Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

305. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, December 3, 1961, 9 p.m.

754. With further reference Embtel 748,² no progress Saturday,³ because Thuan sick (flu) and said could not meet until Monday. I nevertheless had full talk with him at his home Sunday morning, which served clarify to some extent Diem’s position as stated to me on Friday. On basis these two talks, I am putting on paper my understanding GVN position re our démarche. Thuan has agreed go over this paper with me Monday morning and seek get Diem’s approval of it during course of day. Have strongly emphasized time factor and hope to telegraph this paper soonest.⁴ Believe it desirable I then fly to Washington to consult on next moves. If this approved think I should tell press here that I am returning at my own suggestion in order to give my government a full account of discussions which have taken place and, hopefully, to conclude arrangements on which we have been working with GVN.

As indication substance of Diem’s position, based on discussions Friday, following is pertinent. When we got down to brass tacks, I asked Diem to say what he could and would do under two broad headings: measures to improve GVN efficiency (in all fields, including military) and measures to improve GVN public image at home and abroad (to gain more active and widespread public support).

On efficiency, Diem noted what he has done and what he plans to do, at same time stressing shortage of competent people and need to develop administrative skills. He agreed to reactivate National Internal Security Council, to have it meet regularly as “war cabinet”, to create a secretariat for it, and to conduct government security business through it. Thuan said today that this step, in his judgment, is best way to organize national effort at top, to accomplish delegation of authority, and to bring about more efficient governmental action. Thuan said President expects to have NISC meet regularly twice a week. Diem also said that next week he would issue decree setting up Provincial Councils in all provinces which would have advisory and real powers vis-a-vis the province chiefs. These councils would be appointed in first instance, from people who had shown themselves to be “most active anti-communist patriots” regardless of party or occupation; idea was to have them eventually elected. Diem was at first very cool to offer of selected Americans to help in administrative organs, taking position that this would not work out in practice, that nationalistic Vietnamese would resent it and Viet Cong would capitalize on it, and especially that he could not afford to admit publicly that he had to call on Americans to help administer his national revolution. He was blunt here in stating, citing cases in which Americans got frustrated when things were not done “their way”, causing resentment among Vietnamese. He said he would not wish to build up situation like that which resulted in anti-American blow-out in Taiwan some time ago. I made clear that we did not want to force any American advisors upon him, but that we needed assurance of strengthened GVN administration. What did he propose? He said he recognized that certain Americans, on selective basis and on request, could help strengthen his government. Thuan confirmed this. I said this was exactly our idea. (This is something that can be worked out, I think, on an ad hoc and ad hominem basis, but not in any overall sense and not publicly.) On military command, especially on full and unimpeded authority to Field Command to plan and conduct field operations, Diem stated flatly and repeated several times that he had given his military command full authority, had made it clear over many months that he counted on Field Command to plan and conduct military operations with full authority and control of ARVN forces, that he had not interfered either in plans or in troop dispositions, but that he had been sadly disappointed in results. “They tell you”, he said, “that I interfere to hide their own incompetence and lack of initiative.” This was a blunt and apparently sincere statement of a most serious situation. It conflicts, of course, with many allegations from GVN military about Palace interference. In any case I asked Diem how I could recommend that the US invest more heavily in a military machine that was admittedly not effective in overall organization and operation, although, as he had said, individual units fight well. I said we had to have systematic planning and strong, competent overall military direction if we were to support effectively. Could an American, or Americans, help here? Diem would not answer directly, but said he recognized that GVN military establishment had to be “reorganized.” When I came back to the point, Diem said he hoped General McGarr would help General Minh to fullest extent in his planning and would urge him to take the offensive, specifically a major offensive against Zone D. (General McGarr has, as reported, been doing just that for many months.) Thuan said later that part of difficulty in this regard is personal friction between General Minh and General Thanh,JGS Chief of Staff. On our requirement for coordination in planning and operations between ARVN commanders and US command of any US operational units (e.g., helicopter squadrons), Diem was clear and affirmative. In such cases, he recognized that there must be full cooperation in planning and operations and neither party would take an action or decision affecting the other without prior frank consultation. Summing up the discussion on the point of improving GVN efficiency, I said President Diem had stated certain things that held some promise of improvement, but that frankly I was still not in position satisfactorily to answer root question on mind of my government when it considering sending reenforcements to VietNam-i.e., why is it that with forces now available, and with resources built up over seven years, GVN has not been able to mount a systematic and effective effort against an enemy estimated at 20,000 armed men? I thought inadequate governmental organization was part of the answer, and I did not think sufficient remedial measures for this had yet been suggested by President Diem.

