Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

101. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)¹

Washington, July 21, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Vietnam Force Increase

This is in response to your query about the 100,000-man increase requested by the President of Viet-Nam for the Vietnamese Armed Forces. The matter is under study in Defense now, at staff levels. Since it hasn’t been before the Secretary or the JCS for a determination, the most helpful thing to you might be to see some of the staff considerations. After discussing this with Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, I obtained some of the thinking in Defense on this subject and am passing it along to you, informally, prior to a substantive Defense position. The two staff officers most concerned with this subject are Col. Kent in ISA and Col. Levy in the Joint Staff.

Force Levels

Increases in Vietnam’s force levels have been discussed as being in three phases. Based on an authorized level of 150,000, the phases were increases of 20,000 (to 170,000), 30,000 (to 200,000), and concurrently the 100,000 (adding to the 170,000 to make 270,000). The only approved increase, to date, was the 20,000.

Although authorized strength of the RVNAF (Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces) was 150,000, funds were never provided for this size force by either the U.S. or Vietnam. So, the force level in fact was approximately 142,000. When the 20,000 increase was approved, the Vietnamese started building up their force. They have now reached approximately 150,000. Inductions are at the rate of about 4,000 per month, in addition to about 2,000 conscripts and volunteers each month to offset normal attrition. It is estimated that the 20,000 increase won’t be absorbed until December 1961.

The second phase, an increase of 30,000 (170,000 to 200,000) has received careful consideration by JCS and CINCPAC. Both agreed in principle that the increase would probably be required but withheld outright approval subject to continuing assessment of the situation in Vietnam, the training of the 20,000 increase, including officers and NCO’s and the use made of these additional personnel. If the continued assessment indicates further increases up to 200,000 are required, the decision should be made in time to permit the second phase to smoothly follow the first without interruption in the induction of personnel. Estimates of the time required to field this 30,000 increase range from 8 to 18 months, due to the many uncontrollable factors involved. It is likely that a year’s time will be involved. During this period there will be ample time to assess the requirement for a further additional increase of up to 70,000 making a possible total of 270,000.

Thus, the actual problem of the increase from 200,000 to 270,000 will not be ready for physical solution in Viet-Nam until about 18 months from now. CINCPAC has indicated that he does not think there is the need or justification for such an increase at this time. The feeling is that there are a number of months available, during the build-up to 200,000, to make a continual assessment of the capability of the RVNAF to obtain, train, and use officers and men. A timely and justifiable decision could be made during this period as to the necessity for and size of the increase

Some Factors

President Diem, Secretary Thuan, and some of the U.S. staff in MAAG-Vietnam are looking for a “breakthrough” of the problem of the current Viet Cong guerrilla threat by the proposed force increases. About 75 970 of the RVNAF is now required for these operations, with units having had combat missions for many months now (since 1959) without relief nor with a chance to have sorely needed training. They look for sufficient troops to dominate the enemy, liquidate him quickly, and to give a spirited lift to troop morale and combat effectiveness by rotation of units out of the line for rest and needed training.

Troops have been engaged extensively on operations in which months have now been stretched into years of strain, fatigue, and casualties. Morale and efficiency is lowered as a result. Major Millett, a Medal of Honor man who has just returned from MAAG Vietnam, made a point of this when he talked to the Viet-Nam Task Force in Washington,² underscoring the fact that his Purple Hearts were earned only after fatigue had set in after months of continual combat.

Lack of the prospect of success, of turning the tide, is a dangerous morale problem. It generates the atmosphere in which coups are likely. Added to this is the fact that, in a country where family relationships have deep meaning, there has been an extended separation now of soldiers from their families.

The “breakthrough” is seen as needed to give a sharp set-back to the Communist threat, and to give Viet-Nam a fighting chance to get set for future rounds with the enemy. The Republic of Viet-Nam will celebrate the beginning of its seventh year of independence this Fall. It had 8 years of war during the Franco-Vietminh struggle after the fighting of World War II, one year of intense civil strife (during 1954-55), and six years of increasing guerrilla conflict as an independent nation. It is badly in need of a breathing spell.

