177. Memorandum for the Record1
SUBJECT
- Meeting held at Field Command Headquarters, ARVN, on Thursday, 19 October 1961 on the Occasion of the Visit of General Maxwell D. Taylor to Viet-Nam (the meeting was conducted in French)
ATTENDANCE
- General Maxwell D. Taylor, Special Military Advisor to the President of the United States
- Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr, Chief, MAAG, Vietnam
- Major General Duong Van Minh, Commanding General, ARVN Field Command
- Brigadier General Le Van Kim, Deputy Commanding General, ARVN Field Command
- Colonel Thomas A. McCrary, U.S. MAAG Senior Advisor to ARVN Field Command
After an exchange of amenities, General Taylor told General Minh that his visit to ARVN Field Command was in the nature of a courtesy call and that he hoped to speak with General Minh a number of times before his departure.2 He was sure that General Minh was aware of the reason for his trip to Vietnam-of his ambition to study the problems of the country and to help find a solution to them. Speaking as one soldier to another, he asked General Minh for his views on the guerrilla situation, how he could help to solve the problem and what General Minh’s estimate of the present situation was as compared with conditions which existed two years ago. He told General Minh that he found it hard to judge [Page 396] and asked if, in the opinion of General Minh, the progress made by the communists was at a normal rate or if he felt that the tempo had increased sharply.
General Minh replied that, first of all, he considered the visit of General Taylor to be a great honor. He knew that General Taylor had spoken with all of his higher authorities and already knew much of what was happening. Speaking as a soldier, he wanted General Taylor to know that he considered the situation to be extremely grave. Not only had the Viet Cong grown alarmingly, but, worse, more and more, the Vietnamese Armed Forces were losing the support of the population. In reply to General Taylor’s question as to why he felt this, General Minh said that he had known Viet-Nam under President Diem since 1954. The intelligence provided by the population was a guide to their attitude. In 1955 and 1956, they were full of enthusiasm and the spirit of cooperation. Now the population was giving trouble. When General Taylor asked if this was because of a loss of confidence and whether it was restricted to threatened areas, General Minh replied that the attitude prevailed in all areas-Saigon, for instance, could certainly not be considered to be a menaced area.
General Taylor then told General Minh that what he was saying was important and asked him if he had any ideas as to how confidence could be restored. Would success in war do it? General Minh replied that the government had to strive to be better understood-there should be no favorite groups or classes (he invited General Taylor to send out special teams to check). There should be no distinctions of people either because of race or religion. Under present conditions certain religions felt that they were less favored. General Taylor asked if there was a clear division along religious lines. General Minh replied that, although he, himself, was in favor of all religions, the government conferred too many favors on one and gave nothing to others.
Another situation which General Minh thought needed correction was the system of selecting Province Chiefs. He cited his own province as an example. One Chief appointed to the province was a contractor from Hue with no administrative experience. In addition, he spoke to the people in the language of Hue and this antagonized them. After two years of no success, another young man, from the South, was selected-a young Captain, made Major for the job—whom General Minh had known earlier. In the General’s opinion, it had been necessary to stretch a point to make him a Corporal. In answer to General Taylor’s questions, General Minh explained that nearly all Province Chiefs were military. Most were Captains—promoted to Major for the job and promoted again to Lieutenant Colonel within two years. Their authority stemmed directly from the [Page 397] President and they commanded all troops in the province except those on major operations. There were, in effect, two chains of command. General McGarr had fought hard for a single chain of command which had been agreed and which had worked-but only for several months. Now, old habits had returned. The Province Chief was always in command of the Civil Guard and of the local Self Defense Corps forces. Though the Civil Guard had been officially placed under the Ministry of Defense, they could not be touched by the military. When, acting on the guidance of General McGarr, an attempt was made to go on the offensive, it was found to be impossible to obtain the cooperation required for the establishment of security measures in areas which had been swept. There was no help from the Civil Guard. General Minh invited General Taylor to talk to General Don, Commanding General of I Corps, where the Civil Guard was organized and employed in a special way. General Minh went on to say that many things needed to be changed within the Army as well as out-morale had to be raised.
In reply to General Taylor’s question as to whether the Presidential declaration of a State of National Emergency meant that all resources of the Nation would be united in the struggle against communism, General Minh shrugged, agreeing that such a united effort was necessary-that complete coordination of all elements of the government was a must-but many changes would be needed to make this a reality.
As long ago as last February, General McGarr had insisted that a National Plan to combat the insurgency was required. General McGarr added that he had been pushing for this ever since. General Minh, with the help of General Kim, had been working on a military plan which was just about completed. Only last week, according to General Kim, General Minh had requested that plans of other agencies be made available to him for comparison and coordination-he had not yet received any cooperation-and was not too confident of ever getting any.
In reply to General Taylor’s question as to who in the government other than the President, was responsible for a united plan, General Minh said that he thought that the Secretary at the Presidency, Mr. Thuan, should be-but that he was faced with the same difficulties as others were.
When General Taylor told General Minh that he should not be discouraged, General Minh reminded him that he (General Taylor) had not been faced with a war problem like that in Viet-Nam and had been able to retire when he chose to do so. He was not completely discouraged but he was happy to have General Kim with him-they sustained each other.
[Page 398]In answer to General Taylor’s question, he said that if he had the authority to do what he wanted to do, he would simply try to be impartial. To which, General Taylor commented that one was never intentionally unjust. General Minh smiled and said that he understood.
General Minh went on to say that, in general, the Vietnamese do not like the Communists, but some are allowed to fight them and others are not. He had fought against the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai, now these people were ready to die in the struggle against the Communists. The sects no longer existed as they were before, but it was hard to exterminate “what is in the head”-they persisted as religions. The earlier struggle against them was really a fight to exterminate a group of bandits masquerading under the name of the Hoa Hao. General Taylor suggested that the same tactics should be used against the Viet Cong.
(At this point, General Kim motioned that no further notes should be taken.)
General Minh then said that he considered himself to be a young military officer in a young army. He felt that the military needed prestige and leadership, and the assistance of superior authorities to obtain what they needed. He felt that not only was this not true-there seemed to be a desire to downgrade the military.
General Minh told General Taylor that he was happy to be able to speak to him frankly. Others would also, but only if it could be tete-a-tete or in a very small group. There was a feeling that they were on a plane in a dive, and that they would soon reach a point where it would have to be levelled off or it would be too late.
The meeting ended with General Taylor’s expression of his hope to see General Minh again before his departure.
- Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-637-71. Secret. A note on the source text reads: “This memorandum is based on interpreter’s translated, fragmentary notes, expanded from memory. It is in no sense a stenographic record of the meeting and is neither official or approved.” A memorandum of a conversation on the same day between Taylor and Lieutenant General Le Van Ty, Chief of the Joint General Staff,RVNAF, is ibid.↩
- No record was found of any subsequent Taylor-Minh conversations during the visit.↩