Herewith Bob McNamara’s replies to the questions which arose from my
visit to Bragg. I am sending a copy to Bissell who is in charge of our
general review of counter-guerrilla operations. He will consider with
his team the substantive problems involved, and they will form a part of
his final submission. Secretary McNamara could not have been more helpful in all
this.
Attachment
QUESTIONS CONCERNING COUNTER-GUERRILLA PROGRAMS2
Question 1. “Why are the capabilities of the helicopter not being
fully exploited in the counter-guerrilla program of the Vietnamese?
The helicopter is uniquely effective in tracking down
guerrillas.”
General McGarr, Chief of
the MAAG in Vietnam, is intensely
interested in the counter-guerrilla problem there and is well aware
of the importance of helicopters in a counter-guerrilla role.
Instruction
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of the
Vietnamese Army, under supervision of the MAAG, currently includes training in the use of
helicopters in counter-guerrilla operations. The Vietnamese armed
forces now have 14 H19 helicopters. The current military aid program
includes an additional 11 H34’s, which were asked for for the
specific purpose of use in counterguerrilla warfare. Ten of these
H34’s have actually been delivered and the remaining one will be
delivered in the near future. During General Trapnell’s visit to
Southeast Asia3 he discussed the counterguerrilla problem with
General McGarr, who told
him that the total of 25 helicopters appeared to be about all that
the Vietnamese could effectively use and maintain. However, General
McGarr is being
further queried by cable with reference to full exploitation of
helicopters in Vietnam and his reply will be forwarded.
Question 2. “Why were the Special Warfare units withdrawn from
Vietnam in November 1960? Why are they not being sent back to work
with our MAAG there? General
Decker, when asked,
indicated that CINCPAC had
opposed. Why?”
There have been two basic problems in properly training the South
Vietnamese in counter-guerrilla activities. The first of these
involved both U.S. organization and the manner by which President
Diem of Vietnam had organized his own forces. Until quite recently
the MAAG was responsible for
counter-guerrilla training of only the regular armed forces of
Vietnam. The USOM (ICA) was responsible for training the
Vietnamese Civil Guard and police. Further, CIA was responsible for training in guerrilla warfare.
President Diem, on his part, has in the past been trying to conduct
counter-guerrilla operations almost personally and with a
complicated fragmentation of responsibilities in the lower levels.
The conduct of operations in any particular area which involved
primarily local resources, including the Civil Guard and police,
were supposedly coordinated by the political head of the area. If
regular armed forces were involved, the operations were supposedly
coordinated by the military region commander. During the past year,
however, great progress has been made both in the simplification of
U.S. responsibilities and in the Vietnamese organization. The MAAG, Vietnam developed a
comprehensive Counter-insurgency Plan4 which was
finally approved by
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the
Country Team and later in Washington. At the same time, President
Diem-despite the fact that he has not yet agreed to all aspects of
the Counter-insurgency Plan-has moved forward considerably and has
assigned primary responsibility for counter-guerrilla action to the
Ministry of Defense and has also put training of the Civil Guard
under the same Ministry. This has greatly facilitated MAAG training in this field.
The second complicating problem has been the limitation in numbers on
the size of MAAG, Vietnam, deriving
from the “legal” requirements of the Geneva settlement of Indochina
in 1954. The settlement permits no increase in foreign military in
Vietnam above the number there at the time the settlement was made.
It has been the U.S. position for the past years that the MAAG should not exceed 685.
Conceivably the figure could be recomputed now because of reduction
in the French military there
In March 1960 the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, noting the
deteriorating situation in Vietnam, offered MAAG, Vietnam through the JCS and CINCPAC a
“Cold War Task Force,” consisting of 156 Special Forces personnel
and 19 Civil Affairs, psychological and intelligence specialists.
However, because of the personnel ceilings on the MAAG, mentioned above, only 30 U.S.
Army Special Forces personnel could be accepted of the overall
proposed Task Force. Teams of these Special Forces personnel were
used to instruct elements of the Vietnamese armed forces in
counter-guerrilla warfare during the period May through November
1960. As Vietnamese instructors were trained, they assisted each
Special Forces team and gradually assumed a larger share of
instruction as they became qualified. Since becoming fully qualified
these Vietnamese instructors have been working under MAAG, Vietnam supervision to continue
training of others in their specialties. As we understand it, this
training is moving ahead quite effectively and the training load is
being adequately carried.
Because of the current limitation on the size of the MAAG, Vietnam, General McGarr must carefully balance
the makeup of his personnel against his over-all training
requirements. However, he is now in the process of reassessing the
situation and will report if he believes more Special Forces type
personnel are needed and can be accommodated within the ceiling.
Presuming that the current ceiling is not changed, it is possible
that it could be evaded by various subterfuges, but it has so far
been the policy of the Country Team to require the MAAG to remain within its ceiling.
The Cold War Task Force of the size originally offered by the Army in
1960 is still available for employment in South Vietnam if
desired.
[Here follow questions 3-7 which deal with other subjects.]
