97. Letter From Secretary of State for the Presidency Thuan to the Deputy Director of the Viet-Nam Task Force (Wood)1

Dear Ben: Since I returned from Washington to my paper mill, quite a few things happened. So I want to write you a few words.

1.
The financing problem for 20.000 additional men is solved as you know. May I have to say how much do I appreciate your help?
2.

The Staley group has completed their report. They took a few trips to get a more precise idea of the Vietnamese context. On the spot they did realize the difficulties and they did see that we are working and fighting hard. Three major things have to be implemented right away: increasing the force level, building up a wireless system for all villages, and expanding as much as we can the agrovilles network. I get the impression that the Ambassador agrees with me. He took quite a few trips with President Diem and myself. He gets convinced now, I think, that we must have more troops to occupy different areas, to protect population and we have too to regroup them. If you don’t occupy villages, the Commies get in and the population can’t resist.

The village level is the basis. Silver will report to you longer about the trip we took yesterday in Kien Hoa Province. That’s a successful test. The necessity is to act rapidly to create an impact right away. Better to increase noticeably the Armed Forces now to get rid of subversion in one or two years and to increase them afterwards than to take half measures. So, if Cottrell and yourself can get the force level of 200.000 approved for 1962 and the corresponding level of commercialised (sic) aid, i.e., 170 millions US$, that would help a lot.

3.
You know the victory our troops got over the Commies in the Plaine des Joncs. The Communist unit knocked out is their best one. Objectively that’s quite a hit. They lost 187 men and 10 prisoners. Weapons captured: 76. As far as I remember, nothing like that happened before to the Commies in South VietNam, even during Indochinese war. I ask Silver to bring back to the Vietnamese Task Force a cane we got from the Commander of VC unit, namely Battalion 502. I would like that you will show it to President Kennedy. I have been in the front right away after the hit with newsmen. I did see the arms captured, the bodies all over in rice fields. We still have plenty of guts so don’t worry about (us).
4.
Our main difficulty: the rice situation. Many causes to that: [Page 231]
a.
Estimate made by Department of Agriculture too different from estimate made by provincial authorities about the rice production this year. The latter is less optimistic.
b.
Smuggling through Cambodian border. They play on the “change” (exchange). Because of insecurity the black market rate of exchange is like that: 1.6 VN piaster for 1 riel. So people prefer to send rice to Cambodia to be exported and to change afterwards the riels they get into VN piasters at the “faux noir.”
c.
Communists prevent population to sell their rice.
d.
Rumors about devaluation. Peasants prefer to keep rice than to get piasters.

I know that you are very busy Ben. I am too. So I stop here.

My best to Cottrell the “dragon”. Mes homages a Madame et mes amities a votre jeune fils de 14 ans.2

Truly yours,

Nguyen dinh Thuan3
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files ERC 66 A 878, TF VN 1961. Confidential.
  2. On August 19, Wood sent a letter to Nolting enclosing a reply dated August 18 to Thuan, and asked Nolting to transmit the reply to Thuan. In his letter Wood congratulated Thuan on recent military victories by the Government of Vietnam, which he said “have been very encouraging to persons in our Government at every level.” He also wrote that the questions raised by Thuan were ones that he worked on every day and that while some had been answered, “the others keep us so busy that I have postponed any plans of visiting Viet-Nam until early 1962.” In a letter of August 28, Nolting informed Wood that he had sent Wood’s letter to Thuan that day. All these letters are ibid.
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.