Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

329. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, December 15, 1962—6 p.m.

598. Ref. Deptel 588.² Deptʼs assumption first para reftel correct as far as US Farmgate aircraft concerned. As reported Embtel 567,³ Gen. Harkins refused permit use of US aircraft to deliver napalm in Zone D operation because of absence hard evidence of VC concentrations sufficiently large to promise military benefits outweighing political and psywar risks involved. On other hand, GVN has in its possession quantity of napalm provided under MAP, and uses it on basis its own judgment of requirements and effects. Thus US does not have direct control of RVNAFʼs use of napalm on SVN territory any more than it controls use of any other weapon in RVNAF arsenal provided under MAP. At same time, however, RVNAF does not have air delivery capability for large quantities napalm and, as in case of Zone D operation, had to call on us for additional delivery capability. Thus, in terms use large amounts napalm, US in fact has control and is exercising it.

Zone D operation constitutes first time RVNAF has proposed employ large quantities of napalm. Question has not arisen in past and is unlikely arise often in future. Regarding effects of using napalm on GVNʼs ability gain support of populace, we aware reports that during Indochina War napalm considered here as white colonialistsʼ weapon against yellow “natives”. However, we have no evidence of any kind suggesting this attitude has been transferred to GVNʼs use of napalm. Nor do we have any reason believe local people single out napalm or any other particular weapon used by GVN as reason for supporting VC or at least being anti-GVN. While it true that Hanoi from time to time accuses “US-Diem” of widespread and inhumane use of napalm, and other weapons no evidence this line we have has had effect in SVN or that it has been exploited outside SVN.

In Embassyʼs view, adverse political and psychological impact of napalm on attitudes of population would differ from impact of other weapons only to degree napalm more deadly as destroyer than rockets, bombs or large or small arms. Believe question is therefore not so much use of napalm as against use rockets or any other deadly weapon, but rather degree discrimination and care applied in use of all weapons. As indicated above, we are exercising discrimination and care in question use of US aircraft for delivery large quantities napalm.

As for GVN use of stocks napalm and other weapons of destruction, we must depend upon discrimination and care with which GVN prosecutes this war in accordance agreed objectives. Overall agreed policy objective is, of course, to win the support of the people. The expeditious prosecution of the war is a “sine qua non” of this. The overall objective, constantly reiterated and discussed between GVN and US officials in many contexts, is, we think, becoming more and more understood and adopted by GVN forces. This includes greater care and discrimination in target selection and in the use of weapons. Since any lethal weapon is disliked and feared by any enemy in direct proportion to its effectiveness, the use of napalm, crop destroyers, high explosive bombs, claymore mines, and others will predictably provoke protests from hostile propaganda forces.

With respect to last para reftel, COMUS MACV feels restraints already imposed are making it difficult enough to carry the war to the heart of the enemy and tend to set up inviolable sanctuaries where the VC can take a breather. In light of the above explanations, and taking into consideration the need for quick response and action in planning and execution of military operations, I agree with General Harkins that requirement of last para reftel is not necessary, and I request reconsideration. In any event, the instruction is so imprecise (e.g., what is definition of large amounts) that we feel discretion in this important matter should be left with Task Force Saigon.⁴

Nolting

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-1562. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad.
2. Document 326.
3. See Document 326, footnote 2.
4. On December 21, the Embassy in Saigon was granted the discretion requested in this telegram, but was asked to seek advance approval from the Departments of State and Defense for any operations that were likely to have significant political repercussions. (Telegram 617 to Saigon; Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5614/12-2162)