Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

32. Program for the Presidential Task Force on Vietnam¹

Washington, April 22, 1961.

PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE PROGRAM

A. Goal: To counter the Communist influence and pressure upon the development and maintenance of a strong, free South Vietnam.

B. National Plan

I. Political

a. Continue current operations of the Country Team to achieve the above goal, with review by the Director of the Task Force to determine changes and emphasis to fit Task Force actions.

b. To lessen the danger of a coup and to strengthen political administration, the U.S. should take measures to bring about a healthy non-Communist political party structure. Parties should be surfaced. The formation of two major parties should be encouraged.

c. To help in stronger U.S. actions, eliminate U.S. restrictions upon the number of U.S. military personnel in Vietnam, under the terms of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, as necessary.

d. Assist the Vietnamese government with special ideas to make it more responsive to the needs of its people. Introduce philosophy and means, such as a Presidential Complaints and Action Commission in Vietnamese terms.

e. Other nations, as a factor in achieving political objectives of the Task Force goal, must be considered in terms of the Communists, the Neutralists, and the Allies. For example, Cambodia. Effective measures are needed to deny the use of Cambodian territory for the transit or safehaven of Communist armed forces operating in South Vietnam. U.S. personnel (political and military) from the U.S. Embassy, Phnom Penh, should visit Svayrieng and other border areas to obtain facts for U.S. actions with the Cambodian government. If necessary a team of Free World journalists could visit the areas and turn the light of world publicity on the situation.

f. Assist the Vietnamese to become a polarizing spirit against Communism in the Southeast Asia region. Encourage closer working liaison with anti-Communist Asian nations. Visits of political, cultural, civic, military, veterans, youth, and labor groups should be exchanged on a stepped-up scale between Vietnam and her neighbors. Existing exchanges of information on Communist agents, couriers, and activists between national policy officials should be increased.

II. Military

a. Continue current operations to achieve the stated goal, with review by the Task Force Director to determine changes and emphasis to fit into special Task Force objectives.

b. Take actions for prompt additional U.S. support, including necessary funding, of military projects deemed to be needed immediately. In this category is the question of pay and allowances for the additional 20,000 troops for the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

c. Introduce selected personnel, most highly-qualified in counter-guerrilla combat, into Vietnam to assist in making the Vietnamese effort more effective promptly. Such personnel can assist in selected combat operations, as close-up advisors and assure best possible support. Also, an R&D section of RVNAF could be established, with the help of a small group of practical Americans, to develop and apply new techniques for use against the Communist Viet-Cong.

III. Economic

a. Continue existing operations to achieve the stated goal, with review by the Task Force Director to determine changes and emphasis to fit into Task Force actions.

b. Sponsor the visit of a practical U.S. economic team, drawing heavily on U.S. private industry, to South Vietnam to work out with the Vietnamese effective plans to speed up national development, give Vietnam a better tax structure, and establish a sound basis for foreign investment. The U.S. and other economic plans for Vietnam should be re-examined for sound ideas to be incorporated into a firm new plan, with special attention to early impact upon agricultural areas now vulnerable to Communist take-over.

c. Make certain that transport facilities in Vietnam are expanded rapidly to permit fullest possible use of the small cadre of capable government executives, freeing them to leave the capital, get to a trouble spot promptly, and return to pressing duties in the capital with the least loss of time, as well as freeing the movement of security forces to enable them to concentrate forces where necessary in timely fashion. Light aircraft, for economy, should be considered as one of the means for achieving mobility of government personnel.

IV. Psychological

a. Continue existing operations to achieve the stated goal, with review by the Task Force Director to determine changes and emphasis to fit into Task Force actions.

b. Develop an agricultural area just south of the 17th Parallel Demarcation Line as a “show-place” of democratic action, for its psychological effect on the Communists via the “bamboo telegraph.” This project should be accomplished by a combined team of Vietnamese (Civic Action personnel), Americans (Peace Corps), and Filipinos (Operation Brotherhood). Similar projects will be initiated in areas now dominated by insurgents, immediately following troop actions to secure the areas, to boost the morale of the people.

c. Psychologically exploit the rehabilitation of Communist Viet Cong prisoners now held in South Vietnam. Rehabilitated prisoners will testify to the errors of Communism in a psychological campaign to Communist-held areas, including North Vietnam, to induce defections. Sound implementation of the rehabilitation program will be assisted by U.S. personnel; this requires a team of U.S. Army (Civil Affairs, Psychological Warfare, and Counter-Intelligence), USIS, and USOM personnel.

d. To support maximum U.S. impact prominent Americans who make news should appear in Vietnam during this emergency period in the role of Presidential representatives to participate in selected political and economic activities. For example, Vice President Johnson could make a good-will visit, (or, as alternate, Eisenhower or Nixon could undertake such an assignment for President Kennedy). On the economic side, a prominent personality such as James Landis² or George Meany³ could appear in Vietnam for President Kennedy.

d. [e.] Provide U.S. assistance to the Vietnamese government to carry out an effective psychological campaign against Communist targets, as well as a campaign to gain more active support of non-Communists, both inside Vietnam and in surrounding countries. More effective programming, increased signal strength (the South lags far behind the 100 kilowatt transmitters of the North), and better coverage of target areas are indicated as immediate needs. Available U.S. mobile transmitters and staffs should be put on these targets.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C)(A) Files: FRC 77-131, VN Task Force 1961 (Folder 1). Secret; Sensitive. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text. The program was circulated at the first meeting of the Task Force on April 24. Regarding this meeting, see infra.
2. Special Assistant to the President.
3. President of the AFL-CIO.