338. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Viet-Nam (McGarr)1
[JCS 2027-61.] 1. The question of proposed reorganization and ultimate command arrangements which you raise in your Eyes Only message (SGN 901)2 and your letter of 18 December3 is one of [Page 759] utmost importance and one to which I have been devoting much personal attention here.
2. I had planned to have a few moments with you alone after the 16 December meeting to discuss the question with you, but as you know, our party left almost immediately for take-off and there was no possibility for such a get-together.
3. Although the subject was listed in our agenda for the 16 December meeting, it was passed over without discussion because the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State had already initiated joint consideration of the problem here in Washington and had agreed that they personally (and not their staffs) would work out a final recommendation for submission to the President. Therefore, as you noted at the meeting, Secretary McNamara simply skipped the item when we came to it on the agenda. Near the end of the meeting Amb Nolting handed me a note to pass to Secy McNamara in which he said he would like to discuss the subject personally with Sec Def after the meeting. Sec Def agreed although it was his intention not to discuss it with anyone at Honolulu. From what Sec Def told me I gather that they did in fact have a brief discussion on the subject of proposed organizational changes. I understand that Amb Nolting asked Sec McNamara what his and other thinking in Washington was in this regard and Sec Def gave him his general views. From information available to me they did not have a meeting of minds on the subject. (Note: Foregoing is for your eyes only and should not be revealed to any other person.)
4. I would like to give some flavor of my personal thinking and of JCS views on this sensitive question. We have been completely satisfied with the manner in which you have discharged your duties out there and we have consistently made this point in interdepartmental discussions here. With the decision not to introduce combat troops into Viet-Nam we have had serious doubts about the desirability of a fundamental change in the U.S. organization there. In view of information we had regarding thinking at higher levels in U.S. Govt, the JCS response to a request for recommendations for a new U.S. command structure in Viet-Nam is qualified by the words “if it is decided to change the command structure in Vietnam.” Nevertheless although final decision has not yet been made by the President it now appears that a change in U.S. organization will be made. The primary object of the change is to impress Diem that we are entering a new era in U.S.-Vietnamese relationships in which the U.S. will be giving him increased support and be expecting him to pay increased heed to our advice and suggestions. Generally speaking, the new terms of reference will provide for a U.S. military assistance command, rather than an advisory group, and will insure that the senior U.S. military representative in Viet-Nam has the [Page 760] controlling voice, both on the U.S. side and with Viet-Nam officials, on military matters. Another factor which is involved is the possibility of broadening whatever organization is decided for Viet-Nam into a U.S. military organization for all of SE Asia, and possibly ultimately expanding into a SEATO command if the situation continues to deteriorate in Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand.
5. Also, for the purpose of increasing the impact on Diem that the U.S. looks to a new and increased counter-insurgency effort on his part, it now appears that a four-star U.S. commander will be named to operate under the new terms of reference and that you and your MAAG will come under his over-all command. I fully appreciate what your feelings may be if this proposal is implemented. That is why I want personally to emphasize to you that the JCS and I have complete confidence in you and have been thoroughly satisfied with the results you have achieved in the face of great handicaps, obstacles and frustrations. From my conversations with Adm Felt I am convinced he feels the same way. We recognize the burden of personal adjustment necessary to fit into the new command structure, if and when it is created, but are certain that you will take this in your stride, as you have so many other difficulties during your fifteen months in Saigon. I know you’ll appreciate that the new man will have to lean heavily on you and will need every bit of help he can get from you.
6. I will keep you further informed as developments take place here. All of this, I know, adds up to something less than a Christmas present for you, but you are too good a soldier to let it bother you for long. Therefore I’ll close with a personal expression of the Season’s Greetings for you and the members of your command and the hope that the New Year in Viet-Nam will see the results of some of the training and planning you have so patiently and thoroughly accomplished during 1960 [1961].
- Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, L-21071. Top Secret; Priority. No transmission time is given on the source text.↩
- Document 331 ↩
- Not found.↩