Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

189. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Viet-Nam (McGarr) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)¹

Saigon, October 24, 1961.

SGN 747. At a meeting with Taylor and the Ambassador at 0845, 24 October preparatory to an-0900 meeting with President Diem, I was handed a paper² on possible additional forms of cooperation between U.S. and GVN in view of Viet Cong activities and the recent Mekong Delta flood as basis for discussions. These were not in nature of formal recommendations but as time was very short, I commented on only two of the six points covered. Others such as additional helicopters to improve combat mobility, better intelligence by Joint Governmental action, preventing cross border infiltration, and emphasizing the nature of the threat here and to the world have all been covered in my correspondence with you over the past 14 months.

The first point was the introduction of military forces in the nature of a flood relief task force for relief and rehabilitation. This would have the advantage of withdrawal if desirable policy-wise after reconstruction period and would contain logistic, transportation, medical and combat troops. It was thought that the combat element considered would be approximately a Battle Group. I stated that with the known Viet Cong strength in III corps, the recent significant increase in incidents and the additional Viet Cong capability for further Viet Cong increase, I felt this strength inadequate especially as the non-combat units will probably be scattered in approximately thirty locations. When it was indicated that possibly some combat units might be used in the high plateau, I stated this would further fragment U.S. forces and render them vulnerable to successful attack by Viet Cong who have capability with strength in-country. I said I felt adequate forces must be provided to prevent this particularly since it appeared from his remarks that while most of the service forces were to be deployed in III CO UAAREA, possibly certain of combat forces might be used in the high plateau of II corps. He said it was my job to prevent fragmentation and that he would be disappointed in U.S. troops who were unable to protect themselves. I reminded him that careful arrangements would have to be worked out at governmental level to ensure that I had the requisite control and authority over the use of U.S. forces.

The above was followed by a brief discussion on the paragraph concerning a Joint-GVN team which would survey each province to make an overall determination on what was needed to put the whole house in order. This to include command arrangements counterinsurgency planning, supply and equipment for all Military and Para-military forces and the like. This is an extension of my previous recommendation to GVN following the significant Viet Cong success at Vinh Binh for Joint Group to inspect all static defenses countrywide. I said this was sound concept however that MAAG should not be responsible for “B” boards on RVNAF officers. I brought this up because Diem and Thaun have, particularly following a Viet Cong success, repeatedly downgraded their generals to me and this would afford them the opportunity to put the onus of getting rid of certain of them on MAAG. This would put MAAG in an intolerable position vis-a-vis the RVNAF Officer Corps. General Taylor did not answer but Ambassador Nolting agreed this was valid reasoning.

At this point, discussion was terminated in order to depart for meeting with Diem. When I said I would see them at palace, the Ambassador said in effect they had decided to keep meeting small and only “The Four of Them” would attend. I said that as American Military Advisor I recommended strongly that I go as most of the discussion would be about the military. General Taylor said I do not agree that you should go.

I then said to General Taylor, as Representative of the JCS in Vietnam, I recommend that I attend. General Taylor said this was a personal meeting with Diem and I was not to go. I answered it is your decision General.

Mainly, I am particularly concerned regarding local loss of prestige in eyes of GVN which as you know is most important here. This is meant only as background for your personal information

1. Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, 1961 Eyes Only Messages. Secret; Eyes Only. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text.
2. Not found, but the paper’s main points are outlined in Taylor’s telegram, Document 190.