Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

171. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 16, 1961, 1 p.m.

495. Pursuant Embtel 488² following analysis and preliminary recommendations submitted.

In recent requests for additional US commitments to SVN Diem’s govt is acting in light of present security conditions in SVN and their estimate of increasing pressures in future. There is no evidence of panic, and fact is that Diem and his govt, if they do not win out, are so committed that they will have to go down fighting or be ousted by coup d’etat. Recent requests for additional US help have come as result calculations to bolster GVN against following: evidence of increased Communist determination and accelerated organization in SVN, the Laotian situation as seen by GVN at present and potential infiltrations, GVN concern about a possible Korean-type attack, present size of SVN armed forces and time required to recruit, equip, and train additional forces, and time required to bring into effect crash economic-social programs. Diem has given up, at least temporarily, some of his basic philosophy on how to win struggle by asking, first for a bilateral security treaty with US, and secondly and perhaps alternatively for the dispatch of US combat forces (even though ostensibly for guard duty, not for combat unless attacked).

Obvious first question from US point of view is whether or not world balance of power is sufficiently affected by what happens in SVN to cause us to take measures necessary to prevent loss of SVN to Communists. In light of factors as seen from here, physical, moral, and psychological, answer would appear to be clearly affirmative.

As previously reported, a major factor causing increased GVN anxiety and leading to substantial additional requests of US by GVN in last week is situation in Laos and GVN view that approaching solution there is going to transfer communist pressure and force from that country to SVN. Not only GVN, but also ARVN (at least its leaders) strongly hold this view. To what extent it is a factor in public morale is not yet clear. This mission has already (Embtel 373³ and others) submitted its recommendations on this subject as it affects SVN. All indications, however, point to a negotiated solution in Laos, eventuating in a neutral govt under Souvanna Phouma. The main focus of US attention and diplomatic endeavor seems now to be on how to assure strict neutrality, including the prevention of the use of Laotian territory for Communist aggressive purposes against Laos’ neighbors, by means of a proper composition of a Laotian Govt and an international treaty. I should point out in this connection that the GVN cannot be brought to believe (at least, I cannot bring them to believe) that paper guarantees on this score, plus any ICC mechanism comprising Poland, India, and Canada, will in fact protect SVN’s western border. They have had similar guarantees in their own country, and these have not worked. All evidence we have here points to conclusion that, if the Communist strategists are willing to settle for a neutral Laos at this time, it is for the purpose of concentrating their attack upon SVN, utilizing a neutral Laos for the purpose to whatever extent proves necessary. We have, however, done our best to persuade Diem and others that US policy vis-à-vis Laos is not inconsistent with our determination to protect SVN. We have had a certain measure of success in this, although one should not assume that their failure strongly to dissent, here or in Geneva, indicates consent or even concurrence on the part of these people. They do not think it is polite or productive to argue, but they do make up their own minds and determine their own course of action on the basis of their own judgment. They have made up their minds that the presently-envisioned settlement [in] Laos is going to make things harder for them, and they are now trying to build hedges against that.

This is major reason for their request for US reinforcements, involving Diem’s breaking away, in part at least, from his long-held belief that a victory over communism here, if it is to be enduring, must be achieved by Vietnamese sacrifice and manpower alone. In requesting US reinforcements (and thinking about inviting Chinese), he has adopted an expedient which runs against his own convictions, and he is apparently willing to accept the attendant diminution of his own stature as an independent and self-reliant national leader.

If, then, a major cause of the deterioration in SVN cannot be attacked in Laos (or the proposed remedy there cannot be convincingly sold to the GVN), our alternative is to go all out to reinforce this country internally. This would seem to involve even faster, more far-reaching and more expensive measures than those now in train or in prospect. The measures can, I think, be considered under two headings-those designed to protect from external attack and/or large-scale infiltrations, and those designed to strengthen internal cohesion, to create national will and unity necessary to overcome present large-scale guerrilla activity.

Under measures against external attack, following have been and should be further considered:

1. Means to seal 17th parallel and borders with Laos and Cambodia; defoliated strip, barbed wire (electrified?), mines, patrols, posts, other means. Use of US combat engineer battalions to help with construction.

2. US combat forces, as requested, to be stationed near 17th parallel and possibly other places (towns) in high plateau near Lao border, to free ARVN troops for counter-guerrilla action.

3. Additional fighter-bomber aircraft; additional transport aircraft; best means of supplementing shortage Vietnamese pilots and maintenance personnel (US civilian-contract personnel for non-combat operations commends itself to US).

4. Use of forces other SEATO countries (possibly Philippines or Thailand) for above purposes.

With any such far-reaching measures on US side, I think that we have right and obligation to assure Diem takes extensive steps on his side to strengthen his govt politically. These measures would relate to (a) organization, (b) rallying mass support, and (c) unifying local elements (i.e., educated class) in support of govt. Steps in these three areas would to some extent be overlapping since improving governmental organization likely for example have favorable effect other areas, while at same time being important in itself for efficient prosecution of war against VC.

List our suggestions these three areas being further refined. While not complete or unalterable, they do indicate some useful steps which we believe should be taken in both Diem’s interest and our interest of preserving free VN, under following headings:

A. Govt organization at both national and local levels.

B. Mass support measures.

C. Gaining broader support.

D. Educational class.

E. Tax reform.

F. Financial reform.

None of these areas are new, and many have been previously tried, with some, but not rapid enough, results. A very careful balance has to be struck between the ideal and the possible, assuming Diem’s continuance at the helm and given his extraordinary blend of quality, fortitude, deep conviction, determination, lack of political instinct, lack of organizing and administrative ability and many others.

Your subsequent message this subject⁴ delayed in transmission and just arrived. Will be prepared to discuss thoroughly.

Nolting

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/10-1661. Secret; Niact. Repeated to CINCPAC for General Taylor, Geneva for Harriman, Taipei, Bangkok, Vientiane, Paris, London, and Phnom Penh.
2. Dated October 13. (Ibid., 751K.5-MSP/10-1361)
3. Document 133.
4. Not further identified.