Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

194. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, May 17, 1962—2 p.m.

1471. We are forwarding by separate cable² paper based on contention that introduction additional US military personnel and equipment into Viet Nam is legal under Geneva Agreement. Would envisage if Dept and GVN concur that paper might be presented to Indians informally in context that this is one means of dealing with recent US-GVN activities in military field, and that we think it holds considerable merit and would like informal Indian reaction before making any decision whether to use it officially and formally with ICC.³

Re Deptʼs comments on replacement approach we recognize validity colonial point. However, Commies already charge us with colonialism and we inclined to doubt that they can get much propaganda mileage out of our essentially legal argument.⁴

Re legal soundness this approach, seems to us that legally it is same approach that we used in 1960 with ICC in increasing MAAG from 342 to 685 and would appear just as sound now as then. As for 888 ceiling on US forces we stated in 1960 that this was number of US-French military training personnel in Viet Nam, but we are now shifting to wider category of military personnel for obvious reasons in view change of military situation in South Viet Nam.⁵

We believe this approach would probably take care of most equipment but cannot state this definitely until comparative study now in progress of credits, “justifications of title” and actual equipment introduction has been completed. To extent this approach would not take care of equipment it would be handled either clandestinely or by claim that it covered by outshipments for which ICC has lost records.

We share Deptʼs uncertainty re Indian acceptance replacement argument but believe it is worth trying out on them unless Delhi believes mere broaching of idea would increase Indian suspicions US motives in manner which cannot be dispelled.

. . . . . . .

We quite apprehensive however that …recurring requests to Co-Chairmen for instructions which will not be forthcoming will generate growing pressures for international conference on Viet Nam. This would be particularly the case if, as is likely, war activities on both sides in SVN intensify in future and fear of development of South Vietnamese war into major conflagration begins to spread over world.⁶ We do not see how we can rely on apparent current Russian reluctance about international conference as Russian position can quickly change when Russians see advantage to be gained from conference. Moreover we not certain we can rely on British to continue oppose conference in view pressures in some circles in UK on this issue and current domestic political picture there.

Re notification we doubt any decision this issue should be made until some means—…has been worked out for substantive handling of introduction military personnel and equipment under Geneva Agreement. Otherwise notification becomes self-conviction.⁷

. . . . . . .

GVN like US is primary party to this issue and whatever approach adopted could be implemented only through its agency.

. . . . . . .

We shall await Deptʼs instructions re approach to GVN on above.

Nolting

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/5-1762. Secret. Repeated to New Delhi and CINCPAC for Polad and pouched to London and Ottawa.
2. Document 195.
3. In the margin next to this paragraph was written: “Not until after ICC decision on subversion.” This and the other marginal notations are not initialed.
4. In the margin next to this sentence was written: “disagree.”
5. In the margin next to this paragraph was written: “ICC never really accepted it. Thus—only took note.”
6. In the margin next to this sentence was written: “This will likely happen anyway.”
7. Next to this paragraph was written: “Right”