Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

149. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)¹

Washington, April 6, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Thompson Visit

R.G.K. Thompson, formerly Permanent Secretary of Defense in Malaya, now Chief of the British Advisory Mission in Saigon, during his visit in Washington between April 2 and 7, made the following points in various conversations held with Department, Defense and TF/VN meetings.

1) Diem. Generally unpopular in Saigon, particularly with the “intellectuals”. Much more respected in rural areas. They seem to appreciate that Diem has always insisted that Viet-Nam is an agrarian country whose pattern of life is centered in the villages. His agroville program, his frequent visits to the villages and public statements have all emphasized this orientation. For instance, the last Presidential election, although opposing candidates were weak, did not reveal a rigged, forced vote for Diem. It was apparently held with a minimum of coercion. Chances of getting anything better than Diem is very “chancy”. If there were an Army split struggle for power, upon an event of accident to Diem, you could have a chaotic situation wherein the Communists might be able to move in. Therefore, it seems the most prudent policy to go along with the Diem regime, attempting to urge improvements where possible.

2) Villages. This is the key to the Vietnamese situation. You must obtain support of the villages in order to win the war. You cannot win unless you get it. There is tremendous energy in the villages, and if a proper framework is established which will provide them security they will fight in their own behalf to preserve a traditional village system against the Viet Cong. Other considerations are important but peripheral. Diem is a strong village man and has in effect said “the hell with the intellectuals”. It is a fact that the villages are anti-Communist, not necessarily pro-Diem.

3) Nationalism and Communism. It is most important to press the distinction. Many so-called Viet Cong are not fighting for Communism. They are with the Viet Cong because they still believe that the Viet Cong are fighting a nationalistic war against foreign domination. Psychological and informational activities should be directed to destroying the link between Nationalism and Communism which now exists. This means that foreign assistance to Viet-Nam must be played in the lowest possible key. Vietnamese should kill Vietnamese but never foreigners killing Vietnamese. The Viet Cong would love to get the Americans more committed to combat in Viet-Nam because they could then wrap themselves in the cloak of Nationalism and recruit more Vietnamese for the fight against the foreign devils. This is why the British believe we should play down U.S. participation.

Conclusion: We should avoid putting a large number of foreigners “at the sharp end”.

Translated into operations this means that the U.S. presence in the field where they are visible to villagers and Viet Cong should be minimized. On the other hand, doctors, USOM people, or Civic Action people who are handing out services or goods cause no problem.

4) Strategic Hamlet Problem. Brother Nhu has taken a very active interest and for the first time has assumed an executive role as Administrator of the Strategic Hamlet Program. Much of his thinking is good although the program was kicked-off in exaggerated terms. He set up targets of 12,000 strategic hamlets to be completed in 18 months and this started a race between the Province Chiefs to frantically build these installations with attendant imposition on the villagers. Twelve of these new hamlets got hit badly in one Corps area because security infrastructure had not been set up concurrently. Nhu now has lowered his sights and is proceeding more slowly. Thompson has insisted that the hamlet program be carefully integrated into the Delta Plan with the necessary security measures keeping pace with the construction of the hamlets. They now seem to be on the right track. Experience in Malaya indicates that the Government must be firm in resettling villagers and that a certain amount of resentment can be expected at the outset. Later, however, when the benefits, both security and social, become apparent to villagers they generally get to like the system.

5) Communications. This is not yet working properly. Villages where communications have been installed, the results are excellent. The point behind communications is that Viet Cong bands on the move can keep twenty-four hours ahead of any news about them. However, if their presence is communicated from village to village they can be intercepted and cut up. If the network of communications is set up covering sector after sector in connecting links, it would drastically cut the mobility of the Viet Cong. Every effort should be made to hasten the construction of the communications network. Radio should not be put in every hamlet because this is too confusing. Hamlets can use gongs, flares, drums and other simple devices to alert the nearest village.