After the Geneva Accords of 1954, the Communists in North Viet-Nam modernized and strengthened their armed forces to about 380,000, the largest armed force in Southeast Asia. The threat posed by this force has grown as areas of Laos have fallen to the skillfully combined Pathet Lao-Vietminh forces, opening new routes of movement on the Laos-Vietnam border along the western flank of Vietnam. While coping with the internal problem of Viet Cong insurgency, this external threat cannot be ignored; the Communists have given the external threat added meaning by announcing that an enclave would be opened in South Viet-Nam for a “Peoples Liberation” government, and have indicated this would be aided by armed force across the border.

The territory of South Viet-Nam has about 66,000 square miles. About 20% of this is dominated by the Viet Cong, and combat requirements for liquidating the Viet Cong are high. Another 40% has Viet Cong activity, ranging from small hit-and-run guerrilla bands hiding out in jungles and mountains to small teams of subversive agents; in this area, combat requirements are far less. The exact combat requirements are not precisely clear, but certainly appear to be beyond present capabilities. As the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense forces are improved, as the RVNAF forces are increased, the “breakthrough” might well occur before the 270,000 level is reached.

One facet of the force increase problem is the availability of Officers and NCOs. There is some shortage now. The demand for high quality leadership will be sharpened as troop strengths are increased. Training centers are reported to be crowded and there are many problems growing out of the difficulty to provide trainers without placing unacceptable demands on operational units.

The arithmetic of force increases has been based largely on divisions, (with the division being “papa and mama” to its regiments, battalions, and companies however they are detached for combat assignments). An RVNAF force of 270,000 is essentially a 15 division force. It would permit 2 more divisions in the Northern Corps area, 3 more in the Central Corps area, one more in the South, and two in the General Reserve.

It is believed that four divisions are required to provide adequate delay and the defense potential envisioned in the Hue-Danang (Tourane) area, and to conduct effective counter-insurgency operations (reportedly 8,000 Montagnards are being trained in North Viet-Nam and Laos for guerrilla operations in the High Plateau of South Vietnam, and there are records of 700 infiltrators per month). The fall of Laos has placed Route #9 in Communist hands, which flanks this area and gives the RVNF commander the task of delaying from both North and West, and then conducting the defense of Danang.

The High Plateau area is critical and the key terrain in the defense of South Vietnam. This area is vulnerable to attack by forces from a Pathet Lao controlled flanking position, in the Plateau de Bolovens of Laos on the West and Northwest, by forces from the East and Northeast by-passing Danang, and by infiltration. Enemy forces attaining control of the High Plateau area are in a position to drive South to the final objective of Saigon. Four divisions are believed required to secure this area against overt or covert attack.

The East coastal plain, south of the Hue-Danang area, requires one division to secure the Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang area against attack from the North and West and to provide the nucleus for determined defense in this area in case the High Plateau is lost. This division should provide surveillance, protection of lines of communications, conduct counter-insurgency operations and reinforce other areas as required. It should be assigned to the Corps controlling units on the High Plateau.

To conduct the defense and counterinsurgency operations in the Saigon-Delta area requires four divisions. The General Reserve would also initially be positioned in this area. A General Reserve of one division plus the division-equivalent Airborne Brigade would also be stationed initially in the Saigon area. Additional forces may be available from other areas or from the General Reserve if any enemy attack progressed to a degree of providing a major threat.

1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-27-71. Top Secret. Signed “Ed”. Initialed by Taylor with the notation “To SE Asia file.” Copies were sent to McNamara and Gilpatric.
2. The minutes of the July 5 Task Force meeting, during which Millett made his presentation, are in Department of State, Viet-Nam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, Minutes of TF Meetings.