Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

151. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Bagley) to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Taylor)¹

Washington, April 9, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Galbraith letter on SVN²

The memorandum enclosure of a letter from Amb Galbraith to the President is attached; the views of the President and Gov Harriman on the letter, as expressed at the Friday meeting,³ are also appended.

A summary of the content of these papers follows.

Ambassador Galbraith

1. Use the forthcoming ICC report⁴ on DRV and GVN/US violations of the Geneva Accords to seek withdrawal of DRV support of the Viet Cong. The US, in exchange, would reduce its assistance to SVN to normal levels.

2. The Communist view on accommodation would be ascertained through approaches by India or the USSR. Any subsequent agreement would be sought on the basis of the Geneva Accords.

3. Corollary goals would be trade relations between north and south Viet-Nam and eventual reunification. The US would play down its support of Diem.

4. In any event, the US should resist further increases in US personnel in SVN and avoid direct US participation in the pacification strategy and other rural activities.

The President

1. The US involvement in SVN should be reduced at the first favorable moment although it is recognized this may not be possible in the near future.

2. A US position should be prepared now on the anticipated report from the ICC including draft instructions to Amb Galbraith on a possible approach to India.

Governor Harriman

1. The objective to play down US participation in the SVN conflict is a sound and previously agreed course of action.

2. US policy use of the forthcoming ICC report should be formulated after the substance of the report can be studied.

3. It is not advisable to reconvene a Geneva conference or to seek a neutral solution in Viet-Nam.

4. We should not actively work against Diem because there is nobody to replace him.

It seems to me that the Galbraith proposals pose certain basic considerations which should be faced, at least informally, before we move too far toward accommodation:

1. What are the US objectives in SVN and Southeast Asia and what are the prospects of achieving those objectives?

2. Is the establishment of a neutral belt in Southeast Asia a practical concept and does it satisfy US objectives in the area?

3. The Geneva Accords of 1954 were formulated prior to Communist intrusions into Laos. Should we initiate action for accommodation in SVN before the particulars of a Laos settlement are known and tested?

W.H.B.

1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-030-69. Top Secret. At the top of the document, Taylor wrote: “See me.”
2. See Document 141.
3. See Document 148.
4. See Document 208.