230. Memorandum From Lieutenant Commander Worth H. Bagley to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)1
SUBJECT
- State SEA Paper2
Page 1.
Paragraph 2-Reference to “substantial forces” apparently assumes the lower-tone approach you have recommended is not viable. On one hand, our forces are to boost GVN morale, show our resolve, and provide a boost to Diem’s making necessary organizational changes; on the other hand, US forces are to take up the sword and try to win the war.
Page 3.
Ready availability of sea, air, and logistic forces assumed here. This is not consistent with past statements of SecDef. Should be clarified.
Page 4.
If we have warned Bloc of our objectives in SVN before placing troops there, NVN will think twice before supporting Pathet Lao resumption of hostilities in Laos.
What is Harriman view?
If a US force commitment in SVN is urgent (this question is not faced in the State paper), it should not be delayed to complete an “unsatisfactory” settlement in Laos.
As we enter SVN, tell Bloc we intend remain constant to negotiations in Laos as long as fighting is not resumed.
Pages 6-7.
There is every reason to believe that the Taylor Mission eliminated the possibility that significant changes in SVN can be achieved without the encouraging presence of US forces. This fact must be hammered home. If the Vietnamese want us on the ground, the opinion elsewhere is of little account-at least if we truly want SVN to help itself and thereby avoid a large US force commitment later.
[Page 570]Pages 7-8.
If the Task Force envisaged is given an international flavor or strength beyond the initial needs, it is probable that its low-tone application will be lost and it will take on more of the attributes of a combat force deployed for offensive operations. This will then degrade the basic objective of prompting the GVN to organize to win the war essentially without external combat assistance.
Page 8.
If US forces are placed near 17th parallel:
How are flood relief units protected?
Will effect on population be lost since US troops are not visible as they would be in Delta?
If object is to defend line, it can be done better by amphibious force steaming in vicinity of parallel.
Is it not provocative without reason?
Does it not require larger US commitment than would otherwise be needed at outset?
General
Program is blunt. Loses “test” flavor of your recommendations which are more apt to prod Diem to action. As written, State paper emphasizes too much a large, inflexible US commitment for all to see.
Depending on how implemented, State paper may require dictating changes to Diem which will put joint effort on poor basis. A better alternative is your program which envisages a softer approach with no less hard end-objective.
Timing throughout State paper is vague. This should be clarified.
- Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-127-69. Top Secret.↩
- See footnote 1, Document 228.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