On improvement of public image, President’s attitude was one of sincere regret, at times edging on anger, that he had been misunderstood and misrepresented, especially abroad. He spoke earnestly along familiar lines of the need to build in Viet-Nam the “infrastructure of democracy” (education, sense of civic responsibility, administrative skills, political toleration); that infrastructure comes before “superstructure” of democracy, which can only come at a later stage, though as rapidly as possible. Over and over, Diem stressed his view that key to wider public support for GVN and himself is ability of government to provide protection to its people, this to be followed by the steady building of “infrastructure of democracy.” No amount of window dressing, he argued, could substitute for the hard measures of self-sacrifice required to win against the Viet-Cong. This is a battle for the “hearts and minds” of the people; their basic sentiments are anti-communist; they must be given protection from terror in order to demonstrate their true allegiance. On specific measures discussed, he agreed that he should “get to the people more”, by more visits (he already travels frequently and widely) and by more frequent radio talks. Thuan said later that Diem had agreed to talk over the radio at least once a month. On broadening the base of his government, he was generally negative; said that taking in dissidents or fence sitters in any broad government reorganization would not do any good and miss the point. Specifically on taking in a labor leader, Diem said that Buu was at cross purposes with the other principal trade unionists, and that to take any one or all of them in would not be practical or feasible. On release of political prisoners, Diem said that there are two kinds: communists, most of whom have committed crimes, who are in “rehabilitation camps”, and are released periodically; about 30 who were active in November Coup, for whom public trials are being prepared. In summary, on this subject, Diem stuck to his guns; took little interest in any suggestions about measures to improve his public image; gave every impression that, so far as his own country is concerned, he felt confident in his judgment as a political leader and did not evidence concern about opinion outside.

I stressed throughout our requirement for a closer and more effective partnership. His reply in essence was that he cannot share the responsibility of governing South Viet-Nam with the United States; but that within that principle he too wanted to establish a closer and more effective partnership. In probing for specifics, I found some willingness to have US advisors on a selective and agreed basis in intelligence (both civilian and military), in military planning and operations, in joint provincial surveys (where however he insisted that these should be focused on intelligence and military aspects, not on political and social). Thuan said today that GVN prepared to organize surveys this month and that political and social matters could be inquired into, but this could not be advertised. Thuan also confirmed that the Border Ranger Force suggested by General Taylor could be organized and that sufficient ranger companies could be pried loose from static guard duty to form a force of from four to five thousand men.

I realize the above is not a clear picture. It is sent only as a raw report. I will attempt set down the essentials in a paper to be approved by Diem, with Thuan’s assistance. I hope no decisions will be reached in Washington prior to this subsequent report. My own thinking, with full regard to the gravity of contemplated US moves, is that we can develop a base sufficiently solid to give positive results and to turn the tide here in our favor. While I think we can, on a case by case basis, work out arrangements for mutual cooperation and execution of a stepped-up effort, I do not think that the “public image” can be substantially improved unless and until the GVN begins to win the war against the Viet-Cong. I believe that the tide can be turned with the limited concessions which Diem is prepared to make now and others that we can obtain on piece meal basis. In sum, I believe that we should proceed with confidence.

Nolting

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, Box 309. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok and CINCPAC for PolAd.
2. Document 303.
3. December 2.
4. In telegram 756 from Saigon, December 4, Nolting transmitted to the Department of State the text of a memorandum of understanding cleared with Diem that morning for submission ad referendum to the U.S. Government. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-461)