321. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
537. In talk with Thuan at his request November 19, following matters discussed:
- 1.
- Progress Against VC Insurgency. Thuan briefed me on contents VC documents recently captured in An Lac operation. (We have copies of these, now being translated.) According Thuan, these documents, mostly letters from VC officers in high plateau area, describe a situation of severe lack of food, medicines, recruits; generally low morale, desertions, and fear of ARVN attack. Asked whether this was local condition around An Lac, or typical of larger area, Thuan said he thought it applied generally to high plateau (roughly GVN Second Corps area), but this not entirely clear from captured letters. He said President Diem, greatly encouraged by these reports, had briefed his military commanders on them, stressing necessity to keep up military pressure everywhere in highlands; necessity to enforce strict controls over drugs and food distribution; and feasibility of attacking areas like An Lac where ARVN had previously feared to go. I asked Thuan whether this picture of VC demoralization did not offer just the opportunity we have been looking for to start large-scale defections and surrenders by a well-organized country-wide amnesty program. I suggested something like Magsaysayʼs “all-out friendship or all-out war” program, tailored to Vietnamese psychology. He said this had been again discussed and that a program of this kind would be launched at Tet (late January).
- 2.
- External Relations. From discussion of above, I led into dangers to Viet-Nam and to progress achieved here from too narrow and inflexible a policy vis-à-vis Viet-Namʼs neutral neighbors, especially Cambodia. I told him again of our deep concern re RKGʼs threat to [Page 742] invite ChiComs into Cambodia if Sihanoukʼs fears of aggression from Viet-Nam and Thailand were not calmed. I said I did not know what USGʼs position on proposed neutrality statute would be (since we had not seen text), but that GVN ought to be as concerned to find a way out of dilemma made by this move as we are—even more so. I said I felt GVNʼs handling of the issues with Cambodia (border incidents, notes, debt settlement, etc.), regardless of the rights and wrongs on specific issues, had been slow, unimaginative, and inept. If in fact their aim was to calm Sihanouk down and prevent his pushing his demands and threats too far, they should be more skillful in dealing with him. I said we were counting on GVN, and specifically Thuan as Min. of Defense and Acting Min. of Foreign Affairs, to avoid anything which could be interpreted as hostile towards Cambodia on the one hand, and to promote some constructive moves on the other. Thuan said this subject was most difficult. Without contesting that GVN had not been forthcoming or adept in dealing with Sihanouk, he said this was inevitable when GVNʼs president was constantly being attacked personally by Sihanouk as a “bloody dictator,” etc. Under these circumstances, he said, it was most difficult to achieve a flexible and realistic policy, even though such a policy would be “smart”. I asked him point-blank whether there were any grounds whatsoever for Sihanoukʼs fear that GVN had designs to overthrow him or to take any aggressive moves against his country. Thuan answered that there were no grounds whatsoever. I said we continued to get from time to time reports that GVN agents were plotting with Cambodian dissidents, and that Sihanouk apparently believed this to be the case. Thuan denied that this was going on. I then stressed again necessity on the military side to avoid any actions which would exacerbate this situation and might lead to introduction of ChiCom forces on the flank of Viet-Nam. Thuan said he realized the importance of this and would do everything possible to minimize the chances. I told him that we would rely on that. Thuan said that GVN would not enter into an international agreement on the Laos pattern with Cambodia, because this would be tantamount to condemning themselves as aggressors, which they are not. He said the Thai Government felt the same way.
Thuan then said that GVN, despite gratification over internal success, continued to be deeply concerned and alarmed over developments in Laos, where, he said, General Phoumi is bitter against the U.S. and left wing is continuing to make progress among the people. He said that any reduction of Phoumiʼs forces would simply mean transferring those soldiers to support Pathet Lao. He then said GVN was convinced that French Government has made deliberate policy decision to try to restore French influence throughout former Indo-China states through extension of neutralism, with “U.S. paying the bill”. He said French are doing this through Souvanna Phouma in [Page 743] Laos and through “French lawyers” and men like Charles Mayer in Cambodia. He said while GVN fully trusted U.S. intentions in Vietnam, they were deeply worried by U.S. “trustfulness” of French policy. I said that we are not as naive as this statement seemed to imply, that perhaps we had better information on French policy than GVN, whose views on this matter were somewhat prejudiced.
There are good reasons to believe that GVN is genuinely concerned over Cambodian developments and are doing their best to prevent border incidents. On the other hand, I do not expect any effective soothing salve to be applied by GVN, nor any real dexterity in dealing with this ticklish issue.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2162. Secret. Repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, CINCPAC, London, and Paris.↩