Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

257. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Heavner) to the Director (Wood)¹

Washington, August 3, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Great Leap Forward—I mean Quantum Rump [sic]

1. Politics is people. People donʼt change quickly. Helicopters can move fast; attitudes take longer.

2. Nhu and company are moving on what they might be willing to describe as a political quantum jump. The strategic hamlet program, particularly as described by Nhu, is designed as a political revolution. Nhu means to build democracy at the hamlet level, give the people a stake in the hamlet status quo, and rearrange hamlet power structure with emphasis on the common struggle and contributions to it in place of the traditional emphasis on an oligarchy of wealth and privilege. For quantum jump, read strategic hamlet, Mr. Rostow.

3. To what extent Nhuʼs ideas will be translated into reality remains to be seen. Certainly there are formidable obstacles, without counting the VC. But the easiest and most promising course for us is to join Nhu on this one. I donʼt think we can get a quantum jump, but steady progress and the defeat of the VC do seem possible.

4. We have already a factual if not a formal alliance with Nhu on this one. Our support for strategic hamlets has begun to move and will be accelerated. The following may be considered as possible means to sharpen the political focus of our supporting effort:

(a) Ultimately, the modernization of the countryside—i.e. more income and more services for Nguyen van Hai—will depend on more agricultural production, for export. (It is a good Rostowian premise that an agricultural revolution must precede any industrial revolution; if the transition to a modern economy is to be successful, it begins with increased agricultural output. The agricultural Achilles’ heel of the Bloc seems to bear him out.) In the past, for domestic and other reasons, we have done very little in Viet-Nam to increase rice production (I believe AID was formally forbidden to do anything until 1958 or 1959). We skill act as though self-sufficiency in rice is all that is necessary for Viet-Nam.

I certainly know very little about agriculture and economics, but I do know that rice yields in other parts of the world are much higher than in Viet-Nam. I also understand that our demonologists figure the ChiComs could, and perhaps will, increase their rice output dramatically by known means such as fertilizer, better seed, etc. We have talked a lot about fertilizer and agricultural extension in Viet-Nam, but I think done less than we could. Third country experts (Taiwan, Japan, Italy) might have more to offer than our own technicians on this.

I understand the political problem here and abroad of an effort to deliberately and massively increase Viet-Namʼs rice exports. Perhaps the reaction could be blunted by a parallel effort to process the rice (alcohol?) and find new uses for it (George Washington Carver van Hai? Plastics from rice? More rice-fed hogs, cattle, chickens, for export?) If we mean business about modernizing the Vietnamese economy and setting it on its own feet in some reasonable length of time, and most of all, if we are serious about wanting to help the peasant, I think it will have to involve an effort to increase rice production and export. The often heard charge that U.S. aid never gets to the peasant is partly true. Could it be because we have never been concerned about the basic source of peasant income—rice?

We have an item on agricultural prices in our action program. If I understand the problem, the GVN has deliberately held down agricultural prices, in some cases below production costs. This applies especially to hogs, which used to be exported but now are not. Why not talk to Nhu about this, putting it in terms of strategic hamlets, his rural revolution plans and personalism (which stresses the need of an independent economic stake for each citizen). If we talk his language, it may be easier to get through. As for the peasants, an increase in agricultural prices, properly exploited by all media as a GVN policy decision, ought to have an immediate political effect. (It would probably also increase the countrysideʼs absorption of commercial imports over a period of time, thus easing our piaster generation problem.)

The losers in this world, of course, be the articulate and powerful salaried bureaucracy; Nhu would get pressure from that quarter and from urban areas generally.

(b) We have several negative despatches from Montgomery² on land reform. While his case is probably overstated, I think Jim is essentially right in asserting that rent control is a dead letter, that free land from the VC is more attractive than land for sale from the GVN, and that the GVN tends to represent landlords more than peasants. In talking with Nhu, it might be well to suggest tying the strategic hamlet program to free distribution of the 260,000 hectares of French lands which the GVN now holds and has not yet distributed, possibly as common land (on the GVN model) to the strategic hamlets (the rent to support hamlet officials and improvements) or possibly directly to heroes or families of VC victims. This, too, should be exploited by media, as a major GVN policy for the little peopleʼs benefit, and could be coupled with aggressive exposure of Communist land policy in North Viet Nam and elsewhere. Land bought from Vietnamese landlords and still unbought (125,000 hectares) could also be used.

Getting rent contracts renewed and enforced is harder, but should not be given up. I do not believe we should press the GVN to allow the Farmers Tenant Union to fight for this on the local level because I think it would be unacceptable to Nhu and Diem, both of whom are at least middling sour on labor unions. But cast simply in terms of the GVNʼs good faith, Nhu and Diem might be willing to take some action on the problem. Perhaps the Chinats, speaking from their advisors’ experience in the Farmers Associations could back up this ploy. (Those advisors have strong opinions, and seem like pretty good people.)

All this to-do about a land reform program which Diem thinks is completed is important because the Communists have apparently made some yardage simply by being against landlords.

(c) How about a strategic hamlet congress next spring, with elected representatives from each strategic hamlet, to meet in Saigon, study the program, compare notes on experiences, and advise the GVN on future moves? The opportunities for bally-hoo of the peasant reps, medals for the brave defenders, etc., played back to the countryside by media and word of mouth, would be worth the effort.