6) Navy. GVN control of the waterways in the Delta area is one of its major weaknesses. Time after time the Viet Cong attack and get away over the rivers in dugouts. This should never happen. The GVN must work out methods of controlling and denying the use to the Viet Cong. A program seems to be under way with U.S. help but it must be made effective at the earliest possible moment.

7) Civil Guard. Training seems to be going ahead as fast as it can. Civil Guard river patrols are most necessary and getting the civil guard into place to protect the new villages is essential.

8) Self Defense Corps. Beginning to function. Must be tied into the “dear and hold” operations. Self Defense Corps is the key in the village to lead the defense.

9) Sunrise. Plan by the Province Chief of Binh Duong and the Minister of Interior. Thompson is a bit worried about this plan because it involves one of the toughest provinces and the forces needed to keep it clean will be tied down to defense duties. He had urged unsuccessfully that the “clean and hold” operations start in easier areas and push forward against the stronger provinces. It does, however, show a good spirit on the part of the Vietnamese and indicates the right direction.

10) Air Power. Thompson was worried several months ago about the damage from any indiscriminate attacks. Says he thinks the situation is much improved through the installation of a JOC and TAC. However, the use of air in the form of the helicopters, 123, and attack planes has been remarkably effective. It has crippled Viet Cong freedom to attack in large formations and has had a telling effect on Viet Cong morale. He thought the overall effect of some villagers being killed accidentally in attacks on villages probably depended upon how other villagers reacted. He thought it might be minimum because it was his impression that the villages are fairly self-contained units psychologically and are relatively indifferent to the fate of the other villages. He said there probably would be certain bad reactions by mistakes which would make it more difficult to reclaim previous Viet Cong controlled villages which may have been attacked but thought in general the application of air power was being handled properly.

11) Delta Plan. The original concept paper² has been approved by Diem but he does not know about the four implementing instructions. He said he hopes they do not publish them widely because it would assist the Viet Cong. However, instructions must be issued. Question in his mind is whether the GVN would modify them.

12) Chain of Command. Unfortunately, almost all of the province chiefs are Army officers. He has suggested that they all be put in civilian clothes to emphasize the civilian function of their work. Acting as they do, as military men, the Regimental Command of the ARVN is presently wasted. The Province Chief should rely on the Regimental Commander as his military arm. Now battalions are scattered all around the provinces under the Province Chief. He said if he had his way he would cut the telephone lines between Province Chiefs and Diem, in order to prevent the present crossing of wires.

13) Intelligence. Much should be done. Self Defense Corps should be basic intelligence unit “winkling out” the Viet Cong from the villages, collecting intelligence through the villagers and in sounding the alarm when attacked.

14) POWs. In Malaya they sorted them out into white, gray, and black. The whites were given relative freedom and attempts were made to reintegrate them quickly back into society. The gray took longer treatment and the blacks were hard-core Commies. The only occasional success they had with the blacks was to use an ex-Commie who was smarter than the black. They found that the blacks all had a certain fixed conviction which could not be shaken except by an ex Commie.³

15) Length of the War. The Malayan emergency lasted twelve years but after the first six years the battle had essentially been won. The last six was a mop-up operation. Some factors are more favorable in Viet-Nam but some less. Thompson said he would not like to have this go on record, but a rough guess would be not less than three years to win the main battle and it might be five or six. One of the main favorable factors is the remarkable vigor and strength of the Vietnamese villagers which has been true historically. One of the more unfavorable factors is that Viet-Nam is bordered by three sanctuaries, Cambodia, Laos and North Viet-Nam.

16) Crop Destruction. This should be left for the GVN. Foreigners should not be actively involved. At present there is no shortage of food for the Viet Cong so efforts at crop destruction would probably not be too effective. After provinces have been all cleared of Viet Cong then crop destruction would work more effectively. In Malaya they did very little by air. Most of it was done on the ground when they ran into patches in the jungle which were being used by the terrorists.

