Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

251. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President ¹

Washington, November 14, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Negotiation about VietNam

1. It is universally agreed that the objective of the proposed exercise in Viet-Nam is to induce the Communists to cease infiltration, return to the Geneva Accord, while assisting South Viet-Nam in reducing the force of some 16,000 guerrillas now operating in the country. This track unquestionably will require extensive talk with the Bloc countries and, at some stage, probably formal negotiations.

2. One crucial question is this: should we enter formal negotiation with the Bloc on this matter before we have taken steps to stabilize and strengthen the military, political, and psychological position on the ground?

3. I submit that it would be unwise and contrary to the lessons of past and current experience to negotiate with the Communists before we have moved to buy time in Viet-Nam and indicated by deeds that the U.S. is serious about saving South VietNam.

A. As in Laos last Spring, we face a deteriorating situation. If we postpone action to talk, the Communists will do two things: they will extend that talk while continuing to dismantle South Viet-Nam and (as the British and Desai have indicated) will focus the negotiation on elections. Only a de facto stabilization plus the bargaining position which the potential withdrawal of U.S. forces above the MAAG ceiling would offer appears to make conceivable the notion that they would call off the infiltration guided from Hanoi. It may even require a credible threat to impose military action against North VietNam.

B. If we postpone action in Viet-Nam in order to engage in talk with the Communists, we can count surely on a major crisis of nerve in Viet-Nam and throughout Southeast Asia. The image of U.S. unwillingness to confront Communism-induced by the Laos performance-will be regarded as definitively confirmed. There will be real panic and disarray.

4. In the wake of the Taylor Mission, the moves we now make will be examined on both sides of the Iron Curtain with the greatest care as a measure of this Administration’s intentions and determination. It will be very difficult to undo first impressions. If we negotiate now-while infiltration continues-we shall in fact be judged weaker than in Laos; for in that case we at least first insisted on a cease-fire.

5. In advocating this position I have, of course, been mindful of the danger of escalation and war. The question is: does a show of U.S. strength and determination on our side of the post-war truce lines tend to induce war?

6. The Korean War arose from the withdrawal of U.S. force from South Korea and the opening it appeared to offer the Communists.

In other cases where we have acted strongly on our side of the line we have come home free: Northern Iran; Greece; the Berlin blockade; Lebanon-Jordan; Quemoy-Matsu. In Laos, the alerting and loading of the Seventh Fleet induced a cease-fire.

7. In Viet-Nam the gut issue is not whether Diem is or is not a good ruler. That is important in a variety of ways; but he was doing fine from 1956 to 1959, by the standards we apply to other underdeveloped countries. The gut issue is whether we shall continue to accept the systematic infiltration of men from outside and the operation from outside of a guerrilla war against him which has built up from 2,000 to 16,000 effectives in two years. The whole world is asking a simple question: what will the U.S. do about it? If our policy and action is focused sharply on this question, I believe there is a fair chance of avoiding a war. If we act indecisively now, I fear we shall produce excessive fears on our side and excessive hopes on the other side; and then we shall have to over-react to correct a disintegrating situation worse than the present. In those circumstances there would, indeed, be a danger of war. As in Korea we would have first tempted the enemy by our apparent weakness and then double-crossed him. It is that circumstance I would wish to see us avoid.

Therefore, I suggest that we make the moves we believe required to stabilize the situation and to buy time in South VietNam; and then by imaginative communication and diplomacy-addressed to all elements in the Bloc as well as the Free World-we bring maximum pressure on Hanoi to call off the invasion of South Viet-Nam now under way. Such communication should begin the day we publish the Jorden Report-or the day before.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series. Initialed by Rostow.