84. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
2284. Our views on numbered points Depcirctel 14762 are as follows:
- (1)
- As in Laos, can assume Moscow wishes avoid enlargement of hostilities into international conflict which would heighten risk of major war. In this sense Vietnam not vital Soviet interest. However, if balance should tip in South Vietnamʼs favor, Soviets might feel obliged to re-dress balance through greater support of DRV: 1) to meet threat to DRV itself, and 2) to prevent Chinese from coming in large way.
- (2)
- Although Moscow likely prefer peaceful resolution of Vietnam problem, it cannot afford to appear soft regarding expansion of communism in colonial areas, if for no other reason than this would seem to confirm Chinese arguments in ideological dispute. Likely Moscow approach would be to use growing tension over Vietnam as pressure to convene international conference in 1954 Geneva framework.
- (3)
- In past Soviets may have been confident that South Vietnam would fall to Communists sooner or later, but vigorous and effective US support for South Vietnam would change situation, especially if latter became strong enough to expand military operations into DRV.
- (4)
-
a. Establishment of “liberated” area and “government” in South Vietnam would not necessarily pose dilemma for Soviets, although likely that they would oppose these moves until possibility of reactivating international machinery explored further. Moscow for example has not recognized FLN de jure, although it supports latter materially and with propaganda.
b. Do not believe Soviets so much concerned over revelation of split with Chinese as they are with preserving their influence in DRV. Possible that Soviets will promise logistic support to DRV to preempt Chinese intervention as they did in Laos.
Vukolicʼs point regarding “influential groups” in USSR strikes us as typically Yugoslav. Do not believe there is serious division of opinion here regarding Vietnam and all major elements of regime, including military, likely be opposed to escalation there.
Soviet press has not indicated what purpose is of Ponomaryev mission currently in DRV. Presumably this related to Soviet-Chinese ideological dispute, but it could also be engaged in seeking DRV agreement to cautious policy in South Vietnam.
Soviet policy toward Vietnam will be very much influenced by outcome in Laos as well as by developments in other major East-West problems such as disarmament and Berlin. In many respects Soviet policy appears to be approaching a crossroads and developments in any one of these problems could well affect general course of Soviet policy toward West as well as toward Commie China. Whatever Soviet longer-range policy on Vietnam question may be I am convinced that for present they would prefer avoid any decisive actions there.