Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

209. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to India (Galbraith)¹

Washington, November 3, 1961.

A PLAN FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

The situation in South Viet-Nam is perilously close to the point of no return. Serious thought is being given to a military operation in South Viet-Nam which would entail all the risks of the operation in Korea of ten years ago, without the justification of a surprise attack across the boundary, without the support of the United Nations, and without a population determined to fight for independence. This paper suggests a United States program which would entail neither abandonment of South Viet-Nam nor a major military involvement on our part.

The proposal assumes that our long-run objective in South Viet-Nam should be the creation of an independent, economically viable and politically neutral state, rather than a limping American satellite. As a beginning, we would want an end to the fighting in South Vietnam, and a United Nations presence to supervise the keeping of the peace. We would also hope that a start could be made towards a strong, responsive and popularly based government in South Vietnam.

Certain circumstances seem to make this a propitious time for an approach along the lines suggested here. The Geneva Conference on Laos appears to be reaching its climax. The split between the Soviet Union and Communist China has come into the open, and seems to be at an acute stage. Prime Minister Nehru will be in position to transmit in both directions the thoughts of the President, and of India and others at the United Nations. The Taylor Mission and some of the accompanying press reports have given credibility to possible United States military intervention, and have thus probably increased our bargaining position vis-a-vis the Russians, the Chinese Communists and the neutrals.

I would recommend:

1. Replacement of Ambassador Nolting by an ambassador of the character and prominence of Governor Harriman. We need someone who can hold his own with both Diem and the United States military, who will insist once and for all on government reform, and who will understand the United States political implications of developments there. If Harriman himself is unavailable, I would suggest David Lilienthal or George McGhee.

2. A United Nations resolution confirming the independence of the Republic of Vietnam, and calling for immediate dispatch of United Nations observer groups to Vietnam.

The proposal for such a resolution should come, if possible, from a country not directly associated with the United States, and the program for an observer team, as in Lebanon, or a UNEF as in the Gaza Strip, should be in response to an invitation from the Government of Vietnam. The observers should be drawn primarily from the national forces of United Nations members other than the permanent members of the Security Council. The United States should make it clear, however, that it stands ready to supply personnel and equipment for a United Nations contingent in Viet-Nam as needed, and that any American personnel sent to Viet-Nam would share the functions of other United Nations personnel and would be subject to the control of the United Nations command. (This would presumably not affect the present MAAG in Vietnam.)

The scope of the observer group would be to report not only on infiltration into Viet-Nam from outside, but also on any activity within the country dangerous to the peace. The United Nations observer group would be assembled and dispatched under arrangements made by the Acting Secretary General, and its operations would be supervised by him in consultation with a small advisory committee. The theory of the authorizing resolution would, of course, be that the Viet Cong activity against the present Government of Viet-Nam is directed from outside of South Viet-Nam and therefore constitutes external aggression.

This proposal should be presented to Prime Minister Nehru now. Since India is the chairman of the present ICC in Viet-Nam and since the object of the United Nations presence is in part to replace the ICC and to perform more effectively the job of keeping the peace, Nehru’s agreement to the proposal would be most important.

3. Prompt agreement at Geneva on a neutral Laos, including an understanding that Laos is not to be used as a corridor or staging point for operations in South Vietnam. If possible, Ambassador Harriman might approach the Russians on the subject of the mutual interests of the United States and the Soviet Union in cessation of fighting in South Viet-Nam as well as in Laos.

4. In any event, the Prime Minister might be sounded out on his approaching Ho Chi Minh along the following lines:

a. Achieving a cease fire in South Vietnam.

b. An indication that the long-range United States goal is an independent South Viet-Nam not necessarily allied with us.

c. Improvement of economic conditions in the country, with increased trade between North and South Viet-Nam along the lines of interzonal trade in Germany, when peaceful conditions make this possible.

d. Possible reciprocal recognition by the Western and Soviet Blocs of both North and South Viet-Nam and ultimate admission of both countries to the United Nations.

5. In talking with Nehru, we should make clear that the United States stands ready both to continue its present program of economic assistance to Vietnam, and to contribute to possible programs of the United Nations Special Fund in the area.

The program recommended here avoids the high risk and limited promise alternative of armed intervention. Its long-range hopes are that South Viet-Nam would become a viable independent state, North Viet-Nam would become less dependent on Communist China, daily life in both countries would become safer and more prosperous, and the Sino-Soviet struggle for dominance in Southeast Asia might abate.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office File, Viet-Nam Country Series, Security 1961. Secret. The source text was attached to a signed letter of November 3 from Galbraith to the President, which reads in full: “You asked for my views on Vietnam. They are set forth in this paper. I might add that they are shared by Abe Chayes, who has collaborated with me in preparing the paper.” Galbraith was in Washington for the State visit of Prime Minister Nehru.