Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

204. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

REAT MC–17 (Taiwan)

Taipei, October 22, 1958, 7 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary
• Mr. Robertson
• Ambassador Drumright
• President Chiang Kai-shek
• Ambassador Yeh

SUBJECTS

• Communiqué
• Defense of Quemoy
• Use of Nuclear Weapons

(Note: See also REAT MC–13)¹

Ambassador Yeh opened the conversation by asserting that rumors of a “rift” between the Republic of China and United States were circulating in press circles. Mr. Robertson stated that he had spiked these rumors at the conference he had held during the afternoon for the press.²

Secretary Dulles referred to the desirability of the issuance of a joint communiqué on conclusion of the talks and said that Ambassador Drumright had handed a proposed draft³ to Foreign Minister Huang when he had seen the Minister earlier in the afternoon. He hoped that the Chinese side would study the draft and make any suggestions it deemed advisable. Ambassador Yeh observed that he thought the Foreign Minister would have some suggestions in connection with Paragraph 6 of the draft communiqué.⁴ President Chiang observed humorously that he could not read the English language, but understood that Mr. Dulles had prepared the draft joint communiqué, and if that were so, it “must be good”.

Secretary Dulles invited President Chiang’s views as to how to proceed henceforth with the discussions; he expressed the view that it might be necessary to hold a long meeting the next morning.

President Chiang observed that it was possible that Chinese Communists had resumed firing on Kinmen as a salute or token of welcome to Secretary Dulles. The President went on to say that the present Communist pattern of operations will probably continue, that is, firing awhile and stop and then resume firing. The President regarded this as a typical Communist way of attempting to paralyze the morale of the opposing side by tightening the grip on the opponent’s nerves and then loosening up. In the long run, if the Communists are allowed to alternate hold-fire with shelling, the Republic of China side will suffer more than is commonly realized. The effect on the general morale of the people, the economy, et cetera, would be adverse. The Communists employ two tactics, “fight and talk, talk and fight, fire and cease-fire”. The President described these as part of the tactics of the cold war.

Continuing, the President said he hoped that Secretary Dulles would find time to study the military aspects of the situation. The Republic of China, he observed, must find some way to strengthen its defenses—military and civilian—so as to offset the possible effects of Communist tactics on the morale of the population and the armed forces. The President said that when the Communists announced their first ceasefire he had sent representatives to Kinmen to inquire how the defenders felt about the cessation of firing. The reply was that the defenders preferred a straight fight to “stop and start” fighting. The President added that this attitude was especially true when the Communists resorted to the use of propaganda appeals over their loudspeakers. These Communist tactics wear down the nerve of the defenders and have an adverse effect on the defending forces. Some of his forces on Kinmen, the President observed, feel as though they were in prison. Alternation of fighting with cessation of fighting and the tension of waiting for resumption of the attack are particularly tiring and wear down troops, the President observed. The President said if the Communists employ these tactics for three or four months, they will have a cumulative bad effect on the defenders.

At this point Secretary Dulles asked what steps the President proposed to take to cope with this situation. The President replied that the most effective immediate method would be to strengthen the defenses with more guns so that the enemy positions could be silenced. Secretary Dulles responded that the United States is considering the provision of more guns, adding, however, that he knew of no one in the U.S. military establishment who believed that conventional weapons could be used to knock out deeply emplaced guns. Only nuclear guns could do that job effectively. The Secretary then asked the President whether he wanted the United States to use nuclear weapons.

The President replied that he believed that it would not be necessary to use nuclear weapons; however, he believed that the use of tactical atomic weapons might be advisable. In response to this suggestion, the Secretary observed that there is no tactical atomic weapon in existence which could be used at Kinmen to knock out enemy gun emplacements that would not have the power of the Hiroshima or Nagaski bombs. The use of such a weapon at Kinmen would kill millions of people. There would be a heavy fissionable fall-out if bombs exploded in or on the ground. The danger lies not in the size of the bomb but in how it is exploded. If an atomic bomb is exploded on or in the ground, then there would inevitably be a heavy loss of human life. On the other hand if an atomic bomb was exploded in the air, the explosion would have no effect on gun positions.

The President observed that he was neither an artillery nor a nuclear expert. He accordingly suggested that this problem be left for study. He said that what he wanted to do was to stress the importance of finding a way to deter the Communist tactic of alternating fire with ceasefire. His forces at Kinmen had been allowed to suffer too long. Their patience would wear out, they would lose their martial spirit, or would attempt to retaliate against the enemy or create disturbances or trouble. In reply, the Secretary observed that aerial bombing and artillery bombardment are not effective and are like using a pea gun to attack a stone wall. The President said he agreed that air bombardment is no good. He then said he wanted to restress the importance of the psychological or morale impact on the troops at Kinmen. In other words, some positive action is needed to maintain their spirit and morale. At this point, the President said that he is not familiar with nuclear physics and would not have an appreciation of the effect of A fall-out and other aspects of nuclear bombing.

The Secretary said that to knock out guns in and around Kinmen would probably kill very many⁵ people. In response to this statement, the President said that as a matter of principle, he would not want to use nuclear weapons if their use would start a world war or involve the United States in large-scale hostilities. In such contingencies, he would say that they should not be used. At this point the President said he wanted to mention again the fact that he had been unable to find a solution to the Kinmen problem. Accordingly, he would like to have American experts go into the problem. Secretary Dulles responded that there is no satisfactory way to take out Communist guns by use of conventional weapons; only nuclear weapons had this capacity. The use of nuclear weapons would involve Taiwan and if nuclear weapons were used to attack Taiwan, there would be nothing left of Taiwan.⁶

At this point the President observed that the Republic of China might be obliged to initiate and sustain bombing of lines of communication to stop the influx of supplies to the Communists in the Amoy area. In reply, Secretary Dulles said that the United States hopes to find and make available certain artillery which could help the defenders to some extent; in this context he would mention guns which would be capable of blasting causeways, bridges, et cetera. In response, the President said he hoped that the problem could be studied. Secretary Dulles said that he had discussed the problem with General Taylor that morning, adding that it would be studied by the United States military authorities., The President said there was one important thing to remember. The United States tells the Republic of China not to do this or that, but there is a limit to what can be told to the Kinmen defenders. If their patience is too sorely tried, they might get out of control. In response the Secretary said that the best solution would be to have an armistice as in Korea and Germany. The trouble here is that there is a little fighting going on at Kinmen sporadically. The real problem is how to stop the fighting and have this situation maintained on a long term basis.

At this point the President asked to be excused to greet guests who had arrived for the dinner party to be given in the Secretary’s honor.⁷

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1136. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Drumright. The conversation was held at President Chiang’s residence.
1. A summary memorandum of the conversation by Greene. (Ibid.)
2. The transcript of the background briefing which Robertson had held that afternoon is ibid.)
3. Attachment 1 to a memorandum for the record by Greene; see Document 208.
4. For paragraph 6 of the draft communiqué, see Document 208.
5. Another copy of the memorandum of conversation reads “twenty million” rather than “very many.” (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)
6. Greene’s summary of the conversation states that Dulles subsequently authorized Drumright to arrange for an authoritative military briefing on this subject for Chiang.
7. Greene’s summary of the conversation states: “After dinner there was a brief discussion of the proposed communiqué; the Chinese made a number of suggestions, particularly with reference to paragraph six.”