123. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)1

JCSM-583-61

SUBJECT

  • North Vietnam
1.
Reference is made to memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 19 July 1961,2 subject as above, which requests the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the consequences and effectiveness of certain United States courses of action against North Vietnam.
2.
The Viet Cong receives its support by way of North Vietnam, about half of the total being brought in over inland trails and the other half being landed along the coast from junks. A large proportion of the support for communist aggression in all of Southeast Asia passes through North Vietnam.
3.
It is estimated that successful interdiction of the communist logistic support passing through North Viet-Nam would facilitate military control of the Viet Cong and the maintenance of a favorable logistic balance over communist-supported forces in Southeast Asia.
4.
The United States has the capability to substantially cut the flow of communist military support passing through North Vietnam, if and when it is decided to commit United States forces openly to this operation. Formal commitment of United States forces in this manner would probably generate Communist Chinese overt countermeasures, the magnitude of which would be determined by the degree to which Communist China desired to become openly committed to aggression in Southeast Asia and subject herself to further countermeasures.
5.
In event the United States does not desire to commit its own forces openly to interdiction, there are covert, unconventional and guerrilla-type operations, as well as other measures, which can be made more effective.
6.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the assistance of CINCPAC, are investigating as a matter of priority the entire problem of interdicting support for the communist effort in Southeast Asia, together with the various means available and in sight for accomplishing this interdiction. Examples of specific lines of endeavor being pursued or investigated are: [Page 284]
a.
Obtaining better intelligence on the nature and scope of the interdiction problem.
b.
Training and equipping of the South Viet-Nam junk fleet has been accelerated. Development of an increased capability for the interdiction of North Viet-Nam imports and exports by all of South Vietnam’s armed forces is being investigated. Unconventional operations are being studied as well as conventional operations to accomplish this interdiction.
c.
Examining such nonmilitary measures as offering rewards to communist ship masters and fishing boat captains to destroy their cargoes or divert them to Free World ports.
d.
Accelerating United States research and development of more effective weapons, techniques and tactics, unconventional as well as conventional, for interdiction of communist support to aggression world-wide; exploiting modern technologies and, where appropriate, precedents already set by the enemy in unconventional aggression. In this regard, a development and research group has recently been established in South Viet-Nam to perform this mission with regard to the problems in that area.
e.
Examining all possibilities for new legal interpretations within the framework of modern circumstances, which would facilitate the problem of conventional interdiction. The present general interpretations of maritime law give legalistic protection to communist support of insurgency movements by sea. Legally, such activity on the high seas can be performed with relative impunity.
f.
Increasing the unconventional and covert capabilities of United States forces in the area to interdict support for the communist effort in Southeast Asia.
g.
Preventing the employment of Free World shipping in support of such distribution points of communist aggression as North Viet-Nam and Cuba.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Vietnam. Top Secret. Stamped on the source text are the words: “SecDef has seen.”
  2. Document 99.