253. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to the Secretary of State1

Since our talk this morning on the objectives of Mr. Bowles’ proposed trip, I have been over his memorandum2 again and find it even more impractical than I mentioned this morning. His whole thesis is based on the assumption that a Laos-type of international agreement is possible and enforceable for the whole of Southeast Asia. The proposed Presidential statement, “Peace Charter for Southeast Asia,” could only be implemented by an international agreement similar to the one that we have reached on Laos. This would require us to take commitments without any assurance of the other side doing the same, with no enforcement procedures that would be workable. To negotiate such an agreement would require another Geneva meeting, which I understood everyone was opposed to because of its effect on the situation in South Vietnam. Most of the suggested economic objectives can be achieved only after there is peace, and do not give a sufficient basis for immediate heads of government discussions.

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I will be glad to go over the memorandum in detail with you (which shouldn’t take long), and Ed Rice and I believe you will come to the same conclusions we have.3

  1. Source: Columbia University, Harriman Papers, Bowles, Chester. Confidential; Personal—No Distribution. Drafted by Harriman.
  2. Document 241.
  3. At the bottom of the source text the following was typed in capital letters: “I find Walt Rostow agrees that plan is impractical under present circumstances and would cause difficulties if raised with governments now.” On August 1, Harriman sent a memorandum to Rice stating that he could see no value in the trip unless a brand new approach was developed. He instructed Rice to make no commitments without clearing them with him and suggested that Bowles’ staff be informed that a special trip at that time would be counterproductive. (Harriman Papers, Bowles, Chester)