obtained a decided advantage.

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In short, giving the Vietnamese jets at this time will not shorten the war or materially reduce the American commitment. It would risk international repercussions which we are anxious to avoid.

In saying the above, I do not mean of course to close the door on this issue. I think it should be reviewed whenever the situation has so changed as to warrant reconsideration.3

Sincerely yours,

Roger Hilsman
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 67 A 4564, Vietnam 1963 333 Jan. Secret. The copy of this letter in Department of State files indicates that it was drafted on April 18 by Wood and cleared by Harriman, Johnson (G), and Rice. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-S Viet)↩
  2. For excerpts of the Special Report issued in Saigon on June 2, 1962, by the International Commission for Supervision and Control, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1103-1106.↩
  3. On May 17, Secretary of Defense McNamara sent a memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which noted the continuing reservations of the Department of State on the question of the delivery of jet aircraft to the Republic of Vietnam. In light of those reservations, McNamara directed that the 4 RT-33 and 2 T-33 aircraft earmarked for Vietnam in the fiscal year 1962 Military Assistance Program be reallocated to meet other requirements. In addition, McNamara wrote: “As I mentioned at the Honolulu Conference on 6 May, we should take a hard look at the plans for delivering jet aircraft under future year programs for Vietnam. I feel that the plans presented at Honolulu were unrealistic in this regard. Aside from the political aspects, I have reservations as to the advisability, on cost effectiveness grounds, of providing jets for Vietnam before the insurgency is under control. Request that you give special attention to this matter in your review of the CINCPAC Military Assistance Plan for Vietnam.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 3131, Vietnam 452)

    Regarding the Honolulu conference, see Document 107.

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