Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

43. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)¹

Saigon, February 3, 1962—12:05 p.m.

MAGPO 779. JCS pass to Task Force VN Wash. Reference: JCS 041835Z Dec 61.²

1. Official GVN request has been received from Secretary Thuan for commencement crop warfare program. In his request, Thuan stated instructions are being given to RVNAF to avoid damage to crops belonging to government supporters and to take such preventive measures as may be required to avoid adverse political or psychological reaction. Action now being taken to determine if instructions meet requirements ref msg for resettlement displaced persons and alternated food supply system. VN Chairman, Joint Planning Committee for Defoliation and Crop Warfare, had previously been made aware of US position as stated in ref msg and is currently trying to ensure that instructions from DOD include appropriate provisions to meet requirement although in the past Vietnamese have been generally cool to idea of specific plans for resettlement and alternate food supply. VN position, not officially expressed, has stemmed from following arguments:

A. Crop warfare is primarily a GVN show. All missions to be flown by VNAF personnel in VNAF helicopters against targets selected by Vietnamese.

B. RVNAF is currently engaged in a crop warfare program. In their reparations in the field, VC crops and food caches are destroyed whenever found. Chemicals, therefore, are regarded as just another and more effective means of doing something RVNAF is already doing.

C. Chemicals will only be employed in areas not under GVN control and where population either VC or VC supporters. Food supply has been a major concern of the VC. Denial of food would drive VC and their supporters out of their safe haven at last. They would then be handled as the individual situation dictated. The ideal being to resettle and reorient all except hard-core Communists.

2. After considerable US pressure to get defoliation program going, there are some indications that Vietnamese are now becoming impatient with US restrictions imposed on employment of chemicals. President Diem has always actively supported crop warfare program. Now that chemicals are here, VNAF helicopters equipped and target areas selected, GVN anxious to start.

3. There is always the possibility, no matter how great the precautions, that spray operations may produce an adverse effect among people who would support the government under more favorable circumstances. A similar risk is involved when conventional weapons are employed to reduce an area regarded as a VC stronghold. Even though we may [?] in having the Vietnamese develop a plan on paper that is considered satisfactory and meets the requirements of ref msg, we have no assurance that the provisions of the plans will be faithfully excused. once chemicals are released to the VN, it will be virtually impossible to determine if those targets scheduled to be hit are the ones that are actually sprayed. US can participate in planning for crop warfare but US participation in its execution has already been ruled out.

4. American Embassy has decided to take another hard look at crop warfare program to see if political disadvantages outweigh military advantages. They are currently in process of drafting a Task Force message on this subject to be coordinated in the near future. Above information submitted as background in the event Embassy now takes a position against any crop warfare. At such time as draft of Task Force msg received, MAAG will make specific comments and recommendations. At present time feel there are military advantages to be gained in crop warfare and that a complete reversal of US position would be hard to justify to Diem.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Top Secret. Repeated to the JCS, which was requested to pass it to the Vietnam Task Force This telegram was also passed to the White House. A handwritten note at the top of the source text reads: “Bundy—See last para.”
2. Not found.