17) Montagnards. They have been badly treated to date because the Vietnamese have failed to appreciate the differences and make allowances for tribal customs and ways of life which were different from the rest of the Vietnamese. Important point is if the Montagnards are on the GVN side no Viet Cong could exist in the jungle.

18) Rangers. Most important that rangers be put back in their proper role. They should be trained to work in the jungle for up to six weeks at a stretch. At present they are unwilling to live in the jungle longer than a week or so. The secret is that ranger companies must deliberately get lost from the Viet Cong. At that point they become extremely dangerous because the Viet Cong movements are hampered by the very fact that they donʼt know where the ranger companies may be.

19) Casualties. After the security structures are in place and Viet-Cong casualties go up their recruiting afterward becomes very difficult. Morale sags fast among terrorists who are hit frequently and hard. One of the principal weaknesses of the guerrillas is that they must carry off their wounded. This has a bad effect on the remainder particularly if they are unable to leave them in villages for medical attention.

20) Civic Action. The Ministry is not so good and Corps has touch of the old Hitler youth. The idea of arming them is wrong because Civic Action people should not be soldiers or intelligence officers, otherwise they reinforce the distrust of the district and provincial officers. They should be used as manpower to join those under orders of the provincial and district officials. Most important, Civic Action Teams should not usurp the functions of other Departments. For instance, the Health Department and the Education Department should be relied upon for those services in Civic Action.

21) Multi-National Effort. This has certain political advantages in spreading the load and responsibilities but from the Vietnamese point of view we are all tarred with the same brush. Only the Vietnamese should shoot Vietnamese. This is a GVN war against Vietnamese terrorist intruders. We should help but not get out and fight or turn it into a multi-national war against the Viet Cong.

22) ARVN vs Viet Cong Dedication. Ideology doesn’t play too strong a role since 70-80% of the Viet Cong are locals. They are fighting for reasons other than Communist ideology, Nationalism being one of the strongest. The ARVN chaps seem to be well motivated against the Communists but many of them have been fighting too long and need a rest.⁴

23) Information. This is one of the weakest links and is not properly organized yet. Radio, newspapers, pamphlets, propaganda need coordinating so that the GVN is telling the same story through all media. The political and psychological barrier against the Viet Cong should be done through proper information.

24) Terminology. Although it seems rather inconsequential it is important to get the labels straight. For instance, the use of “psywar” is often misused in connection with friendly population instead of enemy. Another example is Viet Cong, dignifying them by labeling them as Vietnamese whereas in Malaya they deliberately called them “Communist terrorists”. A number of these labels should be adjusted if possible.

25) Administration. The villages are the best administrative units in Viet-Nam and the central government probably has the poorest administration. In Malaya the Government still practices the way they were taught by the British, namely, that the decisions of the Cabinet were relayed to the various ministries in clear written form. The ministries then had the authority they needed to proceed. Thompson said he might be able to make an impression on the Vietnamese Government to follow the administrative line in a saner fashion. He said Thuan was very receptive to the idea and urged him to hammer on these points with Diem. For tactical reasons, Thompson said, he thought it was a mistake to press too many “reforms” at one time and up to this point he was concentrating on getting the village system set up with adequate security. When he goes back he will pursue some other ideas including this administrative one. He said he thought it was vital to get our priorities straight in Viet-Nam. The security system comes first and the rest later. He said he thought the next six months would be vital in determining whether the villages were going to be able to reorganize themselves in all fields to achieve ultimate success. In the meantime the foreigners should provide and assist and advise [as] unobtrusively as possible.

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, Poll 7. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text but it is signed “Cot.”
2. Document 113.
3. At this point is the following notation in an unidentified hand: “As I heard it, ‘which could be shaken by a smarter ex-commie, and which had to be replaced by something else.
4. At this point is the following notation in an unidentified hand: “Hence, 1,000 desertions/month!”