Office of the Historian

197. Telegram From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to the Department of State1

Bangkok, October 27, 1961–9 p.m.

626. Sec State for Under Sec Johnson. Reference: Saigon 536.2 By way of Ewell’s daily summary3 I get impression that there may be a tendency to regard the concept of a flood relief task force as essentially a cover plan for the introduction of US troops into VN. Such is not my view. The flood in VN is a real emergency program, capable of giving real assistance to the VN authorities charged with relief measures as well as a military reinforcement to assist in safeguarding the area from a return of the Viet Cong who have fled before the high waters.

This concept does not amount to a cover as it undertakes to conceal nothing. It does give our forces a good reason for coming and the termination of flood relief, a matter at least of months, would give our forces a good reason for going. In the meantime they would have satisfied Diem’s request for troops with a commitment far smaller than that required to make a military or psychological impression if the announced purpose was merely to render aid to suppress the VC insurgency. If we come in for this latter purpose, we will have to talk in terms of the three divisions … .

I hope that thinking on the whole subject of aid for VN will not harden before my return. Behind each item contained in Saigon 536 is a number of considerations of considerable complexity which I would like to present personally before any decision is taken. I will complete my recommendations in Baguio and forward them about Nov 1. In the meantime I would urge immediate action to do the following:

(1)
Get best estimate of the flood problem and determine a line of possible US actions to assist. It may be desirable to send a team of experts from US for survey.
(2)
Determine availability of Army and Marine helicopter companies for prompt movement to VN. MAAG estimated requirement is about 64 cargo helicopters.
(3)
Ask Emb Saigon for report on status of follow-up actions being taken on subjects reported in Saigon 536 as outlined in Bangkok’s 146 to Saigon.4

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-2761. Top Secret. Repeated to Saigon for Nolting. The Department of State was asked also to pass for action to the White House personal for Bundy and Ewell.↩
  2. Document 190.↩
  3. Not further identified. Ewell, a member of Taylor’s staff, was presumably providing, through White House channels, a summary of daily international developments to the Taylor Mission.↩
  4. Document 196.↩