(d) The CI paper from FSI³ suggested that National Assembly Deputies go to the country and get the folks (with our help) what they need, i.e. barbed wire, fertilizer, etc., thus making a direct link between the Saigon government and the peasants. This is a risky idea because it suggests we approach the deputies. I suggest we approach Nhu with the idea of putting the Assembly to work on the strategic hamlets; a National Assembly Deputy could be a fine civic action cadre and help drum up enthusiasm and support, provided he saw the program as a job and not a chance for personal aggrandizement. Perhaps the Deputies could be attached to the appropriate Division Commander chairman of the strategic hamlet regional committees as special advisors and inspectors or something. They are talented and loyal people for the most part, and the Assembly does not demand all of their energies, by any means; there should be some way to tie them into the strategic hamlet effort.

(e) The key to a political revolution in the countryside is the attitude of the people toward government, any government. This in turn depends, at least in part, on the attitude of the officials toward their own role. This is a long-term problem and basically a question of education. Training and retraining officials is one approach we should continue to study and pursue. The GVN is pretty sensitive on the subject, however, and I am not sure that we have so much to offer, anyhow. Do we really have the experts and the methods which could convert the provincial bureaucracy, even if we had unlimited power to impose them? I doubt it. We should offer our assistance on this one continue to indicate that we think it is a basic need, back up people like Colonel Thao who do seem to be able to train effective officials and assume a bit of humility.

(f) As education is the key to vertical mobility for many Vietnamese, an effort might be made through scholarships to capture the loyalty of those young Vietnamese who might otherwise seek to shoot their way to position and prestige with the Viet Cong. At the hamlet level, this could be tied to active participation in the hamlet defense unit, heroism under fire, etc., the candidates to be selected by popular secret ballot. Or the Republican Youth might be the proper instrument for selecting these young people. Their training might be in subjects useful to them personally, i.e. an avenue to government service by the acquiring of a high school education, or to the hamlet generally (health technicians, mid-wives, mechanics) by providing a needed skill. In urban areas, it could extend even to scholarships for higher education, to be used as a means of stimulating participation in various GVN programs such as the Republican Youth.

(g) We should continue to give all the support we can to Canʼs Force Populaire. Because of the difficulty of recruiting people with sufficient intelligence and sufficient motivation to do this work properly, I doubt that it can be more than a partial response to the VC. Getting people to defend themselves and their stake in the hamlet is probably easier, and the strategic hamlet program should remain our top priority, even in CVN. As Helble noted, however, these programs are not mutually exclusive. And Canʼs idea is more political than Nhuʼs in some ways. At least mention it to Rostow, along with our support for it.

Motivation for the Force Populaire might be increased by a stake in land or money, to be paid at the end, say, of two years service. Or scholarships might be offered to outstanding members.

Probably the possibility of applying the Force Populaire idea to the delta provinces is already under study in Saigon. I would guess that it is not readily applicable there, however.

5. At the national level, I do not think that the opposition can be persuaded to work with Diem or he with them. Nor do I think any useful purpose will be served if they are allowed to generate more divisive forces at this time. Oppositionists in the government or a legal opposition outside of the government will not be helpful or possible at this time. Public criticism of the government now would be interpreted by most Vietnamese, many of the Saigon intellectuals included, as a sign of weakness, if not imminent collapse. When the Viet Cong are dearly on the run, something dramatic like a legal opposition with its own newspaper and forum might be useful in meeting the needs of the elite groups and the foreign press. Not now.

6. Our chief effort at the national level should continue to be a gradual improvement in the efficiency of the whole GVN, military and civilian. Our people are doing this in a multitude of ways, with the help of Thompson and other allies. Progress will continue—and will probably continue to be slow. Perhaps we should raise with Diem again the National Security Council and its proper use, but Nolting is the best judge of that.

7. We should encourage the efforts which the GVN has been making to develop channels for complaints from the people (not the oppositionists) to the central government. This could perhaps be beefed up to cabinet level and given a great deal more publicity.

8. We should also encourage the continuing effort to prune the provincial bureaucracy of corrupt or abusive officials. (The press accounts of this campaign sound good, but we need provincial reporting to check it out.) This item can be tied to seven (above), perhaps as part of the function of a complaints cabinet officer.

9. The GVN should be encouraged to take a more aggressive and more positive posture with regard to reunification. It cannot afford to seem to acquiesce in the continued division of Viet Nam while the Commies plump for reunification on their own terms. Perhaps the National Assembly should include Deputies representing the northern part of the country (as the DRV does with the south), the Assembly committee on reunification should be more active and get press attention, and a cabinet position might be created for the study and coordination of efforts to peacefully reunite Viet-Nam. The pitch should be militant without being threatening. This is difficult, but could be done. Perhaps the main thrust would be that Communism is a temporary aberration and that after a few years more of hunger and failure the DRV leadership will be compelled by its own people to abandon its Communist doctrines.

Itʼs easy to win a war on paper.

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 1A-2 Briefing Papers,GVN 1962. Secret.
2. James M. Montgomery, Third Secretary and Vice Consul at Saigon.
3. Not further identified.