207. Memorandum From Senator Mansfield to the President1
SUBJECT
- The Vietnamese and Southeast Asian Situation
In view of the fact that General Maxwell Taylor is due to report to you shortly and also because of the type of stories which are beginning to appear in the press and based on interviews, speculations, etc., I thought that with all respect, I should make my views known to you on this most important, delicate and dangerous situation. Hence, this memorandum.
The question of the possibility of sending American troops to Viet Nam has occurred a number of times in the past. First, in 1954, at the time of the battle of Dienbienphu, then last May, when the Vice President made his visit to Southeast Asia, and most recently, on the occasion of General Maxwell Taylor’s visit to Viet Nam. In my opinion, this is a matter which should be approached with the greatest caution.
On several occasions we have made commitments to use our own troops, while the Russians have carefully avoided using theirs. The sending of American armed forces to Viet Nam may be the wrong way and probably would be, in present circumstances. In the first place, we would be engaged without the support of significant allies. Our troops would be engaged by third-string communist forces (North Vietnamese). Then, they could very well become engaged against the second-string-the Chinese Communists, who might be drawn into the fray and could out-match us and our Asian allies many times in manpower. If American combat units land in Viet Nam, it is conceivable that the Chinese Communists would do the same. With shorter lines of communication and transportation, with much more manpower available, South Viet Nam, on that basis, could become a quicksand for us. Where does an involvement of this kind end even if we can bring it to a successful conclusion? In the environs of Saigon? At the 17th parallel? At Hanoi? At Canton? At Peking? Any involvement on the mainland of Asia would seem to me to weaken our military capability in Berlin and Germany and, again, leave the Russians uncommitted.
It appears to me that the presence of American combat troops in South Viet Nam could be misinterpreted in the minds of millions of Southeast Asians and could well be considered as a revival of [Page 468] colonial force. Moreover, we must be extremely wary of any seemingly simple solution that would have Asian SEATO nations do the intervening at our behest to avoid this appearance. If we give them the go-ahead, then there is every likelihood that we shall have to follow militarily or if we do not, we will suffer disastrous repercussions throughout all of Asia and we will indeed become the laughing stock of the world.
While Viet Nam is very important, we cannot hope to substitute armed power for the kind of political and economic social changes that offer the best resistance to communism. If the necessary reforms have not been forthcoming over the past seven years to stop communist subversion and rebellion, then I do not see how American combat troops can do it today. I would wholeheartedly favor, if necessary and feasible, a substantial increase of American military and economic aid to Viet Nam, but leave the responsibility of carrying the physical burden of meeting communist infiltration, subversion, and attack on the shoulders of the South Vietnamese, whose country it is and whose future is their chief responsibility.
It seems to me that Ngo Dinh Diem has seen the situation in this light in the past. He had almost an obsession with getting the French military out of Viet Nam and I find it somewhat difficult to believe that he is now anxious for American combat forces as a base for his continuance in power. This point, it seems to me, should be clarified before we commit combat forces or even underwrite a commitment of Asian SEATO forces. And it should be clarified in direct conversations between you and President Diem, not through intermediaries who might, from talks with lesser officials, reach the erroneous conclusion that it is Diem’s view that such forces should be sent.
Our problem now is little different than it was in World War II and the years after: to minimize our involvement, particularly military, on the Asian mainland not to maximize it. In this connection, I must say that the antagonism towards Cambodia is most incomprehensible. That is our point of minimum involvement and cost in Southeast Asia and with a tolerable situation instead of alienating that country we ought to be seeking to create through diplomacy comparable situations of minimum involvement and cost.
Within the framework of the problem of minimizing rather than maximizing our involvement, I am convinced that we can do far more than we have done, by a judicious diplomacy and more effective aid in Viet Nam. I would repeat the recommendations which I made in an earlier memorandum, dated September 20, 1961:2 [Page 469]
- (1)
- A Vietnamese foreign policy and propaganda program which hold out some hope of a unification of Viet Nam by means other than the sword;
- (2)
- A vast, coordinated effort in the field of economic development which bears a Vietnamese hallmark and our name in small print no matter how much we may contribute to it
- (3)
- A rapid introduction of democratic practices at the village and provincial level;
- (4)
- A dramatic and sincere effort to enlist Vietnamese intellectuals in all aspects of the government’s activities, primarily by the lifting of the shroud of fear which hangs over political life in Saigon and by acceptance of a genuine opposition in the National Assembly;
- (5)
- A campaign by Diem and his officials to develop close personal ties with the people by a continuous Johnson-like shirtsleeve campaign from one end of the country to the other.
It is readily apparent that the changes listed above are preponderantly those which must be initiated and pursued by Diem and the Vietnamese government. The U.S. mission in Saigon, however, will be a most significant factor in the situation. The following suggestions may be useful in extracting from the mission its greatest possible contributions to the making of these changes:
- (1)
- Appoint an Ambassador who is not a career-man but who is nevertheless knowledgeable in the affairs of the region. The post is one of high career risk and a scope of activity far broader than that normally associated with diplomatic relations. It is not the kind of job that can best be done by a regular foreign service officer or other careerist.
- (2)
- Shake-up the entire U.S. establishment in Saigon and try to cut its size as rapidly as possible. It would be wise to bring fresh blood not only to the heads but to the bodies of the Embassy, the I.C.A., U.S.I.S., MAAG and the C.I.A. and get them out of Saigon and into the field.
- (3)
- Establish a special unit in the State Department, responsible to you through the Secretary of State as the sole channel for the issuance of directives and the receipt of reports on Viet Nam for as long as the crisis continues. This would apply to directives and reports whether they involve the Embassy, MAAG, I.C.A., U.S.I.S. or whatever. This unit should be a planning and action body under your close control which supersedes the Far Eastern division of the Department insofar as Viet Nam is concerned. It should use that division rather than be used by it.
- (4)
- In Saigon, the Ambassador should have full control over all activities of all agencies in fact as well as in theory. This means that he must be the sole channel for the receipt of directives and the dispatch of reports. Most of all, it means that he must have firm control over all contact with the Vietnamese government.
I would add, only, that in present circumstances, I would suggest the greatest reticence in the commitment of U.S. combat forces to Viet Nam or any commitment to underwrite, with our [Page 470] military forces as a last resort, a military action throughout Southeast Asia by Asian SEATO forces. In present circumstances, it seems to me we must exercise every caution to avoid another Korean-type involvement on the Asian mainland. Such an involvement would appear to me to play completely into the hands of the Soviet Union, since it will get them off their present Chinese ideological hook and open all sorts of new prospects in the really decisive area of Germany and Europe. An involvement on our part can lead to four possible adverse results:
- (1)
- A fan-fare and then a retreat.
- (2)
- An indecisive and costly conflict along the Korean lines.
- (3)
- A major war with China while Russia stands aside.
- (4)
- A total world conflict.
Against these four adverse possible consequences, there is the bare possibility of one salutary outcome. U.S. combat forces (not SEATO allied forces) might provide that bare margin of effectiveness which would permit a solution of the guerrilla problem in South Viet Nam or prevent further encroachments southward-assuming of course that the Chinese Communists, let alone the Russians, do not become involved. Even then, we will have achieved a “victory” whose fruits, if we would conserve them, will cost us billions of dollars in military and aid expenditures over the years into the future.