Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

16. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States Information Agency (Neilson), to the Deputy Director of the Agency (Wilson)¹

Washington, January 12, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Your Appointment With Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr.

PAO John Anspacher has briefed the Ambassador to discuss the following topics with us:

1. Washington News Leaks: Anspacher expressed concern about leaks of classified details of U.S. activities in Viet-Nam to the press in Washington. He argued that while it may be necessary to get some things on the public record for the benefit of the American people, it also would be desirable to inform the mission when such a leak is in the making so it can be prepared for press questions there. He also suggested that some people may be merely talking too much and these apparent leaks are actually slips.

Comment: It is true that both leaks and slips have occurred in the Department, the Pentagon and the White House. There is, however, little this agency can do about either controlling such events or alerting the post before the fact. This is a matter that should properly be taken up with the agencies concerned. We have no choice but to go with the news as it develops.

2. Information Advisors in Viet-Nam: It has been suggested to the Ambassador that there is a need for American information/psychological operations advisors at the Presidency level in Saigon and at the province level throughout the country. Anspacher contends that while this is probably a proper role for USOM, in practical terms USIA is the Agency with the competent personnel in this field ….

. . . . . . .

3. British Cooperation in the Advisor Field: Anspacher initiated talks with the British Embassy in Viet-Nam, suggesting that the British and Americans in Viet-Nam concert efforts to improve the whole Vietnamese information/psychological effort here. The British reportedly showed considerable interest and said they would write a letter to the Foreign Office on the subject.

Comment: We think that the U.S. should keep control of the information/psychological operation in Viet-Nam and the British should not be involved at the policy level. If they wish to offer assistance at the operating level we might welcome it depending upon the circumstances and terms of reference. The British paramilitary mission has already caused us trouble by moving beyond its proper role.

4. Anspacher also suggested a week-long survey trip by Mr. Murrow to look into information/psychological problems the GVN faces and to make recommendations on how to solve them. He further suggested that one of the recommendations emerging from such a survey could be the appointment of an American information advisor to the Presidency, as mentioned above.

Comment: The GVN has been surveyed by a great number of U.S. missions already. Another one is hardly in order at this time on such a touchy subject. Certainly there is no need for an official of Mr. Murrowʼs level to get involved in this, although IAF still is trying to get the Director to the Far East.

. . . . . . .

6. Critical News Coverage of the GVN: The Ambassador is rather exercised about critical items appearing in the commercial media. He feels that whereas the GVN is far from an ideal instrument it is all we have to work with and because of the sensitivities in the Palace a critical press has a directly adverse effect on our efforts to get our job done since the GVN is harder to negotiate with after each critical item appears.

A particular case in point is the recent Newsweek story by Bob Elegant that caused that issue of the magazine to be banned. (Without mentioning Newsweek he expressed this general view at the Viet-Nam Task Force meeting yesterday.) After the banning of Newsweek we received a telegram from our PAO saying that Newsweek had decided to suspend distribution in Viet-Nam. We sent back a Task Force telegram instructing them to protest this censorship to the GVN. At this point the VOA carried the story on Pham Vuy Co. In his sharp protest to us about the VOA broadcast, the Ambassador referenced our telegram asking them to protest the GVNʼs censorship. As you know Mr. Murrow assured the Ambassador that there would be no repetition of this sort of VOA transmission.

Anspacher has counseled the Ambassador that the image of the GVN in the world press can be no better than the face the GVN presents to the public and until it is willing to improve its press relations there is not much we can do about it. He also told the Ambassador that our media could not ignore stories that were getting attention in the domestic and foreign press without damaging credibility of our news coverage.

We suggest that the following topics might be taken up with Ambassador Nolting:

1. What is the Ambassadorʼs view of the role and mission of USIS in such emergencies as exist in Viet-Nam? How far should USIS go in support of the GVNʼs information/psychological activities? Do we have enough, and the right kind, of personnel?

2. What are his views on the problems of relations with foreign (British, French, etc.) correspondents in Saigon? (cf my memo to Mr. Harris of Jan. 4)² We should take this opportunity to point out the pitfalls of American—only briefings and emphasize the idea that the best way to get a cooperative press is to offer all possible cooperation.

3. Is USIS-Embassy coordination adequate in his opinion? Is he getting the support he needs?

4. Is Washington support to the information program adequate?

5. Should we be looking to an expanded program in the next year?

6. Would it be useful to institute an adaptation of the Lao Muong Information Program in Viet-Nam?

Ambassador Nolting will be accompanied by Mr. Sterling J. Cottrell, Director of the Viet-Nam Task Force.³

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA/I/S Files: FRC 68 A 4933, Field—Far East (IAF), 1962. Secret. Initialed by Neilson.
2. Document 5.
3. No record of this meeting has been found.