181. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs (McConaughy)
to the Ambassador in Viet-Nam (Nolting)1
Washington, October 20,
1961.
Dear Fritz: In view of the recent rumors about
changes at the Palace … I thought it might be useful to bring up to date
the memo entitled “Suggested Contingency Plan” which John Steeves sent
to Durby under cover of his letter of April 13, 1961.2
The present memorandum is intended to replace the earlier one so that you
will only have one file for easy (and possibly urgent) reference.
Naturally the suggestions which follow are subject to your comment which
we would very much value.
I would like to take this opportunity to tell you how pleased we are by
the sensible, steady and conscientious embassy which you are carrying on
in Saigon under the most difficult circumstances. I think the quality of
steadiness is particularly important in our relations with the
Vietnamese at this time.
Please convey my greetings to your staff and their families. I am very
proud of them all. If there are any personal or professional problems on
which we can be of assistance please be sure to let us know.
Very sincerely,
[Page 408]
PS—Some of the statements in the enclosed memorandum will be obvious
to you, but will provide clarification to high level persons in
Washington who may wish to read it.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State3
Washington, October 20,
1961.
SUGGESTED CONTINGENCY PLAN
The knowledge of the existence of this memorandum is to be restricted
to the smallest possible number of persons. It is not an
Instruction. It is designed for reference by the Chief of Mission,
but is not binding on him.
It is suggested that it be kept available and that it be reviewed
with the Department whenever considered necessary by the Chief of
Mission either through official informal correspondence with the
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs or by telegram if
necessary.
The United States continues to give President Diem full support by
every appropriate means. For so long as Diem exercises effective
control over the GVN, the US should
take no action, overt or covert, which would give any encouragement
to his opponents. During a possible coup the American Embassy should
continue to support Diem fully until a decision is reached by the
Chief of Mission that the time for change has arrived.4
If in the best. judgment of the Chief of Mission the situation arises
where Diem has lost effective control, the United States should be
prepared to quickly support the non-Communist person or group who
then appears most capable of establishing effective control over the
GVN. The nature of US support in
such a situation should be strong enough to achieve rapid results
but not so blatant as to make such a person or group appear as a US
puppet. This will require the most careful handling.
While the final choice should not be frozen in advance, since it is
impossible to foresee a situation which may arise, it is believed it
would be wise if the Embassy prepared and kept current through [Page 409] regular consultation with
the Department a list of persons and groups who might be acceptable.
This might save priceless time in the event of a crisis and reduce
the chances of mistakes or vacillation. Preliminary views follow:
- 1.
- The choice should be limited to persons in Viet-Nam on the
grounds that they would be the only ones who would have any
chance of rallying support in the face of the probability
that the Communists would move fast.5
- 2.
- The first priority should go to civilians within the
Government with emphasis on US backing for a constitutional
solution. Before abandoning Diem every effort should be made
to consider how he might be reestablished even if he
appeared temporarily to have lost control.6
- 3.
- If the Chief of Mission should decide that Diem had lost
control, the first decision would be whether to support Vice
President Tho as the constitutional
successor. A recent Embassy telegram (Embtel 516 dated October
207) describes him as lucid,
having detailed knowledge and as being close to the people.
It would be necessary to persuade Tho
and persuade the military to support him. This might be
achieved through General Duong Van Minh who is an old friend
of Tho’s (they were cellmates in a French jail about 1946)
and who is well thought of in the army. It would be
important to hold off the President’s family. It might be
well for Nhu to take a trip.
- 4.
- Failing Tho, a second choice might be Nguyen dinh
Thuan who is
increasingly widely known as a result of the extensive
representation which he does for Diem and who has preserved
good relations with the Vietnamese military dating back to
his days as a civilian official in the Vietnamese Department
of Defense.8 Both Thuan and Tho are
capable men, experienced in the Vietnamese Government and
friendly to Americans. Although Thuan is not in the constitutional line of
succession, this would probably not be a major problem in
the present crisis situation.
- 5.
- Constitutionally, if Tho did not take
office, President of the National Assembly Truong vinh Le
would be next in line (Article 34) and would, according to
the Constitution, preside for two months pending elections.
He is dedicated, but has little public appeal and does not
seem capable of firm imaginative leadership. At best he
would be a temporary figurehead needing strong military
support and a competent cabinet.
- 6.
- Other possible civilian candidates within the Government
might be Bui van Long, Secretary of the Interior, Vo van
Hai, the President’s Chief of Cabinet or Tran van Dinh if he
were in Viet Nam (he is now at the Vietnamese Embassy in
Washington).
- 7.
- Another possibility which might be preferable paragraphs 5
and 6 would be a military caretaker government under General
Duang van Minh.9
- 8.
-
The strength of the Communist challenge in Viet Nam
would appear to rule out a Government of anti-Communist
oppositionists. These men are disunited, inexperienced
and do not have a wide following. It would seem almost
impossible for them to organize an effective Government
before the Communists took over.
Giving U.S. support to men now in the Vietnamese
Government would reduce the risks of a dangerous
interregnum and would probably be acceptable to most
influential Vietnamese who do not appear to object so
much to their present Government as to Diem’s alleged
inability to lead it effectively.10
- 9.
- It would also seem best to rule out any possibility of a
Government under Diem’s unpopular brothers, even if Luyen
were front man. However, it might be wise to suggest that
Brother Ngo dinh Can be left temporarily in control of his
satrapy at Hue.
- 10.
- Meanwhile we face the very difficult problem of Diem’s
leadership. Most of those close to him do not now appear to
think he is sufficiently effective. Diem seems unwilling to
listen to advice on this subject. The U.S. is committed to
support the Government of Viet-Nam of which Diem is
President. It should be assumed that any U.S. initiative to
remove Diem would become known and would be resisted
ferociously by Diem and his family. But if it is clear that
he can no longer obtain the effective collaboration of the
members of his own government, we shall have to consider
what we should and can do. We presume you will have
discussed this with General Taylor and that he will have your views. We
will discuss this with him when he returns. In the
meanwhile, in view of the reported decrease in support which
Diem seems to be receiving even from his closest advisers,
we would appreciate your thoughts in this regard by
cable.
The best U.S. approach would thus appear to be to support Diem so
long as the Chief of Mission believes his control is effective and
to use our influence with him to make it more effective. In this
connection the Embassy might propose a draft of a letter from [Page 411] President Kennedy to President Diem based on
General Taylor’s
recommendations. Such a draft could state that in the interest of
the defense of Viet-Nam and of our heavy commitment there the U.S.
considers it essential for President Diem to create an effective
Internal Security Council with real executive responsibilities
headed by a person of stature who would be loyal to Diem and
respected by his colleagues. All government business would have to
pass through the Internal Security Council. We should also request
him to confirm to us the name of his successor. Other
recommendations could include a real unification of intelligence
functions. To obtain Diem’s real concurrence it would have to be
made clear that these moves were essential parts of the
Counterinsurgency Plan which Diem agreed to carry out. It would also
have to be implied quite understandably that if he did not, we would
have to reconsider our policy towards VietNam. Such a letter would
require a prior decision that we would be prepared if necessary to
run the risk of suddenly withdrawing our support from Diem and of
almost simultaneously throwing our weight behind the most likely
replacement. Such a move would require preparation, secrecy,
surprise, and toughness.
