Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

147. Memorandum From the Naval Aide to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Bagley) to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Taylor)¹

Washington, April 5, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Thompson briefing to Viet-Nam Task Force²

Mr. Thompson replied to questions at the Viet-Nam Task Force today for an hour and a half. He fully covered his pacification strategy. Some of his opinions/conclusions are of interest.

a. Setting up of strategic hamlets and defended villages should not be rushed, should be phased with availability of required resources, material and human.

b. Next dry season will see first test of pacification strategy as VC must react to maintain contact with the population. Question is will GVN be able to resist VC attacks successfully.

c. He is reluctant to estimate the time required to beat the VC, but is thinking in terms of 3-6 years.

d. He stresses need for border ranger force.

e. US should get the GVN machinery working properly (administration and supervision), but stay clear of the sharp end (village level). He thinks the village organization is the best element in SVN.

f. SVN river forces do not yet control the Delta waterways.

g. The SVN troops are tiring; some units must be rotated out of combat or security tasks.

His talk carried unexpressed implications which I suggest you may wish to explore Friday morning:³

a. GVN organization and capability for control, planning, and public information, and intelligence remains ineffective.

b. The numbers of Americans in SVN is growing too large; the VC can develop a case that the US is running the show and have in fact replaced the French with all its implications.

I have attached suggested questions which can probe these issues further.

W.H.B.⁴

[Attachment]

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS

1. Is the GVN capable now of waging a successful war against the VC?

2. To what extent will Diem respond to advice as to organization for, and implementation of, the province pacification strategy?

3. Is there a need for closer liaison with GVN ministries at the seat of government by selected and limited US (or UK) personnel with special qualifications?

4. Why is Diem resisting release of ranger companies for mobile operations along the border areas?

5. What deficiencies, prejudices, or capabilities are slowing GVN effectiveness in the public information and intelligence fields?

6. Are there too many non-Asian advisors now in Saigon? In the countryside?

1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-132-69. Secret.
2. Thompson was in Washington April 2-7 to brief U.S. officials on the situation in South Vietnam. He traveled from Saigon via CINCPAC Headquarters in Honolulu, where he arrived on March 30.
3. April 6; no record of this meeting has been found.
4. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.