Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

268. Memorandum From the Former Political Counselor of Embassy in Vietnam (Mendenhall) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rice)¹

Washington, August 16, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Viet-Nam—Assessment and Recommendations

I have prepared this memorandum in accordance with your request that I set down my views on the Viet-Nam problem. It is confined to fundamentals, and makes no attempt to deal with other aspects of relative importance.

1. Situation

1959-1962. The Viet Cong have increased their armed regulars in South Viet-Nam from roughly 2,000 in late 1959 to about 20,000 today. The latter figure has remained fairly stationary during 1962, but in view of GVN claims of heavy Viet Cong casualties each month the Viet Cong obviously continue to be readily able to replace large losses. Infiltration from North Viet-Nam is not to be belittled as a source of this strength, but the majority of VC forces have been locally recruited and continue to be so.

In late 1959 the GVN had effective control over almost all of South Viet-Nam (except for old Communist base areas like the Plaine des Joncs). One could travel, at least by day, almost anywhere in Viet-Nam without escort, and in Central Viet-Nam security was virtually absolute. Today the Viet Cong effectively control large areas of the countryside except when GVN security forces enter in adequate numbers, and much of the rest of the countryside oscillates between the two sides. Real government control is largely confined to the cities and towns.

Current Trend. While the rapid deterioration of September-October, 1961, especially in anti-Communist morale, was stopped by increased U.S. military aid and improvements in GVN military capabilities, the present overall security trend continues gradually against us. In the Central Viet-Nam lowlands provinces security has seriously deteriorated during 1962. The Central Viet-Nam highlands provinces are, on the other hand, in better shape than at the end of 1961, but this seems attributable, in part at any rate, to Viet Cong shift in focus from that area to the lowlands where ethnic Vietnamese recruits and food are available.

In southern Viet-Nam (the provinces south and immediately to the north of Saigon) the military situation is superficially a stand-off, but it is actually somewhat in our disfavor as Communist-initiated incidents continue at a high level and the populace is thus not getting effective government protection. Isolated areas (like Father Hoaʼs area at the southern tip of Viet-Nam) have improved, but they represent the exception rather than the rule.

Prospect. The future trend is likely to continue to be gradual deterioration, with perhaps an occasional dramatic large-scale Communist incident carried out for psychological purposes. There is no immediate prospect of Communist conversion of their guerrillas into conventional forces, but they may feel this will not be necessary for their take-over of South Viet-Nam. They may instead decide to depend upon war fatigue in South Viet-Nam and/or the U.S.

If the war drags on with gradual deterioration and no hope of victory, the danger will arise of a switch in political sentiment among the South Vietnamese educated class from strong anti-Communism to neutralism as the only way to stop the war. From the U.S. standpoint I believe this would be disastrous as neutralization of South Viet-Nam alone would shortly lead to Communist take-over from North Viet-Nam.

2. Why Are We Losing?

Fundamental Factor. President Diem and his weaknesses represent the basic underlying reason for the trend against us in the war. Under present circumstances his excellent qualities of intelligence and courage are outweighed by two great weaknesses: a) the organizational inefficiency of his government resulting from his failure to take decisions, refusal to delegate, lack of chain-of-command, refusal to permit errors and distrust; and b) his inability to rally the masses to his support because of his defects as a politician. To win against the Communists, the Government of Viet-Nam should be either efficient or popular, but the Diem Government is neither.

There is common agreement on the essentiality of support of the population if our side is to win the war. Since the GVN does not now have this support, it cannot get adequate intelligence from the people to rout the enemy, and the enemy continues to be able to maintain its strength through recruitment from the population.

To break this vicious circle, the government must win the support of the villagers by providing adequate protection and helping them improve their lot. This the strategic hamlet program is designed in theory to do, but the Diem Governmentʼs organizational inefficiency and poor political approach give little promise that the program will be effectively implemented by that government.

Despite frequent U.S. prodding over many months no real priorities for the establishment of strategic hamlets have been set up, and no systematic allocation of limited civilian and military resources has been made in support of the program. Instead prominent officials are pushing forth everywhere at once to complete the number which will satisfy the pressures from Saigon, even though in almost all essential respects many—probably the bulk—of these hamlets will be inadequate to achieve their purposes and the people will often have been forced to labor in vain.

The political approach used under Nhuʼs tutelage in the strategic hamlets (establishment of mass organizations and reliance on “self-help”, i.e., forced labor) is more likely to alienate than win the people, and the election of hamlet officials by secret ballot is likely in Viet-Namʼs atmosphere to be a sham. The economic and social component of the program—vital to gaining active support of the people—has received virtually no GVN emphasis to date except in a few model hamlets and the two clear-and-hold areas where we have been operating closely with the Vietnamese. For all these reasons there is a serious risk of compromising the strategic hamlet program in the eyes of the people.

There is no chance of changing Diem and Nhuʼs political ways or methods of organization and governing. Diem is too old and set in his mandarinal ways. Both he and Nhu are convinced they know Viet-Nam better than anyone else, and thus infrequently accept advice. Both likewise so basically distrust almost everyone outside the family that they are completely disinclined to change their “divide and rule” method of governing.

3. Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion: That we cannot win the war with the Diem-Nhu methods, and we cannot change those methods no matter how much pressure we put on them.

Recommendation: Get rid of Diem, Mr. and Mrs. Nhu and the rest of the Ngo family.

Alternatives:

a. Vice President Tho and General “Big” Minh as a duumvirate, with Tho succeeding constitutionally to the Presidency and Minh, the most popular general, in charge of the armed forces. This would be the preferred alternative. Thoʼs qualities as a politician and flexibility outweigh his weaknesses. Equally important, while a government by him and Minh might per se not be much more efficient than the Diem Government, they would permit U.S. advisors to operate closely on the civilian as well as the military side, and thus give us the chance largely refused by Diem and Nhu of infusing efficiency into the GVNʼs operations.

b. General Le Van Kim and General “Big” Minh. If Vice President Tho refuses to cooperate in the overthrow of Diem (and no one can say whether he would until he is sounded), then a combination of Kim (the most intelligent of all the generals) and Minh would be the second alternative. At present Kim is Minhʼs deputy in the Field Command, and it would probably be acceptable to Minh for Kim to run the Government and Minh the armed forces.

c. Tran Quoc Buu, President of the Vietnamese Confederation of Christian Workers. Head of the only important organization in Viet-Nam not under government control, Buu has the qualities of a good politician, and knows how to influence the people. An early close colleague of Nhuʼs in organizing the Can Lao Party, he is no longer close to the Ngo family, but has not broken completely with it. What Buuʼs relations with the military would be are not known, nor could one be sure without sounding him of his willingness to head a coup effort.

Comparative Risks: The risk involved in switching from Diem to an alternative would be substantial because of possible Communist military gains in the attendant confusion (especially if the crisis were prolonged). But this can be counteracted, at least in part, by temporary U.S. military intervention during the crisis to prevent Communist seizure of towns.

There is also the risk of failure of a coup, with its adverse effects on our future relations with Diem. But Diem has no place else to turn except to the U.S. for support.

And the overriding risk is the likelihood of the loss of Viet-Nam to the Communists if we stick with Diem.

4. How the Coup Might Be Carried Out²

(I have never carried out a coup, and am no expert in this field. I am suggesting a possible means of doing it—the best that has occurred to me—but there may be better ways.)

It would be desirable to keep the U.S. hand in the coup concealed to the maximum extent feasible. We would want to avoid any public connotation that the new government was our puppet. However fear of exposure should not deter our discreet involvement. We shall always be accused by some of involvement (just as we were with respect to the November, 1960, coup attempt and the February, 1962, palace bombing).³ The cardinal rule would be not to admit involvement publicly.

The appropriate U.S. officials would quietly sound out a few carefully selected Vietnamese (such as Tho and Minh) about a coup possibility, and would if indicated make known its readiness to support a coup at the proper time. With this encouragement these few Vietnamese would contact other Vietnamese about participation. U.S. contacts would be kept very limited to restrict knowledge of our role. We would advise behind the scenes on organization, and let the Vietnamese do all of the implementing.

The aim would be immediate seizure of all of the Ngo brothers and Mme. Nhu and their immediate removal from Viet-Nam if they survived the process of seizure. The physical process of seizure would probably be easier when Diem and the Nhus are out of the palace traveling around the country. It would preferably be carried out when brothers Thuc (the Archbishop) and Luyen (Ambassador to the U.K.) are out of the country since they would be taken care of simply by preventing re-entry. Thuan (Secretary of State for the Presidency) and Tuyen (head of the secret police) would be detained to prevent counter-plotting, but could probably be released after the coup was over since it is doubtful they would pose any real danger to a new regime.

Since the armed forces represent the only real power force in Viet-Nam, it would be necessary to line up in advance in support of the coup as many of their key elements as feasible. Discretion would dictate caution in too wide an approach, but since plans for seizure of the Ngo family could miscarry at first, discretion should be balanced against the possible need to use the armed forces extensively and the desirability of denying the Ngo family the possibility of rallying a significant segment of the armed forces.

The U.S. should be prepared to introduce combat military forces into South Viet-Nam to prevent Communist seizure of provincial towns during the crisis. If necessary to execute this step, the U.S. should publicly announce its neutrality between the contending anti-Communist forces in Viet-Nam. We should not be deterred from the step by the absence of a request from the GVN.

Timing of a coup would be extremely important. Preferably the coup should be carried out when there is publicly clear trend against the GVN in the war with the Communists since many more Vietnamese would be psychologically prepared to support a coup under these circumstances. It would be preferable also to keep the interval between widespread planning and execution short because of the danger of leaks. This does not mean, however, that the U.S. might not discreetly work with selected Vietnamese on the development of coup plans well in advance of widespread contacts and execution.

American dependents should have been evacuated from Viet-Nam in advance of execution of the coup plans. Otherwise we might well find them hostages in the hands of the Diem Government which would not hesitate to use them to pressure us.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/8-1662. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Mendenhall.
2. Next to this heading is written: “(Sounds like a very complicated job and hard to keep secret beforehand. ER).”
3. Regarding the February bombing of the palace, see Documents 87–97; for documentation on the November 1960 coup attempt, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. I, pp. 631 ff.