134. Memorandum From the Naval Aide of the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Bagley) to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Taylor)1
SUBJECT
- Viet-Nam Task Force Meeting, 28 March 1962
1. Items of particular interest which were developed at the Task Force meeting today are listed below.
Mr. Cottrell reported on the Saigon request at Honolulu2 that Washington delegate authority to the Embassy and General Harkins to approve local Vietnamese defoliant operations. Such operations would be on specific targets restricted to Viet Cong crops, laid by Vietnamese helicopters, using chemicals made available by the US. Since these chemicals are commercially available and the Vietnamese have been carrying out crop destruction by burning on the ground, one course of action is for the US to remain aloof and let the Vietnamese carry out operations as they desire. Ambassador Nolting, however, sees some advantage in our issuing chemicals on the spot and thereby retaining a “foot in the door” so we know what operations the GVN are planning [Page 282] and executing. Cottrell asked for opinions within the Task Force. Military … were in favor; State and USIA were doubtful or in opposition. Cottrell will discuss this with Alexis Johnson, coordinate with Defense, and probably come forward to the White House with a proposal for delegating authority under carefully defined parameters.
The concept for the border patrol as outlined by General Harkins in Honolulu was discussed and questioned as to its relevance to your recommendation since it involves 88 posts over a frontier area of approximately 250 miles. Admiral Heinz was requested to send a message to Com USMACV to get a fuller expression of the approved concept.
There was a short discussion on the need for broader-based, more effective planning in South Viet-Nam for civic action. This proposition is understood and supported by Defense and AID; Mr. Cottrell resisted early action. AID and Defense representatives, however, are preparing a draft message for Cottrell outlining the overall strategic requirement for civic action and requesting information from Saigon as to existing plans and specific recommendations for US support.
Defense also has been able to crash through with a draft telegram prodding Saigon to outline a plan to use both military and civilian assets for the deployment of medical teams in the rural areas. The military side, which is already in pilot stage, will be expanded around the ARPA project. AID bought the ARPA idea 100 percent and acted as if they had never seen it before. This is the same project we tried to push through Mr. Cottrell almost two months ago and which you brought up at the Special Group meeting two weeks ago.
As a related matter, you should know that the new AID representative at the Task Force, Mr. Stoneman, who is also the AID Viet-Nam Desk Officer, is aggressive and far-seeing and already getting results. You may wish to comment on this to Mr. Hamilton.
- Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-133-69. Secret.↩
- See Document 124.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